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Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) traditionally have a mission to provide credit to 
the poorest of the poor and promote sustainable pathways towards a better 
tomorrow. Importantly, promoting financial inclusion by providing services as 
alternatives to the informal financial sector of moneylenders, MFIs assist in 
economic and social growth. 
In Nepal, the increasing demand for cash to meet social and religious obligations in 
largely subsistent village economies is increasingly supported by short-term 
seasonal migration. The removal of working-age males from communities produces 
a range of unanticipated and not necessarily desirable outcomes. MFIs, it is 
suggested, can ameliorate the problem and positively contribute to improved 
sustainable development outcomes. Potentially, significant gains in outreach are 
realistically achievable in the context of remote village settings where there is 
currently little access to cash. It is observed that cash requirements among the rural 
poor are increasing as more and more activities, such as the purchase of chattels 
and livestock plus other transactions such as religious festivals and weddings, now 
require money. 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance practices on MFIs’ 
outreach and financial performance in Nepal. In particular, it examines the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms in MFIs and their outreach 
and financial performance. How the Nepalese central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank 
(NRB), through its corporate governance directives for Banking and Financial 
Institutions (BFIs) influences corporate governance practices of MFIs is analysed 
in this study.  
The good governance practices may enable the MFIs to perform better and increase 
MFIs’ social mission as well as their sustainability. Good governance practices can 
reduce the hierarchical time-consuming bureaucracy and wasteful utilization of 
resources necessarily diverted from MFIs’ mission. Defined structures of 
governance clarify the responsibilities and accountability that encourage 
transparency, contributing to a reduction in corruption, freeing available funds for 
MFIs’ mission. Nevertheless, it is debatable what forms of governance practice 
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increase MFIs’ performance. Bankruptcy of firms around the world, especially in 
mature western economies, has raised concerns about governance practices. The 
extent to which promulgated guidelines, flowing from these failures, are applicable 
in low-income countries (LICs), and Nepal in particular, is not obvious and requires 
examination. The standard format of governance structure in developed economic 
countries may not work the same in a developing economic country like Nepal, 
which has strong hierarchical social structures and beliefs. The best fit MFI 
governance structure in Nepal will arise from evidence-based research in Nepal.  
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the existing knowledge of corporate 
governance and MFI performance in several ways. First, it provides evidence of 
corporate governance factors and how respective individual components influence 
MFI outreach and financial performance. Second, this study uses non-parametric 
quantile regression to analyse the data. This method is the most appropriate, based 
on careful diagnostic testing of the data. The non-parametric regression results 
differ from results noted in some prior research. Reconciling these differences 
illuminates some key social, ethnic and regional issues. Third, this is the first direct 
study on corporate governance practices and MFIs’ outreach and financial 
performance in Nepal. Finally, the potential for future research opened by the 
findings in the current study are noted.  
The relationship of corporate governance and MFIs’ outreach and financial 
performance is examined based on available data. Initial efforts to obtain data from 
NRB and the Rural Microfinance Development Centre (RMDC), relating to MFIs 
enjoyed minimal success. The Mix Market database provides the basic input for 
creating an unbalanced data panel. The time period for which reasonable coverage 
is available commences in 2002, post cessation of the Maoist insurgency, and 
finishes with 2012, prior to the major earthquake. Department of Labour (DOL) and 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) provide information relating to labour 
movements and employment. Reports and publications from the Centre for 
Financial Inclusion (CFI), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and 
World Bank (WB) are used and provide useful robustness checks on data. 
Additional data on the corporate governance of MFIs are collected through the self-
reported annual financial statement and reports, and individual MFI’s websites. The 
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study includes regulated MFIs as those outside the oversight of NRB report even 
less information.  
The final panel assembled, after careful diagnostic checking, did not satisfy the 
“poolability” requirements. Cross-sectional quantile regressions are used to 
examine nine core performance variables. The five outreach proxies, used were 
depth, breadth, average loan size, number of depositors and percentage of female 
borrowers as measures of social value creation. Four financial proxies, return on 
asset, return on equity, debt to equity ratio and operational self-sufficiency were 
used to inform consideration of sustainable financial performance. The findings 
illustrate that various governance variables impact differently across the quantiles 
for both outreach and financial performance measures.  
These differences in the impact of governance variables are significant, with the 
sign of explanatory variables changing with the independent factors. The results 
indicate that MFIs with bigger boards, more directors that are independent, high 
gender diversity, and high caste diversity have less outreach in terms of the number 
of credit clients. Improvement in staff productivity, larger sized MFIs, maturity of 
MFIs, and number of employees increase an ability to serve more borrowers. Loan 
size become larger with the presence of independent directors and higher gender 
diversity on the board, and diminish with CEO duality, staff productivity, maturity 
of firm, and number of employees. The range of statistically significant governance 
variables affecting the performance output proxies points to changes that are likely 
to encourage MFIs in their missions and benefits individual and the nation overall.  
This study can assist Nepalese MFIs to adjust their governance structures to 
improve their outreach and financial performance. The regulatory environment, 
including endemic corruption, can change to improve outcomes. The negative 
impact of the mandatory governance factors on MFIs outreach and financial 
performance indicates the need for preparing governance mechanisms for MFIs 
founded on country specific characteristics rather than compelling the code of 
practice of corporate governance mechanisms from other countries. Key principles 
like ethical behaviour and transparency underpin good governance but local factors 
are underweighted in prior research.  
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The robust findings of this study emphasise the need for regulatory bodies, viz.: 
NRB, RMDC and other related organizations, to work together to formulate and 
develop the policies for MFIs industry. The underlying goal is to enhance financial 
capability to sustain a mission of outreach to uplift the poorest of the poor. The 
Nepalese MFIs industry needs a better regulatory framework that will enhance 
corporate governance to yield enhanced outcomes and MFIs industry growth. A 
more efficacious framework with less emphasis on rules and more enablement of 
sound policy formulation may flourish under the correct conditions. NRB’s 
Department of Microfinance Promotion and Supervision (DMPS) may be a key 
enabler of improved MFIs’ performance. The regulators and the MFIs industry may 
encourage the private MFIs into synergy with the not-for-profit MFIs, which will 
enhance the capability of the MFIs to reach to the poorest of the poor in the rural 
areas in difficult geographical region in Nepal. 
This study is unique to MFIs in Nepal and further research opportunities for other 
developing nations will promote components supporting more generalized evidence 
to further empower MFIs. MFIs with different governance systems in different 
countries may impact MFIs’ financial and social mission achievements differently. 
MFIs in other similar economic countries, operating with the same financial 
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1 Chapter one – Introduction 
The potential for microfinance to contribute significantly to economic growth and 
the living standards of individuals continues to receive ongoing attention in 
emerging economies and low-income countries (LIC). The upside potential is 
promoted as large, while the downside risks associated with entrenching resources 
into a corrupt system are not as extensively discussed. In this thesis, governance of 
microfinance institutions 1(MFIs) are examined in relation to the financial and 
outreach performance of MFIs in Nepal. 
This research is important for three main reasons. First, it examines corporate 
governance of MFIs in Nepal, in relation to both MFI outreach and financial 
performance. This is the first study in Nepal on MFI governance mechanisms and 
their impact on MFIs' dual mission of outreach and better financial performance. 
The components of performance, viz. financial and outreach are examined. The 
balance between financial and outreach performance is an ongoing consideration of 
good governance for MFIs as they strive for longer-term sustainable impact. Good 
governance is essential to reach a large number of clients, and without good 
governance, achieving the dual mission is a challenge. Outreach is crucial part of 
MFIs’ measurement, but it is impossible to achieve outreach without better 
financial support because Nepal has poor infrastructure and difficult geography, 
which accelerates the cost of outreach, therefore making it difficult for MFIs to 
fulfil their social mission. As a result, MFIs that have better financial performance 
with no improved outreach turn to another fund supplier organization. Thus, 
financial performance and outreach are linked for MFIs undertaking both goals of 
MFIs, which will make outreach and financial efficiency compatible with each 
other or else they will be in conflict. Corporate governance that enhances MFIs’ 
outreach may not necessarily do the same with financial performance and vice 
versa. This is where it is presumed corporate governance plays the key functional 
role to maintain the correlation between better outreach and financial performance. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether corporate governance that stimulates 
the outreach also does the same for financial performance for MFIs in Nepal. This 
                                                 
1 The Nobel peace prize winner, Md. Yunus, initiated microfinancing in 1976 and formalized 
Grameen Bank in 1986 in Bangladesh, keeping the social mission to alleviate the poverty. 
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study also gives insights into MFIs that have one goal of either outreach or financial 
betterment with corporate governance, and highlights the conflict among scholars’ 
measurement, that is, whether outreach or financial performance should be the tool 
when measuring MFIs’ performance. 
Second, financial inclusiveness, especially for low income, rural poor is examined. 
The importance of this study increases as MFIs work for financially excluded low-
income people. The role of MFIs in South Asia is critical to develop the economies 
of countries in the region. There are 2 billion unbanked people in the world and 625 
million of them live in South Asia (World Bank, 2014b). There are 34%  adults in 
which 32.1% are rural in Nepal, and 46.4% adults in which 43.5% are rural in South 
Asia, who are included in financial services with financial institution (World Bank, 
2014b). The figures indicate there are huge numbers of people in some populations 
who are financially excluded. Therefore, the demand for financial services is higher 
than the institutional supplies of financial services. There are only 37% of women, 
55% of men and 40% of poor households in South Asia that have an account with 
a financial institution (World Bank, 2014b) that increases the demand for the MFIs 
services in South Asian developing countries. The figures demonstrate the 
importance for MFIs to fulfil their social mission to alleviate poverty by increasing 
financial inclusion of poor people in South Asia. The importance of MFIs increases 
the role and importance of governance structure in financial inclusion in this region. 
This study may help for future policy-making in the region, even though the 
countries are under different governments and regulatory structures. Thus, this 
study has significance for governance and institutional performance to increase 
financial inclusion.  
Third, the broader section of stakeholders, including international donors 
recognized in the study, adds to the usefulness of the findings in terms of policy and 
practical considerations. The findings of the study may provide beneficial 
information on Nepalese MFIs for donors, fund suppliers, creditors, investors, and 
stakeholders. McKinsey and Company (2002) report that 63% of investors avoid 
individual companies, 31% avoid countries with poor governance, and 57% of 
investors vary with governance practices, whereas 80% of investors would pay a 
premium for a well-governed company. The boards’ decisions and activities have high 
influential impact on companies’ financial success (McKinsey & Company, 2013). 
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The significant findings may help MFIs policymakers modify their policies to 
improve industry performance in Nepal and may assist individual managers to 
measure, inform and influence their own institutional performance.  
Careful empirical analysis, using appropriate and robust methods is important.  
Evidence-based policy development, in part fuelled by the international donor 
community wanting assurance of change and progress toward both more efficient 
and more equitable MFIs, is increasingly important for LIC. Nepal has experienced 
political turmoil with the collapse of the monarchy, Maoist insurgency, coalition 
government, and economic drives for modern infrastructure, including replacing 
the damage caused by the earthquake of 2011, all in an environment where many 
want their inducements paid. Enhancing governance in MFIs has potential to 
improve productivity and living standards, so a dispassionate analysis is 
fundamental to such a quest.  
There is little research on corporate governance and firm’s performance in Nepal. 
The country is known as a low- and middle-income economy with unstable politics 
and a volatile economy. However, cooperatives, NGOs, INGOs and MFIs are 
widespread. Interest in MFIs and the services they offer have increased extensively.  
This is the first study to explore corporate governance and its relationship with 
financial performance and outreach in MFIs in Nepal. The study uses historical data 
to explore the corporate governance impacts on financial performance and outreach 
in Nepal. Studying a single country’s corporate governance-performance 
relationship provides broad analysis that can be potentially generalizable. The 
database for observation years is comprehensive.   
Researchers have given little attention to the South Asian region. Recently, there 
have been a few studies done on MFIs performance, looking at different dimensions, 
but the studies of the direct relationship between MFIs’ corporate governance and 
financial and outreach performance are minimal. The prior studies do not give any 
empirical results. The existing MFI corporate governance literature is given to 
understanding the dynamic nature of the corporate governance and MFIs 
performance relationship. The Millennium Development Goals prompted the 
Nepalese government to work harder to alleviate poverty, and that in turn increased 
the importance of MFIs’ role. The Nepalese government uses NGO, INGOs, 
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cooperatives and MFIs as tools to increase financial inclusion to boost the local 
economy. The case of poor governance practices in Andhra Pradesh in India caused 
the government there to wake up, regulate and implement policies for better 
governance of MFIs. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the corporate 
governance structure influences MFIs’ financial performance and outreach in Nepal, 
where corporate governance systems are not yet formalised. 
Prior studies have estimated the impact of MFI governance mechanisms separately, 
focussing on either outreach or financial performance (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009). This study investigates the impact of governance mechanisms on 
both dimensions (Hartarska & Mersland, 2012) of social mission and financial 
performance of MFIs in Nepal, providing banking services to low-income families.  
The ethical scandals in Enron, WorldCom and others attracted the attention around 
the world  causing people to question “how companies are directed and controlled” 
that is, corporate governance both inside and outside corporations (Hedrick & 
Struggles, 2014). Corporate governance further explains board-level leadership that 
enables and drives firm performance to be known as a well-governed firm.  
Corporate governance comprises two mechanisms, internal and external (World 
Bank, 2006). Internal corporate governance requires the board of directors to 
monitor management in favour of shareholders’ interest; external governance 
monitors and controls managers’ behaviours. Governance mechanisms include 
board characteristics, board diversity, and an independent board without any 
influence. Governance is about achieving corporate goals (Bassem, 2009) and the 
governance role becomes important for MFIs as they develop the dual mission of 
outreach and financial performance (Hartarska & Mersland, 2012; Mersland, 2011). 
Better corporate governance may be a key factor for enhancing the viability of a 
firm (Mersland, 2011). In the literature, governance factors are frequently discussed 
but researchers have struggled to find the right corporate governance mechanisms 
that influence the performance of MFIs. There are grey areas to governance that 
need to be navigated with integrity, insight and intelligence (Hedrick & Struggles, 
2014). A Microfinance Banana Skins survey done by the Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation (2008, 2012, 2016) identifies corporate governance as a 
principal risk facing microfinance, threatening its role in uplifting poor 
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communities. The Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (2008, 2012, 2016) 
also finds that the quality of corporate governance in MFIs concerns investors. 
BBVA Microfinance Foundation (2011) says Latin American and Caribbean MFIs 
are experiencing a lack of good corporate governance practices. It is evident that 
good corporate governance is crucial in strengthening MFIs’ financial performance 
and increasing their outreach (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Donor reluctance and 
government budget constraints should encourage MFIs to have good governance to 
survive on their own by balancing outreach and operational and financial efficiency. 
A better balance between outreach and financial efficiency can be achieved with a 
good governance framework and the right incentives at MFIs level (Bakker, 
Schaveling, & Nijhof, 2014).    
The literature provides the guidelines for ideal and effective MFIs’ governance 
(Bakker et al., 2014; Council of Microfinance Equity Fund, 2007; Council of 
Microfinance Equity Funds, 2012; Hedrick & Struggles, 2014; Ledgerwood, 1998). 
“It is important that corporate governance does not become a one size fits all 
compliance exercise” (Hedrick & Struggles, 2014, p.2). The empirical results of 
governance and MFIs’ performance are discussed below in the literature review. 
Attention will be paid to gender diversity, ethnic and minority diversity, CEO 
duality, non-executive directors and number of directors on the board are 
governance factors in this study. Governance mechanisms that have a significant 
relationship with the double bottom line of achieving both financial and social goals 
have been included in this research. Variables mentioned in the literature are taken 
for the performance proxies on availability of dataset for MFIs in Mix Market. 
Drake (2012) explains that directors’ behaviour changes with the implementation 
of a governance performance measurement. Governance performance measurement  
is more effective when  ‘relevant peer comparison data’ is available (Drake, 2012). 
This study measures MFIs’ performance using operating efficiency coefficients, 
OSS, and profitability; ROA and ROE for financial performance; and number of 
clients served in order to capture the outreach objective of serving as many poor 
clients as possible (Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009; Schreiner, 2002). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2004, 2015) 
updates principles of corporate governance, including regulations, standards, 
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initiatives, programmes, and much more that are indeed necessary and useful. 
However, by making it an administrative exercise, good governance has come to 
mean compliance rather than excellence, a succession of boxes to be ticked 
(Hedrick & Struggles, 2014). Effective boards need to move beyond mere 
compliance to create flexible and dynamic governance that enables them to respond 
quickly and adapt to the changing circumstances of business. There is no proven 
formula (Drake, 2012) for effective governance and the most effective approach 
needs to be analysed on a case-by-case basis. The spirit of governance (Hedrick & 
Struggles, 2014) that is linked to the culture and performance of an organisation 
needs to be checked with MFIs in Nepal. To analyse the impact of corporate 
governance on MFIs’ performance in Nepal, these questions are established:  
• Does the corporate governance structure affect MFIs’ outreach in Nepal? 
• Does the corporate governance structure affect MFIs’ financial performance in 
Nepal? 
• Can Nepalese MFIs have different board structures that will lead to improved 
outreach while maintaining financial performance?  
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information 
about Nepal, a review of the evolution of MFIs in Nepal, and information about the 
microfinance sector; different types of MFI structures and models that operate in 
Nepal; the need for cash, financial supplies and coping strategies in rural and urban 
regions of Nepal. Financial inclusion and its implications are explained in this 
chapter.  
Chapter 3 provides literature reviews on the empirical findings on governance 
factors that are relevant for this study. It describes the concept of corporate 
governance and its significant impact on MFIs performance. The influence of 
governance factors on the outreach and financial performance is explained. The 
hypothesis is built on the literature reviews on governance factors and MFIs 
outreach and financial performance in Nepal. It describes the estimation technique, 
that is, research framework and the conceptual models used for hypotheses 
development. The dependent, independent and control variables used in this study 
are explained.  
Chapter 4 describes data sources used for data collection, data editing, data gap 
filling, sampling procedure, and sample size. 
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Chapter 5 provides a methodological and econometric framework for this study and 
explains the normality test of data, descriptive statistics, correlation matrix of 
independent variables, and other statistical tests for model specification. It also 
covers econometric methods and models for the empirical analysis of the thesis, 
corporate governance, MFIs’ outreach and financial performance in Nepal.  
Chapter 6 describes empirical quantiles regression results analysis with the 
coefficient relation at different quantiles on corporate governance, financial 
performance and outreach of MFIs in Nepal. This chapter contributes to the 
understanding of how corporate governance affects MFIs performance in Nepal. 
Chapter 7 discusses the analytical cross-sectional quantiles regression results for 
2012 compared to those of 2004. It explains the corporate governance practices, 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Nepal during this period. The 
discussion considers how different governance factors impact MFI financial 
performance and outreach in Nepal.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the findings and the 
implications, academic contribution, limitations of the study and recommendations 
for further research. 
1.1 Background of the study 
The failure of organizations where bribery and misconduct seem to cause the 
collapse of social organizations puts economists and donors in a reluctant position. 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) were established to provide financial services to 
populations excluded from traditional banking institutions. MFIs’ objective is to 
uplift the financial situation of the poor who live below the poverty line. Their role 
in economic development is vital in poorer countries. MFIs provide non-collateral 
small loans to the poor to achieve MFIs’ social mission. Providing small loans is 
expensive which means MFIs often depend on financial subsidies. Donor or fund 
providers emphasize the need for MFIs to achieve their social mission rather than 
institutional financial achievement. However, institutional commercialization, high 
competition, the emergence of modern technology and the reluctance of donors is 
putting pressure on MFIs to become self-sustaining if they want to continue their 
services. The social involvement of MFIs triggers the importance of measuring their 
performance. Thus, social mission and financial achievement need to be considered 
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when measuring MFIs performance. The performance of MFIs can be measured 
against the same tools used for the commercial banking system. 
Corporate governance plays a key role in MFIs achieving their social mission and 
financial performance. However, governance may differ for outreach and financial 
output. The governance that stimulates outreach may not be the same as the 
governance that fuels the financial perspective in MFIs. Governance factors are 
discussed extensively for structural improvement in different countries.  
The study shows the structure of governance and its influence on Nepalese MFI 
performance, which is relatively different from other regions as reflected in prior 
research in different countries. The results of this study improve the understanding 
of the different governance factors that contribute to the financial and outreach 
objectives. This result gives information to stakeholders to compare their trade-off 
between the two objectives of MFIs in Nepal. MFIs need to have better financial 
performance to support their increased outreach. MFIs with no improved outreach 
just become grant organizations. 
The study examines the financial and social benefits of expanded MFIs financial 
performance and outreach 2  in Nepal. Central government policy makers and 
research funders emphasize the necessity to develop MFIs to uplift the social and 
economic situation of the poor in developing nations. Potentially, significant gains 
in outreach are realistically achievable in the context of remote village settings 
where there is currently little access to cash. The cash requirements among the rural 
poor are increasing as more and more activities, such as the purchase of chattels 
and livestock plus other transactions such as religious festivals and weddings, now 
require money.  
The barter economy has operated well but is gradually waning in importance as 
urban habits gain more traction in remote communities. MFIs services, in particular 
credit and savings extension, can be achieved by removing the access barriers in 
rural areas (Bos & Millone, 2015; McIntosh, Villaran, & Wydick, 2011). 
Acceptance of small amounts as deposits may encourage a saving practice and 
contribute to building confidence in saving for the future among poorer 
                                                 
2Outreach relates to the number of customers served by an MFI and the benefit the borrower achieves 
from the credit (Lafourcade et al., 2005). 
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communities. Access to finance can contribute to a long-lasting increase in income 
by raising investment in income-generating activities (Agbaeze & Onwuka, 2014) 
and to a possible diversification of income sources.  An accumulation of assets may 
be achieved and, importantly, an improved smooth food consumption gives a better 
health, which may reduce vulnerability to illness. Drought and crop failures are 
ongoing issues in rural communities but slow and steady improvements in 
education, health and housing through the deliberate choices of borrowers who are 
in improving economic spaces will make for better lives. In addition, access to 
finance can contribute to an improvement of the social and economic situation of 
women who have very, very limited opportunities at present. Finally, microfinance 
may have positive spillover effects in addition to the direct economic and social 
improvements obtained by the borrower (Zhou & Takeuchi, 2010). The positive 
contribution microfinance can make to reducing poverty has convinced many 
governments, non-government organizations (NGOs) and individuals to put effort 
into supporting MFIs and their activities. 
MFIs have also received criticism, including for their failure to reach the ultra-poor 
(Lønborg & Rasmussen, 2014; Scully, 2004), and not adequately providing benefits 
through financial services and programs (Aghion & Bolton, 1997). The tension 
between financial performance and outreach is manifest in the lack of confidence 
from the MFI sector and seeing the risk that the ultra-poor present as borrowers. 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) suggest that the poorest of the poor, the so-called core 
poor, are generally too risk averse to borrow for investment purposes. Therefore, 
they benefit only to a very limited extent from microfinance schemes (Lønborg & 
Rasmussen, 2014; Newman, Schwarz, & Borgia, 2014). Staff of microfinance 
institutions may prefer low-risk exposure, if bad debts are unfavourable in terms of 
bonuses or advancement, then seeing the ultra-poor as extremely credit-risky 
promotes a desire to avoid them (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). MFI practices may also 
lead to the exclusion of the core poor, such as a requirement to save before a loan 
can be granted (Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002; Lønborg & Rasmussen, 2014; 
Mosley, 2001).  
In an economy where rural workers receive payment in kind, there is little money 
in circulation. The opportunity to acquire additional poultry or grow a roof garden 
to supplement in-kind receipts with cash sales requires an initial investment. If there 
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are no MFIs operating in the area, then the moneylender, a traditional source of 
money, who some now consider high-country loan sharks, is one option. Migration 
has long been an important livelihood strategy for the people of rural Nepal. 
Whenever the population has risen to such an extent that people can no longer 
secure a livelihood, they have migrated elsewhere. Even today, poor people pursue 
short-term seasonal3 migration as a livelihood strategy in Nepal. The migratory 
worker culture is becoming a stable pattern for survival rather than a process of 
generating surplus cash to invest in money-producing agriculture or trade. Often 
this form of work is necessary even where moneylenders operate. Worker migration 
is now a common situation for rural people, particularly those in more remote 
villages. 
The poorest rural people in Nepal own no land, have no regular income sources, 
collateral or financial literacy. The tyranny of remoteness is an obstacle too large to 
address through an immediate policy change. Small incremental steps are more 
likely to be successful. Development of investment lending in rural communities 
will stimulate a trickle-down effect through paid day-labour having cash in hand. 
Aghion and Bolton (1997) find that the trickle-down mechanism can lead to a 
unique steady-state redistribution, improving the production efficiency of the 
economy. Applying this trickle-down mechanism in Nepal may enhance economic 
growth and in turn further contribute to the expansion of lending and saving 
activities. In Nepal, those who have more wealth and are more capable of managing 
resources will be creating jobs through investment and therefore producing more 
business or businesses. This would encourage people to work more to earn more. 
This process leads to local economic growth and wealth creation that benefits 
everyone, not just those who invest.  
1.2 Statement of research 
The study explores the potential for changing corporate governance structures in 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Nepal to enhance their outreach performance to 
reduce rural poverty. Microfinance loans were developed principally to facilitate 
entrepreneurial activities in poorer communities that are totally or partially 
excluded from the banking system. The aim is to reduce poverty, promote self-
                                                 
3Seasonal migration comprises a period of a few weeks or months and implies a regular return of 
migrants to the original place (Shrestha 2009; Department for International Development, 2007)  
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employment, and improve the empowerment of socially excluded persons, 
particularly the poorest of the poor in society.  The existing corporate governance 
practices in MFIs concentrate on their ability to raise capital, which creates a 
perception that private interests are benefiting from the vulnerability of the poor 
which could cause the “mission drift.” There are articles suggesting that the focus 
of MFIs has moved to profit-making and better financial performance at the 
expense of outreach to poorer clients. The MFIs’ priority to reach the rural poor 
seems in doubt. MFIs are moving into serving the urban poor, away from the rural 
poorest of the poor. MFIs allocation of loan amounts in urban areas increases their 
individual profit-making. Thus, the aim for higher profit has led to reduced outreach 
amongst MFIs. 
In Nepal, MFIs have opened central offices in each of the country’s five regions 
and moved to implement a more decentralised system to run more efficiently and 
effectively. Nevertheless, these steps are not necessarily impacting in a significant 
manner upon poverty reduction; rural people still struggle for daily bread. This may 
indicate that MFIs are not yet making sufficient penetration into capacity building 
for the poorer stratum of society. Preparation of enhanced general guidelines for 
corporate governance to overcome current inadequacies for MFIs, and dealing with 
cultural and regional differences through the development of a specific framework 
for corporate governance will afford real, tangible and sustainable additions to 
outreach. Outreach is central to the mission of MFIs and may be more carefully 
crafted into governance guidelines. 
Good corporate governance in terms of strengthening stewardship, achievement of 
MFIs’ primary objectives, and promoting further development of the industry have 
been asserted as key elements to enhance outreach performance, which will in turn 
promote sustainable growth of micro-, small- and-medium sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) in Nepal. These are lacking from the well-intentioned normative level of 
outreach, which is fostered through these structures. In addition, the financial 
viability of MFIs needs to be included as an important component of any empirical 
study.  If financial performance declines too far, the solvency of the institution will 
be threatened. MFIs need to minimise the possibility of management failures, which 
may jeopardise the efficacious application of received funds from local and 
international donors. Transparency and accountability are essential. 
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In the Nepal context, there are number of factors that require consideration. There 
is a need for improved access to MFIs, timely engagement, non-collateral based 
loans, gender equity, and transparency in terms of monitoring of loan-fund use and 
increasing the pool of resources available. Enhancement of MFI’s outreach within 
a framework of sustainable development will require the formulation of an MFI 
governance model that may require greater degrees of participation by all 
stakeholders and less gaming between parties trying to exploit personal advantages, 
which results in a reduction of both outreach and confidence in the institutional and 
regulatory framework. 
1.3 Significance of study 
This study analyses MFIs’ corporate governance in Nepal from the perspective of 
enhancing outreach. There is a significant potential for enhanced outreach to 
positively impact the lives of many rural poor in Nepal and some of the findings 
may be generalizable to other low income countries (LICs). Improved outreach can 
promote sustainable development, which will generate further demand, growth and 
raise the horizons for many lower subsistence-level rural poor to escape the poverty 
trap in which they currently call home. The amplified outreach is not possible 
without better financial performance by the MFIs. Profitability and operational 
efficiency will define the MFIs’ financial performance, and depth and width will 
measure outreach in this study. This is the first empirical study to measure MFIs 
outreach and financial performance with corporate governance practices announced 
as mandatory in 2007 in Nepal. This study considers the national governance 
system to measure its influences on MFIs performance in Nepal. The study findings 
can be generalized to any country with the same governance characteristics. 
The wider use of outreach and financial proxies to measure the MFIs’ performance 
will enhance the understanding of how different corporate governance mechanisms 
collaborate with MFIs’ outreach and financial performance. Previous studies 
relating to MFIs in LICs are mostly descriptive and do not address the relationship 
between the governance system and outreach performance for rural poverty 
reduction, especially for Nepal. The current study, through its empirical emphasis, 
is clearly distinguishable from the predominantly descriptive and normative 
literature. Prior research has mostly been on developed economies. There has been 
little research on MFIs in the South Asian region. This study will fill the gap of 
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corporate governance mechanism and MFIs performance in this region. The 
differences in social, regulatory, ethnicity, politics and economy of each country 
may have different impacts on the nature, direction and operational processes of 
MFIs in emerging economies, more so than in developed economies. Governance 
systems may influence MFIs’ performance in different countries.  
The findings of the study will contribute to the empirical evidence concerning the 
correlation of corporate governance practices and MFIs’ outreach and financial 
performance. The more sophisticated method of analysis used in this study 
increases the probability of robust results, which will have a greater likelihood of 
finding acceptance among analysts and officials charged with policy formulation.  
Aspects of MFIs in the Nepal context include internal control systems, ethnicity 
and sociocultural differences, regional differentiating characteristics, 
discriminatory impacts of Hindu caste system, and the role of donors and investors 
in promoting outreach performance for poverty reduction in rural areas of Nepal. It 
is to measure whether the internal corporate governance structure influences MFIs’ 
outreach and financial performance in Asian countries. The external governance 
mechanism may be ineffective because of high political uncertainty and corruption 
in an emerging market. This study extends an understanding of the nature of 
corporate governance practices in MFIs in Nepal and the effect such practices have 
on firm performance. 
Consideration of how MFIs reach clients with services in an effective, equitable, 
and efficient manner encompasses many challenges. The need for MFIs to 
incorporate sustainability through providing ongoing services is essential. Better 
governance may stimulate an awareness of the deep-rooted discrimination founded 
on religion, ethnicity and caste systems, which reduces output and national income. 
Better governance may be achieved with higher transparency, accountability and 
operational efficiency, which in turn will increase firm performance. Failure of 
MFIs in Andhra Pradesh in India caused increased concern by investors, donors, 
creditors and stakeholders on the fund utilization by MFIs. The unpleasant 
governance practices jeopardised MFI operation in the market, suggesting the need 
to analyse governance practices that will improve MFIs performance.   
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Ethnicity, while being a sensitive matter, is often taken as fixed and not to be 
questioned among the very conservative rural communities. Good corporate 
governance requires a delicate balance when handling sensitive issues but also 
needs to consider the interrelationships lest suboptimal outcomes become the future. 
Any improvement in MFIs governance that picks up stakeholders’ interest will have 
an impact upon outreach of financial services for poverty reduction. The study, 
through considering the representation and understanding of these factors, can lead 
to improving stakeholders’ interest by reduction of ethnic bias, caste bias, and 
discrimination.  
There is a considerable body of research, focussed predominantly around publicly 
listed companies, relating to corporate governance and various financial 
performance variables. This material provides a base for exploring the financial 
performance link with variables in MFIs’ governance, which have not yet been 
considered for Nepal. The study gathers secondary data for this aspect of the 
research. 
By combining the financial performance and outreach into one study, this research 
explicitly recognises that the latter cannot be attained without a sustainable business 
model in respect of the former. An MFI in liquidation will not be engaging in 
outreach. MFIs play a greater role in financial inclusion in developing countries. 
Scholars have also criticised MFIs’ involvement in mission drift from their social 
mission achievement. More studies need to take the importance of MFIs into 
consideration when studying the financial sector, rather than focusing mainly on 
commercial banks and other lending institutions.  
To promote the usefulness of this research, it is proposed that the findings will be 
shared with key stakeholders. Small presentations and seminars for interested 
parties will be undertaken among industry members in Nepal. Further interpretation 
of the findings in the light of the feedback will promote the potential for the study 
to have more direct implications on future outreach projects. 
This research will make explicit the trade-off public policies that would help to 
improve governance in MFIs so outreach services are enhanced for rural poor 
people to raise their living standards and open the door for sustainable income 
resources. It is anticipated that improved governance in MFIs will incorporate 
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matters reported on the basis of this research. Many issues will take time to work 
through and both regulatory and cultural changes will be needed. A glaring example 
is corruption and the necessity to pay bribes to secure a microfinance loan 
specifically designed to assist a person working their way out of poverty.  
16 
 
2 Chapter two - Background of Nepal 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses Nepal’s background, the institutionalized evolution of MFIs 
in Nepal, and their mission. MFIs’ operational situation demonstrates the reality of 
the MFIs services in rural and urban regions in Nepal. The rural poor’s need for 
cash and their ways of coping with that need is explored. MFIs’ financial 
inclusiveness situation is explored in rural and urban regions from the dimension of 
financial inclusion: that is, access, uses, and quality. The informal monetary section 
is active in the absence of a prudential number of financial institutions in Nepal. 
The Nepalese MFI structures, types of MFIs and their model are explained. 
2.2 Nepal background 
Nepal is one of the world’s least developed countries located in the north of South 
Asia. According to the World Bank (2014a) the annual per capita income of 
USD750 ranks 157th of 187 countries in the world in the Human Development 
Index. More than 80 % of the total population lives in rural areas and their 
livelihood depends on agriculture and related activities (World Bank, 2014a).  
A landlocked republic surrounded to the north by China and to the south, east, and 
west by India, Nepal has potential to grow its economy, capitalizing on its location, 
sandwiched between the two emerging giants of India and China. Geographically, 
it is divided into three zones: high mountains and the Himalayas in the north, small 
mountains and hills in the middle, and the plain (Terai) in the south.  
Nepal and India share a 1,778 km border that is very porous, making it difficult to 
accurately capture data on cross-border movement and undocumented migration. 
There is an 'open' border through the agreements of a bilateral treaty signed in 1950. 
According to the Treaty, Nepalese and Indians can travel and work across the border 
and are treated on a par with local citizens. Rural Nepalese, who have long been 
suffering poverty, unemployment, and more recently, a civil war, migrate to India 
in their thousands every year. 
The Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) estimates that nearly 30% of the Nepalese 
population of 28 million live on less than USD14 per person per month. Some of 
the causes for their poverty are disparities of caste, gender, and geography. 
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Stimulation of migration, according to Bhattarai (2007), is a main source of income 
to ameliorate poverty, unemployment, declining natural resources, and more 
recently, the Maoist insurgency. 
Bhattarai (2006) argues that there are reasons to migrate from Nepal, such as limited 
employment opportunities, deteriorating agricultural productivity and armed 
conflict.  Further, he observes that many villagers go abroad to work for a while, 
returning with some money and the experience of living in a different geographical 
location. However, what is clear is that most would be worse off if they were 
depending solely on local employment (Walsh & Jha, 2012). 
2.3 Evolution of institutional micro-credit activities 
The formal banking system started in 1937 by establishing the Nepal Bank Limited 
with credit and deposit financial services to the commercial sector in Kathmandu 
and some urban areas in Nepal. In 1956, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) was 
established as the central bank of Nepal to monitor and administer the banking 
system to control the money with a view to improving the lives of people.  
The Nepal Central Bank established the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) in 
1968 to support farmers by providing credit and marketing support for agriculture 
and its products. It was the beginning of Nepal’s rural financial services and the 
first microfinance in Nepal.  In the process of developing the standard of living for 
the deprived4 sector and rural regions, the NRB directed that all commercial banks 
should invest a portion of their resources into these needy groups. Furthermore, 
NRB mandated for all the commercial banks to invest 5% of their resources in rural 
development projects with 80% to be in agriculture. There is a steady upward trend 
in MFIs lending as reflected in Figure 1. 
                                                 
4 "deprived " means “low income and especially socially backward women, tribal people, Dalit, 
blind, hearing impaired and physically incapacitated persons, marginalized and small farmers, craft-




Figure 1. Asset/ liabilities of MFDB and RDB for 2005-2014 
Data source: (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014a) 
Regional disparity is a consideration for the NRB, which encourages the private 
sector to participate by providing financial services in the rural areas of Nepal. In 
the process of facilitating financial services to the rural region, the NRB opens its 
doors to participating with the private sector, to continuous development and to 
modifying its Acts to regulate banking and financial services (Shrestha, 2009). As 
a minimum, the NRB should be playing a positive role in forming and executing 
the policies for the financial sector to enrich rural people through access to financial 
services. The financial sector is still in its infancy and needs more nourishing in 
order for it to provide services to all corners of the country. Financial services are 
still limited and focused on urban rather than rural areas. The rural poor, in the 
interior regions, consequently have no financial services and depend on traditional 






















Figure 2. Fund suppliers 
Data source: (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011) 
The formal sector’s loan fund supplies, as shown in Figure 2, is 29% of total funds, 
comprised of 20% from banks, 5% from cooperatives, and 4% from NGO/relief 
agencies. The informal financial sector in rural Nepal is widespread, supplying 71% 
of funds, with relatives, friends and neighbours being the largest component with 
51%, moneylenders providing 15%, and a further 5% coming from other sources. 
The informal financial services come from property owners, merchants, farmer-
lenders, goldsmiths, pawnbrokers, friends and relatives or informal group 
institutions such as Dhikuti, Dharambhakari, and Guthi (United Nations Capital 
Development Fund, 2011). 
The easy approach to personal credit, a short-term loan with quick access, and 
flexibility with or without collateral, is a popular informal financial service in rural 
Nepal. In most cases, the informal sector provides loans on the same day or within 
a week as a maximum. Most importantly, from the borrowers’ perspective, lenders 
are flexible with the repayments. Borrowers in rural areas view informal lenders 
more favourably than MFIs. The forms of collateral preferred by lenders include 
gold or silver ornaments, bonding land or property, in some cases livestock, and 
even in the form of labour services.  
The interest rates charged by the informal fund providers range from 25% to 60% 



















labour services and small gifts, in addition to the repayments, given by the 
borrowers as a way of keeping warm relations with the fund providers. 
The availability of widespread informal financial services in rural areas suggests 
MFIs’ outreach would occur if MFIs were present and offering suitable terms. 
Efforts to date by the NRB to encourage formal financial institutions to establish 
themselves in rural areas have met with limited success.  
2.4 Microfinance 
The expanding microfinance literature encompasses a broadening understanding of 
the concept or usage of the term. As originally conceived by the Nobel Prize 
winning founder of Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus, the concept related to 
lending to the poorest of the poor in rural communities. Over time there was a 
mission drift towards urban poor and a greater concentration on financial 
performance with a corresponding de-emphasising of outreach, that is, the impact 
upon the lives of the poor in terms of providing a platform for sustainable 
employment. More recently the term has been captured in mature economies to 
express the work of non-governmental organisations working with the poor, often 
in association with budget advisory services.  
An MFI is a micro-credit provider of small loan amounts to low income people who 
are not able to access commercial bank services. The goal for providing this micro-
credit is predominantly to assist them to start an income-generating business and 
thus reduce poverty (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). Piot-Lepetit and 
Nzongang (2014) describe microfinance as making financial services available in a 
low-income community that traditionally lacks financial resources. Many 
researchers have defined microfinance variously. Nevertheless, the vision of 
microcredit supply and access to financial services to the poor and vulnerable 
groups cuts across most definitions. Commonly, it is seen as a tool with which to 
fight poverty in developing countries. 
The microfinance concept moved beyond the LIC and emerging economies to be 
more inclusive. Hartarska (2005) proposes microfinance as being concerned with 
making financial services and lines of credit available to the poor and less privileged. 
The possibility of adding non-financial services into the package of services offered 
has been proposed with Bassem (2009) suggesting microfinance is provision of 
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financial and non-financial services to the un-bankable poor. The un-bankable or 
excluded is noted by Barry and Tacneng (2014) who suggest it is a means of 
including people to improve their welfare and living standards through improved 
financial access. 
The broadening usage is reflected by Burkett and Sheehan (2009) in their study of 
MFIs in Australia, defining microfinance as a financial tool providing fair, safe, and 
ethical financial services to low income and financially excluded people to achieve 
the poverty alleviation objective by providing financial services such as small loans, 
savings, insurance, bill payment and money-transfer facilities, superannuation and 
financial advice. They did not consider the exploitative, predatory or unfair lenders 
as microfinance providers in their definition. 
In New Zealand, the expression has found another niche in relation to debt laden 
poor. Nga Tangata Microfinance Trust joined Kiwi Bank in New Zealand, defining 
microfinance as a microcredit service provider to address poverty and not gather 
commercial benefits. Through this trust, one can borrow NZ$2000 to NZ$3000 with 
no interest for asset-building purposes that are defined as being in the form of 
education, family wellbeing, essential home goods and business programme setup, 
and debt relief purposes to households in South Auckland and  Waikato regions 
(Quilliam, 2013). It defines further that low income people should get help to avoid 
being caught in the loan-shark trap (Quilliam, 2013). The first microfinance 
initiative was taken by the Maori Women’s League in 1987 in New Zealand, and 
Good Shepherd Trust was the first microfinance institution in Australia in 1981 
(Children's Commissioner, 2013). 
2.5 Mission of microfinance 
The mission of microfinance is to lift the poorest of the poor’s economy by 
providing financial services. MFI provides its services to the unserved categories 
of society that are unable to access any other kind of banking service. MFIs that are 
working to increase social welfare to the poor has diverted scholars’ attention away 
from measuring the MFIs’ financial performance. 
Adhikary and Papachristou (2014) observe that supply of financial services to poor 
families helps to generate income through self-employment and to cope with 
economical vulnerability. Thus, it is providing an opportunity to low income people 
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to become self-sufficient through saving and borrowing money. Microfinance is not 
only helping people to overcome poverty but also making them self-confident 
through self-employment and engagement in income-generating activities. MFIs’ 
small financial support provides an opportunity for the individual poor to gain 
financial improvement. This individual economic improvement contributes to 
improvements for family, society and ultimately the country’s economy. MFIs’ 
main target customers are the less-privileged poor women in developing countries. 
It is assumed financially empowering women will boost family incomes. The 
evidence also shows that MFIs have made a significant impact on socioeconomic 
development by increasing household incomes, mostly through providing credit to 
women (Olasupo, Afolami, & Shittu, 2014).  
Helping the poor is always a difficult task and an ongoing cumbersome process. It 
has been long argued and accepted that microfinance is a helping hand for the poor 
to fight poverty (Shil, 2009). The MFIs’ outreach has been acknowledged, 
promoted and appreciated in decades. The ground reality of outreach of MFIs as 
providing financial services to clients at the lower levels of society in developing 
countries has been taken as a first objective of MFIs. Outreach to the poor is seen 
as the measure of success but reaching the poor is always costly. Thus, MFIs depend 
on donors and external funds to achieve their objective. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to say that the MFIs need to be self-sustaining in order to continue their financial 
services to the poor to help lift them out of poverty.  
There are many factors that prevent the poor from getting traditional financial 
services: the lack of physical collateral; the often lengthy bank processes which can 
discourage the less educated to approach banks; and location – banks are focused 
on urban areas rather than rural areas when considering credit allocation (Imai & 
Azam, 2012). This compels the poor and isolated to become trapped in the informal 
financial sector, often dealing with moneylenders who exploit them with the under-
valuation of collateral, higher interest rates, and lenders’ monopolistic power (Shil, 
2009).  
MFIs provide financial services in Nepal and in other developing countries to 
women, small-scale entrepreneurs, and landless farmers. There is a large portion of 
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people who are below the poverty line and are potential credit clients left over from 
commercial bank services (Quayes & Khalily, 2014).   
The MFIs’ small loan system has benefitted many poor through their financial 
services. It became high on the public agenda for its financial services and the costs 
related to outreach. It is reasonable to say that donors, practitioners, and policy 
makers are concerned about the state of MFIs and that they tried to increase the 
efficiency in both outreach and financial performance (Mersland, 2011). It is also 
noted that the MFIs will only survive with competitive financial and outreach 
performance.  
2.6 MFIs operations in rural Nepal 
Banking services allow people to develop savings, which in turn will help them to 
improve their livelihood and meet unexpected expenses. Importantly, savings will 
increase the likelihood of obtaining a loan for investment purposes. Local 
investment activities will help local economies grow and stimulate job 
opportunities. This will be an improvement on the current situation where many 
cannot access financial services provided by the larger financial institutions, which 
effectively increases the income inequality gap. The poor remain trapped with debts 
for medical expenses, social obligations and sometimes consumption from which 
there is no escape and no way forward to earn money.  
Statistics reported by the Nepal Rastra Bank (2014a) reveal that approximately 40% 
of the Nepalese population now have a bank account, which is far greater than the 
26% in 2006. However, it is unknown whether there have been multiple accounts 
opened by the same person, which might cause distortions in the per person 
calculation. Opening a bank account requires holding identification documents, 
which many rural people do not have, and distance to a bank, time involved, and 
the opportunity cost of lost labouring pay all suggest there are significant costs to 
accessing a bank (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012).  
The Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) shows there are 40% and 44% of 
households that have access to financial services in less than or equal to half an hour 
and more than an hour’s distance respectively. Rural households’ access to financial 
services comes to 27%, compared to 89% of urban households. Furthermore, the 
percentage of households able to access banking services within an hour is highest 
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in the plain (Terai) region at 75%, the hilly region is 45% and the mountainous 
region is 17%. Even though the plains have the highest number of households with 
access to banking services, the interior parts of the plains region do not have ready 
access to banking services. In 2014, India made it compulsory for all people to have 
a bank account in order to be eligible to get loans and government benefit payments 
(Lakshami, 2014).  
The Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) indicates that during the last two decades 
there has been little change in the number of people taking out loans.  The number 
of households receiving loans increased but proportionally the non-included 
households remained constant. Any progress has not been good enough to tackle 
rural people’s financial needs. Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) data in Table 1 
shows the percentage of households receiving loans decreased in 2011 to 65 from 
68.8 in 2004. However, the average number of loans remains constant at 1.6. The 
percentage of outstanding loans declined from 66.7 in 2004 to 62.6 in 2011, while 
average outstanding loans in 2011 were the same as in 1996. The financial 
institutions have not promoted a scheme to reach poor households or increased their 
outreach and service to those people who are still unattended. 
Table 1: Statistics of household loans, 1995/96 - 2010/11 
Description 
Nepal Living Standards Survey 
1995/96 2003/04 2010/11 
Number households receiving loans  1,9240 2,538.0 3,715.0 
% of households receiving loans  61.3 68.8 65.0 
Average number of loans received  1.6 1.6 1.6 
Number households with outstanding loans 1,830.0 2,468.0 3,566.0 
% of households with outstanding loans  58.4 66.7 62.6 
Average number of outstanding loans  1.5 1.6 1.5 
Data source: Central Bureau of Statistics, (2011) 
The majority of the rural households have a low chance of getting financial 
institution support because they lack physical collateral; the lengthy processes of 
banking services discourage financially illiterate folk; and financial institutions are 
more focused on urban than rural areas in credit allocation.  
Cumbersome processes for completing loan application documentation are a step 
too far for many financially illiterate poor. The supporting documents, 
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recommendations, and need for guarantors heightens this disparity of access 
between rural and urban services. This significantly increases the likelihood that 
rural poor will only have the informal sector of relatives/friends/neighbours or 
moneylenders for credit purposes. 
Table 2 presents demographic and MFI information for the Janakpur region.  Four 
of the six districts show an improvement in the number of people per branch, that 
is, a lower number, while one is unchanged and one has a very significant decline. 
When a branch closed in Ramechhap there was a big increase in people per branch. 
When transport difficulties are included, the low level of service provided in rural 
areas is compounded. There is no internet or mobile banking in these areas. 




Population Population per branch 
2013 2014  2013 2014 
Sarlahi  21 21 769729 36654 36654 
Dhanusha  19 23 754777 39725 32816 
Mahottari  15 20 627580 41839 31379 
Dolakha 4 5 186557 46639 37311 
Ramechhap 3 2 202646 67549 101323 
Sindhuli 7 11 296192 42313 26927 
Data source: (Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), 2014a) 
A consequence of obtaining a loan from an MFI or the informal sector is the 
struggle to generate cash to service such loans, which may lead to short-term 
migration. Success stories are few, but occasionally working overseas does pay off. 
Pragas5 and his three brothers spent their childhood as domestic help at Dekaha 
neighbouring villages. Their teen years were bonded labour and rickshaw pulling. 
They tried hard to pay back the debt their parents assumed on different occasions 
from moneylenders, normally from the same landlord where Pragas and his siblings 
were working as domestic help and later as bonded labour. Their parents took credit 
for consumption, medication for elders and themselves, and a daughter’s marriage 
and were barely able to provide food for the family.  
                                                 
5Personal friend of researcher 
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Pragas got married, after his sister, and was unable on his earnings to manage 
consumption expenses and servicing the debt burden. They started a group for 
workers to migrate short-term to India. Their earnings from migrating work were 
enough for consumption but not debt repayment. Migration to foreign lands, such 
as Qatar and Malaysia, became popular among group members. Pragas decided to 
go to Qatar after meeting with an agent from a labour consultancy in Kathmandu. 
He took a loan of NRs 100,000 from a neighbouring village’s moneylender. He 
worked for three years at Qatar and then returned home. He managed to repay the 
credit but he does not save money for investment.  
He borrowed again to return to Qatar and this time took his two other brothers.  In 
Qatar, he knew where to go and what to do and did not need other people’s 
assistance. He returned to Nepal after three years with his brothers. This time they 
paid back the credit and bought a small piece of land where Pragas built his own 
bamboo house. He spent all his earnings on building the house and land. He did not 
have savings but he was reluctant to go abroad again. He started investigating local 
credit options, visiting banks that operated in the nearest towns; Janakpur and 
Jaleswor, the district headquarters. His time in Qatar had given him greater 
confidence, especially relating to financial matters. He was unable to get any help 
from banks, so he borrowed from a moneylender and started a business; a tea stall 
at his village. This time he was confident he would be able to pay back the 
moneylender from his local earnings. His wife and mother help him run the tea stall 
and he makes regular repayments to extinguish his debt. He is able to send his 
children to school. This is a story of an unfortunate person who is financially 
excluded and bound to pay higher interest rate to the local moneylender to try his 
luck for a better future.  
MFIs should widen their wings to include these excluded rural poor in their services 
to make their life fortunate. MFIs can assist people like Pragas, making their life 
easier by providing credit facilities at a local level instead of through urban-based 
financial institutions. Credit facilities in rural communities save time and ease 
access to credit for simple people. Rural people can be motivated to become 
involved in financial activities to accumulate cash for their family’s wellbeing. 
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Labour migration and remittances have their own role to play in household 
economic development. However, migration also has a role to play in human capital 
accumulation. The longer-term migrant worker, using the caste-based vocation 
which they grew up with, may receive an injection of new competencies through 
working in a foreign land. Sunam (2014), in a Nepalese village case, discusses how 
one man developed his tailoring skills and established a tailoring business after 
returning home with savings from Qatar.  
Those who do not have skills can accumulate benefits by acquiring new skills 
working overseas and the exposure they gain puts them to the fore of the crowd to 
do things differently. These people are assets to their country from what they 
accumulate during their foreign sojourns. The foreign sojourn promotes 
entrepreneurship, and transferrable knowledge and skill (Aghion & Bolton, 1997; 
Dahal, 2014). The new working culture, habits, behaviour, norms and ideas (Levitt 
& Lamba-Nieves, 2010) may enable them to start their own small businesses with 
the little savings accrued. Their engagement in economic activities contributes to 
the country’s economic development. As the local economy improves, new 
opportunities for self-employment arise and there are job opportunities for others. 
The success of these new businesses will provoke others to do the same. MFIs’ 
initiations are also potentially capable of promoting significant economic success 
for the poor. MFIs are essential in a situation where there is minimal employment 
creation (Nepal Remittance Association, 2014) while government and private 
sectors sleep (Karobar, 2015). The MFIs’ role is vital to help poor escape the 
poverty trap and have a better life.  
 Need of cash and migration as a stimulant 
The opportunities for improved standards of living that will flow from expanded 
availability of MFI facilities in Nepal is evidential. There are 37 MFIs operating in 
Nepal. Despite such initiatives, there are significant regions that have no MFIs 
services. The need for cash continues to increase for the rural poor as they struggle 
to meet social and religious responsibilities. These are people who are without land 
and livestock, living a subsistence lifestyle on a day-to-day basis. 
Increasingly, there is an expansion of the long-standing tradition of men moving to 
areas outside the village to earn some cash to meet financial obligations or invest 
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in the acquisition of poultry. As the migratory labour movement grows, in the 
absence of alternative mechanisms to finance basic inputs, a process of social 
disintegration accelerates. Villages without men, families without husbands, fathers 
and brothers are becoming more common and threaten traditional values. While the 
spread of communicable diseases, as has been seen in parts of Africa, has not been 
documented, the danger is present and the country is ill-prepared. 
A greater penetration into Nepali rural communities by MFIs, clearly focused on 
outreach, could promote sustainable changes among these non-urban poor. 
Historically, the mission of microfinance is to lift the poorest of poor by providing 
financial services to invest in sustainable income-generating endeavours. Improved 
outreach can promote sustainable development (Shylendra, 2012) and economic 
growth, which will generate further demand and growth, raising the possibilities for 
many lower subsistence-level rural poor to escape the poverty trap at local level. 
Increased outreach and better financial performance of MFIs will impact local 
economic growth and job availability. This may stem and reverse migration, 
improving families’ economic and social outcomes. 
The majority of rural households have a low chance of getting MFIs credit. The 
lack of physical collateral, lengthy application processes which discourage the 
uneducated from applying, and lack of MFIs in rural areas mean the informal sector 
of moneylenders is the only real source of cash for rural poor, aside from shorter-
term seasonal migratory employment. The investigation presented here considers 
the short-term seasonal migrant labour phenomenon, contrasting the results with 
what could be achieved through promoting MFIs outreach programmes with 
sufficient appeal to overcome the scepticism and conservative nature of the rural 
poor. Returning MFIs to a primary objective of growing the social economy by 
providing financial services to the poor is a workable programme. Microcredit loans 
designed principally to facilitate entrepreneurial activities in poorer communities, 
through starting income-generating businesses, will reduce poverty and promote 
social cohesion. It is noted that greater success is likely if MFI expansion is coupled 
with agricultural extension and business model developments. The trickle-down 
effect in isolated village communities is rapid as day-labour opportunities expand. 
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Short-term migration has become the way for self-help. The wages earned through 
migration are a vital source of cash but it is a cycle of poverty with little likelihood 
of escape. Money earned through short-term migration, in most cases, dissipates 
through repayment, partially or fully, to moneylenders, friends or others who 
supplied loans. When the purpose of the credit is for consumption, weddings, 
medical expenses, or travel expenses to find work, it becomes a vicious cycle. There 
are no surplus funds available for investment in productive use. MFIs may be able 
break the poverty cycle. A lack of education and financial literacy contributes to 
the repetitious cycle. Without mentoring and financial planning assistance, there 
are limited prospects for creating wealth from the meagre funds available. 
 Cash generation  
Credit suppliers continue to meet the increasing demand for cash. As demand 
increases so does the cost of credit. The lack of financial inclusiveness in Nepal, as 
shown in Figure 2, reflects a low-level of penetration by the formal sector. The 
informal sector, operating in a largely unregulated setting, means there are good 
arbitrage opportunities in lending money. Seasonal migration (also known as labour 
circulation) has also long been a major feature of livelihoods in rural Nepal (Gellner, 
1982). In rural settings, the majority of family members engage in migratory work. 
Almost without exception, at least one member of each family leaves the village in 
search of a job in a nearby town or city and often in the Indian border area. 
Cheaper transportation costs and readily available transport facilities from the 
Indian boarder to cities in India encourage short-term migration. The major border 
crossing points from Nepal into India are serviced by railway and road transport to 
major Indian cities. Costs associated with short-term migration principally consist 
of transportation, food for the journey and funding a couple of days at the 
destination while finding employment. These expenses consume the majority of 
money provided by friends, relatives, and local moneylenders.  
 Positive actions toward microfinance in Nepal 
There is a range of initiatives, established by successive administrations, to promote 
financial services and improve rural production and the quality of life for village 
people. In Figure 3 below, major programmes are noted. There is potential to 
rationalize the various schemes but no consolidation has occurred. Overlapping 
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programmes present a moral hazard problem and some exploit these to their 
advantage while others fall through the gaps.  
The Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) reports an 80% use of no-collateral loans. 
The figure is 5% higher than the second survey of 2004 and 6% higher than first 
survey in 1996. This shows that the presence of MFIs and their services has 
produced an improvement on the previous decade. This performance has reduced 
pressure on land and housing as well as other categories: ruminant collateral loans, 
which have reduced to 12% and 3% in 2011 from 14% and 9% in 2004 (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011). MFI financial services in Nepal have made it 
compulsory to an open account for their clients for their savings, credits and 




Figure 3: NRB and MFIs’ programmes 
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Rural Self Reliance Fund (RSRF): 
credit Provision for deprived sector 
Commercial banks are mandated to 
lend a minimum of 5.0% of their total 
loans to the deprived sector and 
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SACCOs, and FINGOs as priority 
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"Poverty Alleviation Fund” for future 
training programmes and to extend 
micro-financing services to enable 
the growth of rural financial markets.  
 
Donor funded microfinance 
programmes: 
Production Credit for Rural Women 
(PCRW) 
Micro-credit Project for Women 
(MCPW) 
Third Livestock Development 
Programme (TLDP)   
Poverty Alleviation Project in 
Western Terai 
Rural Microfinance Project (RMP) 
Community Ground Water Irrigation 
Sector Project (CGISP) 
Enhancing Access to Financial 
Services (EAFS)  




 Capital building 
The need for cash for consumption and other purchases creates opportunities for 
the informal money suppliers to capitalize on their investments. Informal sector 
operators who supply cash to needy poor to fulfil their consumption and other needs 
are accumulating plenty of cash and growing their incomes. Capital is being limited 
to the money suppliers. The borrowers are unable to get rid of the debt. The 
moneylenders are in most cases landowners. In the rural regions, landowners are 
selling land for prices five to eight times higher than prices a decade ago. This gives 
moneylenders even more cash for their credit supply business and those landowners 
in the credit business find money lending less risk than sole dependence on 
agriculture and agricultural products. The gap between wealthy and poor is 
increasing.  MFIs can intervene, bringing their financial services to the poor people 
in rural as well as urban areas for investment and creation of job opportunities at 
local level (Newman et al., 2014). 
 Sustainability 
The improvement of agricultural production through self-sufficiency to capital 
accumulation is essential for the rural poor of Nepal. The traditional method of 
agriculture can result in workers being unemployed for long periods during the year 
and forcing them, through economic necessity, to look for employment 
opportunities elsewhere (Department for International Development, 2007; Walsh 
& Jha, 2012). Table 3 reports that the vast majority (95%) of non-land owning 
households rely on non-agricultural activities for the major portion of their income. 
For landholding households, the situation is more evenly balanced with a small 
majority not able to survive purely from agriculture. The sufficiency of the 
agricultural products for the landless households is too low at approximately 5%, 





Table 3: Households and their dependence on agricultural and non-
agricultural activities  
 
Total 
Main source of 
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71,517  64,804.5 
433,46
2 
6.1 53,597 17,920 35,474 36,044 
Data source: (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013) 
Encouraging the development of efficient markets for agricultural products, in the 
sense of transparency regarding prices and a regulatory framework to minimize 
corruption and cartel practices, is an essential component for encouraging 
agricultural investment. A greater confidence in fair prices for agricultural products, 
coupled with access to capital through MFIs, will expand the quantity and range of 
produce available to consumers. There does need to be a market and transport for 
crops produced. 
A recent problem relating to ginger production in Nepal serves as a salutary lesson. 
Nepal is the third largest producer of ginger after India and China (Prasain, 2014). 
The Nepalese farmers have limited training and no access to technical advice on 
pre- and post-production of ginger to reduce spoiling of this perishable crop by 
rhizome rot (Nepal Trade, 2014). The lack of a processing plant at local level means 
export is essential and more than 60% of Nepali ginger goes to India (Gurung, 2013). 
Indian importers process the ginger adding value (Gurung, 2013) and re-export it 
internationally.   
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The farmer, while benefiting from the sale, is not benefiting from the added value 
of processing. A producers’ cooperative to store, dry and process ginger may be 
viable but requires investment. Without access to capital, farmers have no option 
but to sell ginger to the intermediaries at the offered price or face the ginger rotting 
(Gurung, 2013). 
A ginger market, supported with soft interventions to ensure there is no monopsony 
present, could reduce the trend of migration or foster reverse migratory trends 
(Mercy Crops, 2014). The intervention of the financial institutions to facilitate the 
proper market for the ginger, collecting it and establishing processing centres in 
production regions will benefit growers and the economy. MFI support for 
individual growers and smaller entrepreneurs will promote a vibrant industry 
context. MFIs' inclusion in rural areas has a significant and positive impact on 
people’s lives in Nepal (Rajbanshi, Huang, & Wydick, 2015) which may support 
the local and country economies in the long term. Furthermore, Lønborg and 
Rasmussen (2014) find MFIs supported poor people living are better than poor who 
are not supported. 
The flow-on effect in terms of better diet, improved health and less reliance on 
imported perishables will be considerable (Mazumder & Lu, 2015; Walsh & Jha, 
2012). Government intervention in supporting a more open market is a necessary 
component of a sustainable solution for the cash poor families to ginger up their 
local economies. This will have direct impact on the agricultural jobs in the region. 
An increase in agricultural activity will affect employment opportunities and may 
translate to downstream processing activities (Walsh & Jha, 2012). 
Investment in lifestyle changes is not a one-off capital injection.  A loan to buy a 
female kid (goat) can be a start. Support for good nutrition, access to good semen 
for breeding, basic equipment for milk collection and distribution/sale and care for 
kids will require ongoing investment. A small enterprise that is successful will 
repay the capital and interest. If it grows larger, then there is likely to be ongoing 
leverage required and this is good business for the MFI. 
Poultry farming – duck, chicken or geese – can provide a source of protein to a 
family and produce for sale. When planned and managed at the local level it is 
obvious that not every poultry owner needs a drake, rooster or gander. The 
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possibility of borrowing with payment in kind for the service can lead to further 
spin-off business. 
Cash crops offer potential and do not necessarily require much land to get started.  
Roof gardens are common and there is potential for improvement with a small 
injection of capital for quality seedlings and nutrients. The conversion of livestock 
manure through composting or liquefying is a basic source of nutrients. There is the 
potential for commonalities. If peas are grown, then pea-hay provides a good source 
of feed for livestock during the winter months. 
MFI credit and on-the-ground agricultural extension advice is important. In 
communities where literacy is low, schooling is unlikely to provide the necessary 
knowledge and skills to bolster production, manage risks and improve productivity. 
MFIs individually or jointly supporting extension services can assist in remedying 
the knowledge/skill gaps. 
Progress is happening in some areas as shown in Table 4, which presents several 
performance metrics. There are additional MFI activities, including more staffing 
and lending, but there is no evidence indicating an inclusion of the rural poorest of 
the poor. Delays are costly in terms of quality of life: morbidity rates, health, 
education and social structures, and national cohesion 
The number of staff in MFIs has increased due to the number of registered MFIs 
increasing from 28 in 2013 to 48 in 2017. The Table 4 progress report shows that 
total staff involvement in MFIs increased from 3296 to 6631, which is 31%, 32%, 
16%, 17% for 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively. Total number of staff 
involvement decreases to 16% in 2015. However, there is 101% staff involvement 
improvement from 2013 to 2017. There is a significant jump of 110% in MFI 
branch establishment from 2013 to 2017. The number of centres increased by 135% 
from 2013 to 2017. The number of centres has increased by 42% for 2014, reduced 
by 29% in 2015, further reduced to 21% in the beginning of 2017. The sharp 
downfall in members, number of borrowers and number of passive members points 
to a potential ineffectiveness in MFIs’ programmes. The closing of centres and staff 
inefficiency in promoting outreach to the neediest people remains a concern. MFIs’ 
loan distribution improved to 177% from 2013 to 2017. The loan distribution 
increased to 41% in 2014 and then dropped 36% in 2015, and further dropped to 
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21% in 2017. This is indicative of the MFIs focus towards a profit objective when 
making loans rather than prioritizing an outreach perspective. 
The number of microfinance loans repaid dropped in 2015 to 30% from 42% in 
2013, and further it drops to 19% in 2017 from 44% in 2016. The outstanding MFI 
loans increased to 84% in 2015 from 30% in the previous year and reached 26% in 
2017. MFIs loans outstanding has increased by 248% from 2013 to 2017. Loan loss 
provision has reached 88% from 2013 to 2017. Loan loss provision in 2015 reached 
31%, up from 15% in 2013. These figures do raise some concerns about MFIs’ staff 
efficiency and programme effectiveness in urban as well as rural areas. The 
percentage change in number of depositors reached to 17% in 2017 from 32% in 
2014, 27% in 2015 and 17% in 2016, which is a concern as it is becoming a trend. 
The total saving-to-total-loan ratio reduced in 2015 to 28% from 31% in 2013. This 
is only a small reduction and when combined with the share of compulsory savings 
in total savings the decline does start to raise concerns. The proportion of 
compulsory savings to total savings assumed to be MFIs borrowers, reduced to 29% 
in 2017, 32% in 2016, 35% in 2015 from 38% in 2014 and 41% in 2013. 
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Table 4: MFIs in Nepal 
Indicator 1st quarter 2013 1st quarter 2014 1st quarter 2015 1st quarter 2016 Jan-17 
 Changes   
Nepali Calendar year 31/12/2069 30/12/2070 31/12/2071 30/12/2072 29/09/2073 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 to 2017 
No. of MFIs 28 35 36 41 48  
  
  
Total no. of Staff 3296 4319 5715 6631 7731 31% 32% 16% 17% 101% 
No. of  Branches 598 813 1062 1258 1555 36% 31% 18% 24% 110% 
No. of Centres 39895 56503 73076 93895.2 113484 42% 29% 28% 21% 135% 
No. of Groups 215128 280871.2 290368.2 352768.2 399579 31% 3% 21% 13% 64% 
No. of Passive 
Groups 8844.4 9959 11020 5078 9045 13% 11% -54% 78% -43% 
No. of Members 1163712 1542345 1476636.85 1793828 2068235 33% -4% 21% 15% 54% 
No. of Passive 
Members 61811 68543 52846 35323 56881 11% -23% -33% 61% -43% 
No. of Borrowers 848974 1060315 1030914 1247147 1384809 25% -3% 21% 11% 47% 
Total loans 
disbursed 129519366.8 181155300.9 249169122 353605056 433030783 40% 38% 42% 22% 173% 
Microfinance Loan 104856050.1 147887362.6 201572927.3 289985678 349679472 41% 36% 44% 21% 177% 
Micro Enterprise 
Loan 7900618.787 11301362.11 16610437.93 22946021.9 29214024.9 
    190% 
Other Loan 16762697.91 22789231.14 30985756.73 40673356.2 54137286.2     143% 
Loans Recovered 108504536.3 149228936.1 199152117.7 283307796 343213952     161% 
Microfinance Loan 
Repaid 89545338.64 127082834.6 164999794.1 236904443 282722170 42% 30% 44% 19% 165% 
Micro Enterprise 
Loan Repaid 5786789.956 7865274.145 11323438.36 16111438.5 20614058.7 
    178% 
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Other Loan Repaid 13172407.66 14280881.88 22828885.25 30291914.8 39877723.1     130% 
Total Loans 
Outstanding 21014830.54 31926362.24 50302718.17 70570768.4 89830045.6 
    236% 
Microfinance Loan 
Outstanding 15317580.39 19984277.54 36753899.68 53320645.1 66980524.3 30% 84% 45% 26% 248% 
Micro Enterprise 
Loan Outstanding 2109430.783 3436076.441 5394309.343 6680984.91 8589931.99 
    217% 
Other Loan 
Outstanding 3597397.82 8506008.42 8154509.148 10576648.4 14259589.3 
    194% 
Overdue Loan 668542.7994 527067.1495 470825.3157 906583.998 747031.806     36% 
No. of Overdue 
Borrowers 52585 30044 32742 63486 62532 
    21% 
Total Interest 
Recovered 5595176.416 8552126.779 12258424.1 20218678.7 25502604.7     261% 
Total Due Interest 468863.9296 450136.9224 474816.965 594098.641 613516.764     27% 
Loan Loss Provision 702705.4045 807060.935 1058900.39 1320991.72 1483667.51 15% 31% 25% 12% 88% 
No. of Depositors 866222 1142160 1451453.5 1778277.8 2075103.8 32% 27% 23% 17% 105% 
Total Savings 6409471.449 9917091.892 14200338.24 21483836 27738328.4 55% 43% 51% 29% 235% 
Compulsory Saving 2600161.822 3793767.201 5019172.834 6813679.44 8165334.13 46% 32% 36% 20% 162% 
Optional Saving 2200609.475 3253525.832 4659335.561 7131200.46 9611320 48% 43% 53% 35% 224% 
Other Savings 1265497.466 2338395.547 3731066.188 6204778.34 8260835.58 85% 60% 66% 33% 390% 
Saving from People 343202.6858 531403.3114 790763.6595 1334177.76 1700838.73 55% 49% 69% 27% 289% 
Total Saving/Total 
Loan % 30% 31% 28% 30% 31% 
    1% 
Total 
Microenterprises 
Loan/Total Loan % 
10% 11% 11% 9% 10%     -5% 
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Microfinance Loan / 
Total Loan 
Outstanding 
73% 63% 73% 76% 75%     4% 
Compulsory Saving 
in Total Savings 
Ratio 
41% 38% 35% 32% 29%     -23% 
Data source: (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013b, 2014c, 2015b, 2016b, 2017a) 
40 
 
2.7 A snapshot on financial inclusion in Nepal 
The most significant observation relating to prior studies is that the majority of the 
Nepalese population is excluded from benefiting through readily available financial 
services. There are more than two  million adults without a bank account according 
to Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, and Oudheusden (2015). They report that 34% 
of the adult population (31% of women, 24% of adults in the poorest communities, 
and 40% of households) has a bank account in Nepal. This poses a big challenge 
for financial institutions to expand financial inclusion to ensure all people benefit 
from their services. Financial inclusion requires that financial services are available 
to all people and is typically defined as promoting the availability of finance at 
reasonable cost to the marginalised, socially excluded and regionally remote 
components of a population. Providing the services and products at affordable 
prices to people and businesses in a fair, transparent and convenient manner and 
respecting dignity are the hallmarks of financial inclusion (Center for Financial 
Inclusion, 2015; Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et 
al., 2015). The challenge for financial institutions should not be underestimated. 
There is an increasing demand for access to financial services to smooth 
consumption, build assets, generate income and manage risk in poor households. 
Financial inclusion is used as a tool to reduce poverty and to help economic growth 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). It further increases individuals’ prosperity by 
provision of access to financial services for well-performing small businesses 
wanting to expand with probable increases in employment, which, in turn, will 
boost the local economy. Ultimately, financial inclusion may reduce the differences 
in income inequality (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). Financial inclusion is a major 
challenge for a developing country such as Nepal where approximately 80% of the 
population live in rural areas and their livelihoods depend on agricultural and 
related products. The explanation for low levels of financial inclusion may be as 
simple as the high cost and consequential low return, plus higher risk associated 
with providing services to rural areas of Nepal.  
In the absence of formal sector financial services, that is, those provided by 
institutions under the control of the central bank and other government regulatory 
institutions, it becomes obvious that the majority of the rural poor will choose 
services that are available, referred to as the informal financial sector, that is, not 
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under the control of the central bank or other government regulations. Rural poor 
people may use their little savings to buy ornaments, livestock, jewellery 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2015), and other forms of savings that are 
considered less risky than a financial institution deposit, which is in keeping with 
the conservative practices found in rural Nepal.  
 Dimensions of financial inclusion 
Financial inclusion is considered in the literature in various dimensions and this 
study analysis relies on three: access, usage and quality. Access to financial services 
increases the confidence of people who benefit, grows cash savings, and the 
availability of credit will stimulate local economic growth. MFIs provide financial 
services but they also rely on their customers and educational services to enhance 
awareness of financial literacy among local people. The quality of financial services 
provided by MFIs is important in terms of fitness for use and robustness (Barman, 
Mathur, & Kalra, 2009; Triki & Issa Faye, 2013). The mode of service used differs 
between developing countries, where there is a clear preference for face-to-face 
transactions through a teller, and more mature economies where ATMs, internet 
and mobile banking are far more common (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). 
The World Bank (2014b) reports for Nepal that the total number of adults having 
financial institution accounts jumped to 33.8% in 2014 from 25.3% in 2011. Nepal 
has 32.1% of its adult population living in rural areas, where 23.7% of rural adults 
belong to the poorest groups and 40% of those have a bank account. A United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (2015) study reveals that 40% of the adult 
population is banked, 61% of the adult population is formally served, 57% of the 
adult population is informally served and 18% of the adult population is financially 
excluded. Nepalese access to a financial institution account improved to 6.7% in 
2014 from 3.7% in 2011. The use of bank accounts in the past years for receiving 
wages stands at 2.4%, government transfers 0.5%, and paying bills is 0%. The 
percentage of adults who have saved through a formal financial institution in 2014 
improved from 9.9% in 2011 to 16.4%. Furthermore, 11.9% of adults borrowed 
from a financial institution, an increase from 10.8% in 2011. However, borrowings 
from family and friends stands at 35.1% and borrowing from private informal 
lenders stands at 17.8%, which again establishes that informal lending is a major 
source of cash for rural poor (World Bank, 2014b). 
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The informal sector is the more popular route for rural borrowing. The traditional 
moneylenders are present and engaged with villagers who without significant travel 
ties and additional costs cannot access the formal sector funding through MFIs or 
banks. Moneylenders require from borrowers a lower level of literacy and do not 
have complicated forms to complete and a need for identity papers. The limitation 
of the information on the financial access makes it difficult to estimate the factual 
demand for funds. However, the demand driven financial system for poverty 
elimination is not reaching the ground. This shows that MFIs are still in developing 
mode and face many challenges as they attempt to serve their clients.  
On the supply side, funding for poverty alleviation comes from formal and informal 
institutions. Government agencies through various development initiatives, banks 
which are in part required to provide development money, NGOs and foreign 
investors, and MFIs provide the pool of funds. Remittances from overseas working 
Nepalese make a considerable contribution to the pool of funding. MFIs as suppliers 
of funds are drifting toward urban areas where it is easier to lend to employed 
people for consumer products rather than to the rural poorest of the poor. 
Table 5 explains the sources and fund supplies for MFIs. The fund supply comes 
from borrowing sector in total fund supply that stands at 59.77%, 63.36%, 64.43%, 
and 64.1% in 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014 respectively. The borrowing share has 
dropped due to the improvement in the members’ savings 29% in 2017 from 26.43% 
in 2016, and equity 11.02% in 2017 from 10.21% in 2016. Even though equity has 
reached NRs 11,745,531,910 in 2017 from NRs 3,743,978,810 in 2013, borrowing 
share has dropped to 59.7 % in 2017 from 64.17% in 2013.  The fund supplies from 
deposit accounts improved to 29.21% in 2017 from 22.62% in 2013. The most of 
borrowing comes from the wholesale institutions which receive funds from 
commercial banks under ‘deprived sector lending’ as well as donation. The 
deprived sector lending fund supply stands at 66,511.05m in 2016, 52550m in 2015 
and 43019.82m in 2014. The saving amount is a second major source of fund supply 
that stood at 29.21%, 26.43%, 25.15%, 24.9%, and 22.62% in 2017, 2016, 2015 




Table 5: Fund supplies for MFIs 
 
Sources and uses of funds of MFIs (amount in NRs. '000') 













share in total 
fund 
Total supply 




Apr-17 11,745,531.91 11.02% 63,698,124.96 59.77% 31,131,390.66 29.21% 106,575,047.53 101,683,408.05 4,891,639.47 
Jan-16 6,203,539.07 10.21% 38,497,048.23 63.36% 16,057,982.56 26.43% 60,758,569.85 55,327,268.14 5,431,301.71 
Apr-15 5,852,859.16 10.42% 36,193,876.09 64.43% 14130407.96 25.15% 56,177,143.21 50294985.59 5,882,157.62 
Apr-14 4,809,767.34 12.11% 25,023,972.34 63.00% 9,889,038.82 24.90% 39,722,778.50 31,948,315.54 7,774,462.96 
Apr-13 3,743,978.81 13.21% 18,183,403.77 64.17% 6,409,476.72 22.62% 28,336,859.30 21,014,824.63 7,322,034.67 
Sources: (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013c, 2014d, 2015c, 2016c, 2017b) 
Table 5 above shows the gap between the formal sectors services and high ratio of the financially excluded population. The gap between the formal 
sector services and demand of the financial inclusion is being manipulated by the informal sectors. 
Various patterns emerge from the data providing insights into both the issues and the lack of traction gained by policies and actions adopted to 
date. The discussion is divided into three sections: access, uses, and quality. 
2.7.1.1 Access 
NRB reports that there were 241 banks and non-bank financial institutions licensed in Nepal in 2015 up from 204 in 2014. There are 30 “A” class 
commercial banks, 76 decreased from 84 “B” class development banks, 47 decreased from 53 “C” class finance companies, 38 increased from 37 
“D” class micro-credit development banks, 15 decreased from 16 saving and credit cooperatives and 27 decreased from 30 NGOs in 2015 from 
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2014 as shown in Table 6. Nepal Rastra Bank (2015a) reveals total bank branches reached to 3838 in 2015, up from 3456 in 2014, and 3138 in 
2013 with the population per branch dropping to 7206 in 2015 from 7646 in 2014 and 8443 in 2013. 
Table 6: Growth of financial institutions 
Financial institutions  Growth of Financial Institutions 
 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Commercial Banks 3 5 10 13 17 18 20 25 26 27 31 32 31 30 30 
Development Banks 2 2 3 7 26 28 38 58 63 79 87 88 86 84 76 
Finance Companies 
  




4 7 11 11 12 12 15 18 21 24 31 37 38 
Total Banks and financial 
Institutes 
5 7 38 72 114 127 144 173 181 203 218 213 207 204 191 































Saving & Credit Cooperatives 
Limited (Banking Activities) 
  
6 19 20 19 17 16 16 15 16 16 15 16 15 
NGOs (Financial 
Intermediaries) 
   
7 47 47 47 46 45 45 38 36 31 30 27 
Total of Cooperatives and 
NGOs 
0 0 6 26 67 66 64 62 61 60 54 52 46 46 42 
Total 5 7 44 98 181 193 208 235 242 263 272 265 253 250 250 




























Sources: (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2015a) 
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The downturn in recent years as illustrated in Table 6 shows the fact sheet of 
financial institutions’ growth in Nepal. The percentage change in financial 
institutional growth reflects a downturn from 2012 by -2.57%, further decreased by 
-4.53% in 2013, -1.19% in 2014 and no change in 2015. These decreases are 
attributable to the decrease in finance companies and NGOs (financial 
intermediaries) over consecutive years. However, numbers of MFIs have increased 
during the years 2011 to 2015, reaching 38 in 2015 up from 12 in 2008 and 7 in 
2000. The number of financial intuitions grew even during the decade-long Maoist 
insurgency. This is the result of willingness of donor organisations to support MFIs 
and the demand for credit from rural poor. MFIs can provide the services that are 
not offered by commercial banks to include rural poor. 
 
 
Figure 4: MFIs outreach indicators 



















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Outreach Indicators
No. of MFIs Total no. of Staff
No. of Borrowers Total Savings
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The total number of staff has increased steadily over the last four years as shown in 
Figure 4. The rate of increase in total staff is significant with increases year-on-year 
being over 30%. Similarly, the number of centres and groups served also show 
similar trends. These patterns provide initial evidence of an increase in financial 
inclusion from an access perspective by Nepali MFIs. 
The marginalised and unbanked people who are reliant upon informal financial 
services may benefit from a more inclusive financial system. The World Bank 
(2014b) reports that access to financial institution accounts improved to 6.7% in 
2014 from 3.7% in 2011. 
The NRB has established four particular policies to enhance the level of financial 
inclusion in Nepal: to create policies and regulatory environment that allow banks 
and financial institutions (BFIs) to offer financial services to the remote areas which 
lack financial access; develop a financial infrastructure that has capacity to provide 
high quality financial services; to create innovative models of financial service 
provision that are used effectively to extend outreach to underserved regions and 
groups;  and to increase  capacity of clients to understand and utilise financial 
services effectively to help increase the access to financial services in rural areas 
(Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014b). 
The NRB requires commercial banks, development banks and finance companies 
to lend at 5%, 4.5% and 4% respectively with the objective of enabling the poor to 
access credit for self-employment as a poverty alleviation strategy (Nepal Rastra 
Bank, 2015a). The regulation in terms of outreach to the rural poor appears positive, 
with above required levels of lending at 5.1% for commercial banks, 5.2% for 
development banks and 3.5% for finance companies. This may be the result of the 
NRB provision of having at least one branch in remote areas where no access to 
financial services had previously existed and which carries an entitlement to an 
interest-free loan to minimise the service cost (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014b, 2016a). 
There are dangers of moral hazard behaviour emerging where internal transfer 
pricing of overheads results effectively in taxpayer subsidies to the financial service 
providers.  The degree of disaggregation of data needed to monitor such an agency 
cost issue is not currently available. 
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There are 1.1 million borrowers and 1.8 million depositors who are benefitting from 
MFIs, cooperatives, NGOs and INGOs in Nepal (Microfinance Information 
Exchange, 2015). Although the number of depositors is higher than creditors, 
borrowing stands at US$332m and depositing at US$154.7m (Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2015). The microcredit service providers use these deposit 
amounts for lending purposes. However, the significant gap of US$177.3m between 
lending and deposits indicates that the service providers have external funding to 
finance this lending. These external funds may come from their equity or donations, 
which somehow do not appear on their balance sheets. Any borrowing from other 
financial institutions increases the financial cost and MFIs will need to pass this on 
to borrowers. Asian Development Bank (2012) data indicates 1.6 million 
households use MFIs’ microcredit services with an average loan size of US$150. 
Nepalese MFIs reach 30% of households in rural areas and 40% in urban areas. 
The total client number served by the MFIs, (see Figure 4) had reached 1384809 by 
the beginning of 2017 up from 1247147 in 2016;  1,030,914 in 2015, 1,060,315 in 
2014; and 848,974 in 2013  (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013b, 2014c, 2015b, 2016b, 
2017a). This shows the hopeful improvement of MFIs regarding their commitment, 
even though their outreach reduced by 4.3% in 2015, improved with 21% in the 
first quarter of 2016 and slowed down to 15% in the beginning of 2017, (see Table 
4). MFI depositors reached 2075104 in the first month of 2017, up from 1778278 
in 2016, 1,451,454 in 2015, 1,142,160 in 2014, 866,222 in 2013 (see Table 4). The 
advent of a requirement that applicants for credit must open a deposit account is 
reflected in these significant percentage increases. MFIs’ total savings have also 
improved to Nepalese Rupees (NRS) 27,738,328,400 in the first quarter of 2017, 
up from NRS 21,483,836,000 in 2016; NRS 14,200,338240 in 2015; NRS 
9,917,091892 in 2014; and NRS 6,409,471449 in 2013 (see Table 4). Although, the 
total savings amount has improved in numbers with 235% in 2017 from 2013, 
savings growth has been deteriorating; from 54.73% in 2014, to 43.19% in 2015; 
then 29.11% in the first quarter of 2015 (see Table 4). The drop in the number of 
credit clients in 2015 shows that MFIs were concentrating on raising funds rather 
than outreach. 
Establishing branches in remote rural areas is expensive. The Rural Microfinance 
Development Centre (RMDC) is trying to increase financial inclusion in 75 districts 
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of Nepal through different programmes for MFIs, cooperatives and NGOs. It has 
so far reached 65 districts (Rural Microfinance Development Center, 2011). 
However, new directives of Nepal Rastra Bank (2016a) allow MFIs to add up the 
five more financially excluded districts among 22 as listed in NRB bulletin to 
extend their services on the current license of 10 districts services. The new policy 
from NRB that allowed MFIs to borrow NRs 30 million loan on 0% interest from 
NRB (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2016a) emboldened MFIs to start branches in remote 
rural areas. MFIs have less access to a significant deposit base and depend on 
borrowing from other institutions. Consequently, MFIs add an interest margin, 
which in turn makes their credit products more expensive to borrowers among the 
rural poor.  
Table 7: Presence of BFI and MFIs in five regions 
BFI Class 
  
A B C D Total 
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 
No. 30 30 84 76 53 47 37 38 204 191 
Branches 1547 1682 818 823 239 216 861 1143 3465 3864 
Population 











2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Eastern 287 309 109 105 26 23 244 314 666 751 
Central 770 835 316 294 136 125 288 398 1510 1652 
Western 264 293 290 322 66 57 180 228 800 900 
Mid-
western 136 152 75 74 9 9 88 120 308 355 
Far-
western 90 93 28 28 2 2 61 83 181 206 
Total 1547 1682 818 823 239 216 861 1143 3465 
386
4 
Source:  (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014a, 2015a) 
In spite of MFIs’ increased outreach, their viability and institutional stability, 
credibility, quality of service and breadth of outreach are always questioned. The 
diversified financial institutions have not yet managed to provide truly inclusive 
access to finance in Nepal. The MFIs’ lower branch presence, as reflected in Table 
7, results in an increasing proportion of the population to serve per branch. MFI 
presence is higher than Class ‘C’ BFIs shown in Table 7. Despite the MFIs pushing 
their presence into the hilly and mountainous regions, there are still 80% of 
49 
 
households excluded from banking services and 75% are the poorest households 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013). Still 77% households depend on informal 
lending (Asian Development Bank, 2013).  
There are more MFIs, Class “D”, than commercial banks, Class “A” as shown in 
Table 7 but MFI branches are limited to 861 and 1,143, which is less than 1,547 
and 1,682 in 2014 and 2015 respectively for Class “A”. This shows that MFIs are 
still in developing mode and face many challenges as they attempt to serve their 
clients. There were 314, 398, and 228 MFI branches in 2015 that improved from 
288, 244 and 180 in 2014 in Central, Eastern and Western regions respectively, with 
just 120 and 83 in 2015 up from 88 and 61 in 2014 in Mid-western and Far-western 
regions. The significant number of branches which increased in first three regions 
reflects the tendency to concentrate in more populated areas. However, the number 
of population to serve has reduced for MFIs due to the improved number of 
branches. The population number increased to 122,660 in 2015 from 110,856 for 
class “C” because of branches decrease to 216 in 2015 from 239 in 2014. Moreover, 
population per branch for the total BFIs has reduced to 6,857 in 2015 from 7,646 in 
2014. The large number of branches of Class A commercial banks in the Central 
region compared to other regions and only two branches of Class “C” in the Far-
western region in two consecutive years 2014 and 2015 places an extra burden of 
responsibility on the MFIs to serve the people in hilly and mountainous districts. 
2.7.1.2 Usage 
It is noted that the formal BFIs are not serving the people who need them most, 
even with the NRB’s continuous efforts since the 1950s, especially promoting 
services for low-income households and small businesses. It is typically the case 
that rural and poor households are away from financial services. Data on the usage 
of financial institutions indicates that the use of bank accounts in past years for 
wages received is 2.4%, government transfer is 0.5% and bill payment is 0% (World 
Bank, 2014b). For adults, 16.4% have saved with an informal financial institution 
in 2014 which is up from 9.9% in 2011; 11.9% of adults borrowed from financial 
institutions; an increase from 10.8% in 2011 (World Bank, 2014b). 
To increase the use of the financial institutions, the Ministry of Finance (2013), 
through two national banks, implemented pension payments for retired civil 
50 
 
servants from January 2014. The Nepal Bank Limited and Rastriya Banijya Bank 
are assumed to have 185,000 pensioner accounts (Nepali Headlines, 2014, January 
12). 
The number of depositors improved by 32 % in 2014, 27 % in 2015, 23 % in 2016 
and a 7 % in the first quarter of 2017 (see Table 4). The percentage change in total 
savings was 54.73 % in 2014, 43.19 % in 2015, 51 % in 2016 and 29 % in the first 
quarter of 2017 (see Table 4). The reduced savings in consecutive years 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 shows the use of MFIs has fallen. 
The Asian Development Bank (2012) observes that 56% of rural households and 
59% of urban households in Nepal have deposits with banks and 82% of all 
households have savings in some form. 
There have been successful cases of increased outreach in India with the 
introduction of mobile banking and electronic cards developed by a private firm, A 
Little World (ALW), and its not-for-profit sister organization, Zero Mass 
Foundation (ZMF). These options could be very useful examples for Nepalese 
MFIs (Arora & Kazmi, 2012). Nepalese MFIs have not yet started branchless 
banking, mobile banking, internet banking, and electronic (debit/credit) cards. In 
contrast, banking and financial institutions are providing one or more banking 
services to their clients with 1652 ATM outlets and 4,131,242 debit cards (Nepal 
Rastra Bank, 2014b). The number of credit card users reached 57,898 issued by 
Class “A” commercial banks (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014b). The Asian Development 
Bank (2012) survey indicates that more than 50% of households (rural and urban) 
could adopt electronic banking based on their holding a bank deposit account. The 
potential for these technologies needs to be considered efficiently and effectively 
to improve the uses of the financial services available in the Nepalese market.  
Information communication technology (ICT) services has significant role to play 
in using technology for promoting the development facilities for the poor. Central 
bank openness to adopt the technology advancement is an advantage for the MFIs 
to exploit in their service. However, a number of factors are the crucial milestones 
for the MFIs to use ICT in their services to increase their outreach: use of ICT, 




1. Use of ICT: The use of ICT provides the potentiality of MFIs to reach the 
rural region as well as reduce the operational cost. It also exploits the risk 
for both parties; service providers as well as service users.  ICT is still in 
progress in Nepal. There is limited access to internet and mobile network 
services in rural areas. ICT services are being formulated and used in urban 
more than rural areas. Nepal has yet to facilitate ICT services in remote rural 
regions of the country. Digital division of rural and urban service does not 
allow MFIs to take advantage of ICT in their services. Small scale MFIs are 
struggling to have enough capital as well as skilled human resources to use 
the ICT in their services to increase their outreach. As a result, small scale 
MFIs are depending on the paper-based approach, which is also the case for 
the large scale MFIs. Most of the MFIs have computers at their central office 
and continue to use a paper-based approach.  
2. Infrastructure: The role of infrastructure is essential for MFIs to enrich the 
rural region. Extending MFIs services to the needy people is a hurdle. The 
MFIs struggle to enrich rural areas because of the poor infrastructure. Poor 
mobile networks and unavailability of internet services in rural regions 
makes it difficult for MFIs to approach to the rural region. The ICT service 
has divided the rural and urban region in its services, making it difficult for 
MFIs to reach to the rural potential clients. Also, the infrastructure is not in 
place, which increases their operational cost. 
3. ICT familiarity: Rural people have no familiarity with ICT. Potential rural 
credit clients of MFIs are illiterate and uneducated which discourages them 
from using the online services some of MFIs are providing. The rural poor 
are unfamiliar with use of mobile phones and their services as well as being 
unable to afford the smartphone to connect with MFIs.  Some of large scale 
MFIs have online websites but it is yet to be utilized in general practices as 
the website does not provide enough information and online services for 
clients. Thus, physical offices need to be approached for further information 
regarding the institutional services.  
4. Money matters: Rural people have very limited understanding of money 
matters. The barter payment for labour is still in practice, which gives them 
less access and understanding of the commercialized world of cash uses in 
practice in rural region. There is a good example of barter exchange during 
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the IRS 500 and 1000 banned in India in 2016, some of the village life in 
Haryana, India was unaffected while cash dependence was in crisis for 
almost five months. 
5. Face-to-face assistance preference: Rural people prefer face-to-face 
assistance. Their confidence on receiving the proper information increases 
when they approach the office and discuss with a person in charge the 
service that they would like to get. The poor online service, less information 
available on the institutional website, and unfamiliarity with ICT pushes 
rural poor to approach the physical offices. The warm welcoming face-to-
face assistance provided by moneylenders is appealing for credit needy to 
approach. 
2.7.1.3 Quality 
MFIs play an important role for local economic development by including the 
unbanked rural poor in their financial services. It is the MFIs’ mission to reduce 
poverty by servicing low income people. However, the quality of MFI services is 
shabby in Nepal. Most MFIs have chosen to go into the densely populated regions 
for their ease of access and lower operational costs. MFI officials are guided 
towards the profit-making motive and the poor are not bankable (Rural 
Microfinance Development Center, 2011). Officials are put in a position of being 
selective when choosing clients, which leaves needy people with no option but to 
borrow from informal moneylenders. The Rural Microfinance Development Center 
(2011) says that over-indebtedness of clients resulting from overcrowding of MFIs 
in a few easily accessible areas distorts  this sector. MFIs should work for needy 
people in rural areas instead of residents in easily accessed regions. The presence 
of MFIs in easily accessible regions may increase rivalry among the MFIs, which 
leads them further away from their founding objectives. The stakeholders, Nepalese 
government and NFIs all need to find a sustainable way to reach the most vulnerable 
and needy people in rural areas. The Rural Microfinance Development Center 
(2011) has stressed that equitable national development is impossible until and 
unless MFIs increase their outreach to the remote rural regions in Nepal. By 
adopting modern technology, MFIs would find it easier to deliver their services to 
difficult geographical and remote rural regions, that is, mobile banking, telephone 
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banking and cash cards could be better options than opening physical branches 
(Rural Microfinance Development Center, 2011). 
 Informal monetary sector services 
Providing services and products from financial institutions to people and businesses 
in a fair and transparent manner at affordable prices, delivered with convenience 
and dignity defines financial inclusion (Center for Financial Inclusion, 2015; 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). In the 
absence of formal financial services, informal financial services are embraced.  
People invest their savings buying ornaments, livestock (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2015), accumulating these so-called less risky assets, according to 
the conservative practices of rural Nepal. These folk are reliant upon the informal 
sources: moneylender, goldsmith, friends and relatives. The unbanked people rely 
on their own savings for their obligations and investment (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Klapper, 2012), which reduces the potential for growth and transitioning from 
poverty through investment income-generating assets such as livestock or small 
businesses such as a tea stall. This ensures the maintenance of stark income 
inequality and poor economic growth. 
The Asian Development Bank (2012) finds 42% of households are in debt from 
formal and informal sources in Nepal. Further, it finds that 37% of rural and 8% of 
urban households borrowed from moneylenders and family members. Borrowing 
from family and friends stands at 35.1%, and private informal lending stands at 
17.8%, illustrating that informal lending is a major cash source (World Bank, 
2014b). The Asian Development Bank (2012) says average balances held with an 
MFI are $145 and those with informal sources such as family and friends are $85. 
The informal financial sector in rural Nepal is widespread, supplying 71% of funds, 
with relatives, friends and neighbours being the largest component at 51%, 
moneylenders provide 15%, and a further 5% comes from other sources. The 
informal financial services come from property owners, merchants, farmer-lenders, 
goldsmiths, pawnbrokers, friends and relatives (Barman et al., 2009; United 
Nations Capital Development Fund, 2011). 
The easy approach to personal credit, a short-term loan with quick access, and 
flexibility with or without collateral, is a popular informal financial service in rural 
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Nepal. In most cases, the informal sector provides loans on the same day or within 
a week at a maximum. The marginal difference in effective annual interest rates 
charged by the informal sector and formal sector is not significant in many cases. 
The informal financial service is an instant solution for obligation and emergency 
fund needs, which places large financial burdens on households to service the loans. 
Short-term migration is seen as a good source of cash income to relieve financial 
burden and has become a tradition in remote villages to generate cash. Migration is 
becoming a cultural pattern for survival and repayment of moneylenders. The more 
desirable process of generating surplus cash from investing in money-producing 
agriculture or trade cannot proceed as the males in the village are working 
elsewhere. MFIs have the potential to break this poverty cycle. Without mentoring 
and financial planning assistance, there is a limited prospect of creating wealth from 
the inadequate funds available. 
The availability of widespread informal financial services in rural areas is indicative 
of a demand, suggesting outreach would occur if MFIs were present and offering 
appropriately designed services and products with competitive timeliness. Efforts 
to date by the NRB to encourage formal financial institutions to establish 
themselves in rural areas have met with limited success. 
The potential to integrate components of the informal financial sector into the 
formal sector is worthy of consideration. Moneylenders may partner with an MFI 
in an agent role. The MFI may provide additional liquidity and the moneylender 
could manage the loan arrangements with the understanding that over time these 
will be more formally structured. 
 Implications 
The desirability of financial inclusion is seldom discussed as a goal in developing 
countries such as Nepal where most of the population resides in remote rural areas 
away from formal financial services. It is typically assumed that enhanced growth 
will stimulate inclusion, but an equally compelling argument is that financial 
inclusion stimulates growth by lowering the cost of credit and building sustainable 
self-sufficiency in rural areas supports policies to expand inclusiveness. There is an 
ongoing effort being made by the NRB to increase financial inclusion in Nepal. It 
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is unlikely the NRB will achieve its financial inclusion objective for the poor in 
geographically challenged areas.  
The NRB started Grameen model banking services, following the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh, in five development regions in Nepal. These banks are independent 
of each other but work under NRB. Grameen banks initially made significant 
outreach contributions to enrich the rural poor. However, they have become more 
focused in urban and nearby rural regions. The weakness of the BFIs and MFIs with 
low outreach and focusing on profit making objectives leaves remote people reliant 
on informal financial providers.  
Policies for BFI and MFIs are not making rapid progress to reach remote areas. The 
Central Bank policies on loans without interest when applied to MFIs in 
geographically remote areas result in “picking fruit from the low branches 
approach” with branches opening in the most accessible of what is deemed remote; 
this might mean somewhere between villages on a rural road. BFIs and MFIs have 
reached 65 of 75 districts in Nepal, leaving 10 districts without banking services, 
even though sophisticated technology is available in Nepal. Further, it is difficult 
to obtain data on whether these BFIs and MFIs actually reach remote areas or are 
just limited to an increase in the number of districts they serve. Data available to 
improve transparency is essential. The Nepalese government financial subsidy to 
MFIs and financial intermediaries should require transparency in external reporting. 
As noted, policies to motivate the BFIs and MFIs to establish in remote rural areas 
are not gaining traction. Operational costs for the institutions and the small amount 
of loans borrowed is not commercially viable positioning. The small populations in 
remote areas means that fewer clients are served at higher cost. The lower lending 
and saving amounts increase the transaction costs for MFIs. The poor in hilly and 
mountainous areas are scattered and living at a distance from each other, rather than 
in communities like folk who inhabit the plains. This scattered living makes it 
difficult for people to form a group to be eligible for MFI credit services. A policy 
to promote group lending to clients is likely to be attractive to potential borrowers. 
As this form of borrowing is currently practised through the informal sector, such 
a product is necessary to promote formal lending.  
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The majority of rural households have little chance of getting financial institution 
support because they lack physical collateral; the lengthy process of banking 
services discourages financially illiterate folk; and financial institutions are focused 
on urban more than rural areas in credit allocation.  
MFIs’ successful use of the Grameen model of group lending in the Terai plain 
region illustrates the tractability of the model. Policies to have National 
Identification cards will assist financial institutions. However, not all people will 
be entitled to the cards even though their families have lived in Nepal for 
generations. This type of racial policy is not unique to Nepal as neighbouring 
Bhutan has a significant grouping of people with roots as Hindu Nepali. They are 
not recognised as citizens. 
The poor infrastructure or no transportation service is another obstacle. It takes 
longer to reach places, resulting in less communication with clients.  It is also more 
difficult for MFIs to employ and retain staff in isolated areas unless additional 
allowances are paid.  Monitoring and performance systems need to be improved to 
reduce risks to the institution. Policies to improve infrastructure need to be 
associated with the goal of creating financial inclusion. Roading is obvious but 
expensive and, potentially, rural Wi-Fi is a better way to promote connectivity.  
Enhanced electronic communication will improve the inclusiveness of remote staff 
into an MFI’s operations and also their families and friendship circles.  
 Dealing with quake and MFIs  
A 7.8 magnitude earthquake in 2015 had a devastating impact upon the lives of 
Nepali people, commerce, production and social cohesion. It made people's life 
difficult for day to day activities, shelter, food and even clothing and other essential 
utilities like water, electricity etc. Government initiatives as of early 2017 have not 
reached some devastated places and been unable to build even a single shelter for 
people (Sharma, 2017).  
MFIs, SACCO, FINGOs are the primary financial sources (National Planning 
Commission Nepal, 2015) for income generating activities to the poor people, 
particularly in the rural and remote regions in Nepal. The microfinance and 
cooperative sector have been harshly impacted in the quake disaster regions 
(National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015). Thirty one of the 75 districts are 
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affected and 14 of these the most impacted, which accounts 13.6% of poor living 
under the poverty line (National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015). It is also noted 
in this report that 156 out of 1049 MFIs branches in country are damaged in a way 
that made MFIs difficult to operate.  
The livelihood of more than 2 million households, approximately 5.6 million people, 
is affected. It is estimated by the UN that  that 94 million workdays are lost and 
personal income of NPR17 billion destroyed 2015 (United Nations Development 
Programme Nepal, 2016). National Planning Commission Nepal (2015) reports that 
there are 72,064 households directly affected and 53,457 livestock lost in the most 
effected region. The quake devastated 498,852 houses and 2,656 government 
buildings, 256,697 private houses and 3,622 government buildings. Forty one 
percent of damaged houses belong to Dalits and Indigenous communities in the 
most affected region (United Nations Development Programme Nepal, 2016). The 
preliminary impact assessment of damages reports that there are 132,000 and 
155,000 members of licensed MFIs and FINGOs respectively have been affected 
(National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015). The BFIs (Class A, B, and C) 
infrastructure damage of 408 branches and 652 ATMs may cost approximately NPR 
864 Million. The NRB building in Kathmandu itself needs NPR 3.1 Billion 
(National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015) to replace the damaged building.  
According to National Planning Commission Nepal (2015), MFIs may face two 
major financial problems: firstly, relating to a deterioration of asset quality because 
of the MFIs members may have lost their lives and livelihood in quake damaged 
areas; Secondly, falling in liquidity leading to a contraction or cessation of lending 
and an inability to repay deposits. MFIs obtain 60% of funds from mandatory 
lending for deprived sectors of BFIs of classes A, B, and C.  Potentially, there is a 
looming shortage of funding available due to the default risk on loans provided by 
MFIs and FINGOs as well as withdrawals of deposits by the members for their 
immediate expenses in devastated areas. MFIs have received NPR 34.5 billion 
under the deprived sector lending in 2015 (National Planning Commission Nepal, 
2015).  
Quake damage to the productive and community infrastructure significantly 
reduces access to basic services and livelihood opportunities (United Nations 
58 
 
Development Programme Nepal, 2016). People need additional credit support to 
finance their basic human necessities: food, shelter, clothes and basic utilities. MFI 
members need to withdraw their savings to finance their essential needs for their 
survival in this difficult time. Borrowers lose their income-generating sources and 
require support to make loan repayments. MFIs' credit policies require stable 
income-generating sources from borrowers as repayments to finance the credit and 
so a hopeless spiral develops.    
The major sources of rural livelihood in the quake affected areas include small 
farms; the sale of agricultural products, vegetables and artisanal products; and jobs 
from local tourism (United Nations Development Programme Nepal, 2016). Family 
incomes, depending on farming and tourism, are suffering. The economies of 
devastated areas have slowed down. Loan restructures from MFIs may help credit 
holders to recover their livelihood. MFIs are positioned to participate in 
supplementary roles to support house rebuilding and repair if they have funds.  The 
rebuilding can use salvaged materials: 80% stone, 30% wood and 25% brick in 
reconstruction (National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015). 
Maila Lama, a carpenter in Manekharka village, rebuilt his home with some 
salvaged corrugated tin sheets, a doorframe and some mesh wiring building a 
makeshift shed from debris for his family with three young children, using a 
borrowed hammer and nails (Sharma, 2017). His continuing efforts have assisted 
more than dozen families to get a roof over their heads. Maila’s initiative is a good 
example of work that gives the community ‘a new lease on life’ (Sharma, 2017). 
Using people like Maila for training others for building the small scale 
reconstruction leads to big achievements. “The recovery and reconstruction process 
will impact the labour and employment market, and systems need to be established 
to evaluate and match the demand with appropriate skill building programmes” 
(United Nations Development Programme Nepal, 2016). If MFIs can create ‘Cash 
for Work’ programmes to reconstruct the houses and shelters, that gives immediate 
income-generating opportunities, so, they can move onto the normal life track that 
is crucial for the developing country economy to improve.  
The Nepal government’s relaxation of document requirements and flow of 
remittance have assisted in recovery (National Planning Commission Nepal, 2015). 
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The average remittance received in Kathmandu stands NPR 58,967 with the highest 
amount NPR 89,647 and lowest at NPR 38,964 (Central Department of Population 
Studies, 2016). However, 45.5% of households, with migrant workers sending 
funds, are based in the worst hit districts and their remittance levels only reach up 
to NPR 25,000 (Central Department of Population Studies, 2016). This amount is 
too low to manage with the disaster that has taken up their belongings and preserves.  
2.8 Why does microcredit not reach many of the poor? 
For rural poor in Janakpur, there is evidence that they do not join the MFIs’ 
programmes because they lack the skills in the particular specified programme or 
they lack labour resources, as family members are already fully committed and 
sometimes working out of Nepal. Some of them are afraid of the consequences of 
failing to meet a loan repayment. Most people do not want to join the programme 
because they think MFIs charge high interest rates. Prospective borrowers can 
readily compare the costs related to a loan with charges made by local 
moneylenders, but the knowledge to do the mathematical calculation of 
compounding interest on the principle amount borrowed is not available.  Rules and 
regulations that borrowers must accept when taking a loan from an institution 
appear too demanding compared with the flexibility of moneylenders. A MFI loan 
is formal and does not give a grace period to commence making loan instalments, 
and this gives a bad impression of the MFI program compared with moneylenders. 
People in Janakpur preferred not to deal with an MFI even when one became 
available. 
Another reason is the staff of these institutions are picky and do not reach out to the 
households of rural poor. It is because of the pressure placed on field staff from 
their senior officers who demand they collect loan repayments and make sure 
people do not default. If field staff performance is measured by the percentage of 
loan repayments and no defaults, then an adverse selection failure arises.  
Prospective borrowers who appear most likely to repay the loan and exhibit low 
default risk get the money. The poor and unskilled rural people who are the target 
clients are excluded.  
Partnering arrangements with the local communities are difficult for MFIs that have 
a policy to encourage local people to take responsibility to ensure that loans are 
60 
 
repaid. When asked to be local representatives, there is general reluctance on the 
part of villagers to take on the task. The possibility of default discourages village 
members from wanting to be responsible for what might be an uncomfortable action. 
The confidence level of repayment on a group loan diminishes with individual 
members’ poverty levels. MFI field staff play a significant role in choosing groups 
and their respective members. If non-performing loans have a bearing on field 
staff’s performance records, there is low risk taking. Typically, there is no 
confidence that the poorest people will make their loan repayments on time, which 
effectively excludes them from consideration for taking out loans.  Barriers within 
the MFI and doubts in the community combine to ensure moneylenders’ hold on 
the poor and social pressures from short-term migratory labour will continue.  
2.9 Nepalese MFI structures 
 Discussion of different types of MFIs in Nepal 
There are many ways microfinance is provided; through microcredit providers such 
as banks, cooperatives, nongovernment organisations (NGO), and community-
based funding organisations. 
A potential useful taxonomy is to consider MFIs according to two different 
objectives: for-profit and not-for-profit. The commercialised for-profit 
organisations provide loan services with and without collaterals and non-
commercialised MFIs also provide loan services with third party assurance. For-
profit MFIs tend to have a more ‘business like’ role in the microfinance sector 
(Roberts, 2013). The largest portion of microfinance institutions fall into this 
category in Nepal, representing 42% (490 out of 1169 MFIs) in the Mix Market 
data base in 2009 (Roberts, 2013). 
The various types of MFIs differ in their approach and the characteristics of services 
they provide to clients. Not-for-profit institutions have an objective to develop the 
social economy through helping the financially excluded. In contrast, for-profit 
institutions are profit oriented and have highly commercialised objectives which 
divert them away from social economic development purposes toward generating 
financial operating profits (Lindsay, 2010). The profit allows them to run their 
services on their own and to be less dependent on the subsidies and donations for a 
supply of funds. Thus, the motives of for-profit MFIs relate more to being 
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financially efficacious rather than the more traditional goal of outreach to the poor. 
This makes commercialised MFIs more transparent for investors concerning 
probability of getting a return on certain level of risk (Galema & Lensink, 2005). 
For-profit MFIs provide the financial services with higher secured loan amounts 
issued with collateral.  
The MFIs started with the not-for-profit institutions that help the financially 
excluded people by providing microcredit loans. Financially excluded people are 
deemed riskier in terms of their ability to make regular instalment payments, with 
no collateral to support their applications. Not-for-profit MFIs do take these risks 
and can still financially remain solvent (Lindsay, 2010). Not-for-profit MFIs mainly 
operate with government grants, subsidies and funds from donors (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2010). This type of institution is always taking bigger risks. Regular funding 
supply or subsidies are essential for their operation, which enables the not-for-profit 
MFIs to continue their services to the financially excluded poor (Lindsay, 2010; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Non-collateral loans are riskier as there is a chance of 
slippage in the repayments and then there is a no security to be sold to repay the 
loan. This results in losses for the funder and creates the situation of dependence on 
a continuous supply of money from donors. Regardless of the financial performance 
and dependence on the donor supply of money, it is vital for not-for-profit MFIs to 
continue their financial services to the poor for social development by enhancing 
the local economy (Lindsay, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2010).   
It has long been argued that outreach, number of customer served, is an expression 
of MFIs as a social development mission. The not-for-profit and for-profit MFIs are 
structurally different, covering small independent cooperatives with grant capital, 
charitable non-government organisations (NGOs), commercial NGOs, profit-
making units, and subsidiaries of banks but they work for the same social 
development mission. 
Microfinance in Nepal has a historical background but it has become more 
mainstream after the establishment of the Grameen Bikas Bank in 1992. The 
Nepalese government’s liberal financial policies in 1991 accelerated microfinance 
activities and involved the NGOs in poverty reduction through microcredit. Nepal’s 
central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), has defined microcredit in terms of limits 
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on the loan amount with or without collateral. Nepalese MFIs are categorised by 
the NRB in ‘D’ class for the financial services.  
MFI services to the Nepalese people are operating with diversified methods and 
modalities as follows:  
• Grameen banking model;  
• Deprived sector lending model;  
• Rural Self Reliance Fund (RSRF) model;  
• Small farmers' cooperatives model;  
• Financial non-government organisations (FINGOs) model;  
• Savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) model;  
• Project based micro-credit model; and  
• Wholesale lending model.  
There are three sectors: government, semi-government and non-government 
organisations participating in the microfinance programme. As a result, there are 
31 MFIs and four wholesale microcredit lenders, 31 NGOs, 25 small farmer 
cooperatives and 15 savings and credit cooperatives (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013a) 
and some self-help community based groups. The mode of providing financial and 
non-financial services of MFIs in Nepal falls into three sectors: Microfinance 
Development Banks (MFDB); Financial Intermediary Non-Government 
Organisation (FINGO); and Cooperatives: Small Farmer Cooperatives LTD (SFCL), 
and Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), and Community-based 
organisation self-help groups. MFIs in Nepal could be divided into three sectors: 
formal, semiformal, and informal.  
 a) Formal MFIs: These are a government mandated model, and rural 
development banks regulated by the central Bank, NRB. These are for-profit 
organisations. 
b) Semiformal MFIs: This is a microfinancial model that provides financial and 
non-financial services to the poor. These organisations are unregulated and for 
members’ mutual financial benefit, based on the not-for-profit concept. Thus, 
SACCOs, Microfinance Development Banks, National Cooperative 
Development Bank, and FINGO come under this category. Nepalese society 
has a long history of cooperatives in the form of self-help groups. Cooperatives 
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are non-regulated. However, The Nepal government has put forward an 
amendment to regulate all the cooperatives.  
c) Informal MFIs: This includes moneylenders, landlords, friends and relatives. 
Table 8: MFIs’ frame 
Societies Licensed MFDB 
SACCOs SACCOs 
FINGOs 
Grameen Bikas Banks (GBB) 
Private Microfinance Development banks (PMFDB) 
  
Table 9: MFIs’ orientation 
Profit 
orientation Regulation Sectors Institutions Fund Suppliers 
Not-for-
profit 
Unregulated semiformal FINGOs, 
SACCOs 




Regulated formal NMFC Autonomous/private 
For-profit Regulated Formal GBB, PMFDB RMDC, RSRF, SKBB 






























































 Wholesale refinance institutions  
There are different wholesale refinance institutions that provide loans to MFIs in 
Nepal to support the microfinance industry. These institutions are briefly explained 
below.  
2.9.2.1 Rural Microfinance Development Centre (RMDC) 
The centre was established under the public-private partnership (PPP) programme 
as a joint venture with the Asian Development Bank in 1998 and other commercial 
banks, with NRB having 26% equity and providing guidance. RMDC provides 
wholesale lending to MFIs. Its untiring efforts to provide financial services to reach 
the poor, particularly in hilly and mountainous regions of the country, are reflected 
in it reaching 65 of the 75 districts in Nepal, and providing 70% of the country’s 
MFI funding. Its staff make onsite visits to isolated and highland regions to identify 
the cooperative societies and engage in building their capabilities. 
RMDC provides the start-up funds for microfinance operations to serve the local 
poor. This organisation also provides the financial services through the member 
organisation Microfinance Development Banks (MFDBs), Development Banks 
(DBs) implementing microfinance programmes, Cooperatives (COOPs) and 
Financial Intermediary NGOs (FINGOs). The RMDC aims to provide the financial 
services through these members to women who are under the poverty line. It has 
grown into a large wholesale lending institution with 186 members as of July 2014. 
It started with two MFIs in 2000 and the membership comprises 11 MFDBs, 10 
DBs, 24 FI-NGOs and 141 cooperatives (Rural Microfinance Development Center, 
2013). In addition to financial support, it provides technical and intensive training 
support to the member organisations to increase MFIs’ credit quality and 
performance. It helps the members improve institutional capacity by providing 
onsite knowledge and skills training to MFI staff and clients. These are some of the 
programmes that build up the capacity of the institution; on-the-job training, on-site 
technical assistance, classroom training on different subjects, study visits and 
interactive workshops, all of which expose MFIs to industry best practice. In the 
process, it monitors and supervises the members closely, which serves the aim of 





Figure 6: RMDC members 
Data source: (Rural Microfinance Development Center, 2013) 
2.9.2.2 Rural Self-reliance Fund (RSRF)  
The Nepal government established RSRF in 1991 for deprived people to increase 
income and job opportunities. It provides wholesale lending credits to the MFIs, 
SFCLs, FINGOs, and cooperative SACCOs to reach the deprived sector. It also 
considers long-term loans through the Agricultural Development Bank to provide 
cold storage for farmers and also for tea and cardamom wholesale credit for on-
lending purposes (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013a). 
2.9.2.3 Sana Kisan Bikas Bank (Small Farmer Development Bank) (SKBB) 
This bank was established in 2002 to provide wholesale loans to small farmer 
cooperatives. The Nepalese government initiated microcredit by setting up the 
cooperative movement and providing microcredits to re-settlers who were affected 
the 1960 flood (Kayastha, 2013). In late 1968, the Nepalese government established 
the Agricultural Development Bank Nepal (ADBN) to provide credit and marketing 
support for farmers. In 1975, ADBN established the Small Farmers Development 
Programme with the support of United Nation of Development Programme (UNDP) 
and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) that provided guaranteed credit for 
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groups and promoted group savings for group members who owned land less than 
0.5 hectares. 
SKBB provides financial as well as non-financial services to accelerate micro-
financial services in Nepal. It offers wholesale credit to the MFIs and cooperatives 
to enrich the poor and low-income people in the hilly and mountainous areas. It also 
provides non-financial services, and technical support to the small farmer 
cooperatives LTD. (SFCLs) and similar types of micro-credit providers. It basically 
promotes and strengthens the grass–roots small farmer cooperatives LTD (SFCLs). 
It also runs training programmes: financial management, financial evaluation, 
cooperative management, bookkeeping, a replication programme, supervision and 
evaluation of cooperatives for an institutional capacity development programme for 
SFCL, which  has benefitted 140,000 groups (Sana Kisan Bikas Bank, 2014). 
SKBB has found that women are better clients and managers of microfinance 
programmes than men or mixed gender SFCLs, producing better financial results 
for their institutions (Sana Kisan Bikas Bank, 2014). Ledgerwood (1997) finds that 
the repayment rate was significantly poor, reaching 50% in 1996 and the average 
loan size was NRS 8,000 to NRS 30,000 with interest 14-18% for individuals within 
the group.  
2.9.2.4 First Microfinance Development Bank Ltd. (FMDBL)  
The First Microfinance Development Bank Ltd was established in 2010 as a 
wholesale lending micro-credit service to the economically and socially 
disadvantaged and deprived people through MFIs or community-based 
cooperatives. It prioritizes wholesale lending in microenterprises, businesses, and 
income-generating or self-employment activities to improve the livelihood of 
targeted people and minimize poverty. It is also committed to promoting sustainable 
microfinance services in Nepal by providing consultancy services for professional 
development, study and research, fund management, institutional evaluation and 
management, institutional change, and other aid services. In additional to wholesale 
lending, it is contributing to capacity building through microfinance training, 
professional training on microbusiness, seminars and other interaction programmes, 
monitoring and supervision and value chain creating activities by recommending 




2.9.2.5 Centre for Microfinance (CMF) 
The Canadian centre for international studies and cooperation implemented a 
project in Nepal funded by the Ford Foundation and the US Agency for 
International Development during 1998-2000. This project became autonomous 
and a privately owned national network organisation for strengthening the 
microfinance sector. In 2000, it was renamed as the Centre for Microfinance with a 
vision of “sustainable access to microfinance services for the poor” (Centre for 
Micro-Finance Nepal, 2014). It strengthens the MFIs' delivery capacity to serve the 
poor with microfinance services with the women as the focal point, by conducting 
the training, providing technical assistance to improve their technical capacity, and 
knowledge management in Nepalese MFIs. The Centre also explores the MFI 
market through its research, advocacy and advice on the policy changes involving 
all stakeholders, staff members and project advisors for MFIs. This is achieved 
through building up a network with national and international MFIs practitioners 
(Centre for Micro-Finance Nepal, 2014). CMF mentioned on its websites that it has 
54 members including 25 microfinance experts, 2 associations, and 27 institutions 
in Nepal. 
 MFIs model in Nepal 
MFIs’ modality of serving the financially excluded people in Nepal is defined as 
Microfinance Development Banks (MFDB), Financial Intermediary Non-
Government Organisations (FINGOs), Cooperatives, Microfinance programmes 
through donors, and Asian Development Bank (ADB). These are described and 
discussed below 
2.9.3.1 Microfinance Development Banks (MFDB) 
This category can be divided into two parts: Grameen Bikas Bank (GBB) and 
Private Microfinance Development Banks (PMFDB) (South Asian Micro-
entrepreneurs Network, 2011). 
2.9.3.1.1 Grameen Bikas Bank (GBB) 
This bank is established by the Nepal government on a similar concept to that of 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh on the recommendation of the central bank, NRB, 
for the purpose of improving the living standards of the very poor, under the 
regional rural development bank named as a Grameen Bikas Bank (Kayastha, 2010). 
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Grameen banks are established in five regions of Nepal to provide the optimal level 
of financial services to the poor who are under the poverty line. Grameen Bank’s 
services are focused on the providing financial services to rural women without 
collateral under a guarantee. It provides individual- and group- based loans where 
group members guarantee each other’s loans. It also provides individual loans on a 
collateral basis. Grameen Bank’s target clients are women who can get the loan on 
the group guarantee for a short term with no collateral at first. The loan amount and 
loan term period eventually depends on the members’ reputation for repayments on 
previous loan. 
2.9.3.1.2 Private Microfinance Development Banks (PMFDB). 
The Nepal government’s regulation that 3% (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013a) of total 
loan portfolio investment of commercial banks must be in the deprived sector 
generated the private microfinance development banks. These banks are disciplined 
by the fund supplier organisation, RMDC, SKBB and RSRF. This is where 
commercial banks and financial companies invest their mandatory 5% share of 
investment for rural communities development as the private MFIs. They are the 
members of the wholesale fund provider organisation for MFIs. PMFDBs are 
financed by RMDC, along with commercial banks and finance companies under 
the Deprived Sector Lending (DSL) scheme (South Asian Micro-entrepreneurs 
Network, 2011).  
2.9.3.2 Financial intermediary Non-Government Organisations (FINGOs) 
In the formulation and development of the Financial Act of 1995, the first NGO, 
called Nirdhan Utthan Development Bank, was established. It is licensed by the 
NRB as a financial intermediary. NGOs normally disburse money that they collect 
from deposits through MFIs as well as from wholesale credit.  
They are also formed from informal self-help groups of saving and credit services 
providers to become a formal organisation at local level under regional 
administrative supervision. UNDP and some other international non-government 
organisations have been running their projects for strengthening local governance 
in MFIs. Consideration has been given to working with community organisations 
(COs) at the Village Development Committee (VDC) level to mobilise funds. 
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However, community organisations are easily waylaid into a political lobbying trap. 
Thus, COs are seen as a personal political benefit rather than community benefit.  
2.9.3.3 Cooperatives 
These are divided in two categories: Small Farmers Cooperative Limited (SFCL), 
and Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs).    
2.9.3.3.1 Small Farmers Cooperative Limited (SFCL) 
This cooperative model of Nepal was developed in a joint effort with the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal and German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ). It is a trial programme established by the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Nepal in 1975. It is a community-based self-help group of 
small farmers who own less than 0.5 hectares of land individually. It provides 
financial and nonfinancial services to low income members mostly in rural areas. It 
is a community group organised to meet the members’ basic needs and address their 
interests. It executes its process of financial services through the ward of the local 
VDC. However, the executive committee at the top level of management will 
observe the ward-level leaders’ recommended credit applications to make the 
approval decision. It provides the credit services with or without collateral. Their 
welcoming open-door membership policies have managed to reach all around the 
country from a start of just two districts in 1975. SFCL also provides wholesale 
loan services to MFIs to reach the very poor efficiently and effectively as well as 
non-financial services: social mobilisation, training, and technical services. 
2.9.3.3.2 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) 
This is the community-based financing model that serves the poor and non-poor 
populations in Nepal.  It is a self-help organisation governed and managed by its 
members who are drawn from the same community. The members understand and 
cooperate with each other to save their money together and they are able to lend 
money to the members at a reasonable rate of interest. This cooperative provides 
both saving and loan financial services to the members in local communities and 
they are well represented throughout the entire country.  Cooperatives give a short-
term loan for a minimum of three months and can extend that to more than 18 
months loan for different objectives: children's marriage, celebrating a cultural 
ceremony, small businesses, buying modern technology that is TV, smart phone, 
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computer etc. The loan covers specific purposes, such as agriculture, 
microenterprise, housing, emergency or social reasons. It gives an opportunity for 
members to get loans for their consumables and business activities. They provide 
service options for individual or group saving products, deposits, and targeted 
festival and educational savings (Asia Resource Centre for Microfinance, 2004).  
The Cooperative Act 1991 facilitates groups of 25 members from a community to 
obtain registration to operate services through the Department of Cooperatives 
under the surveillance of the Ministry of Cooperative and Poverty Alleviation 
previously in Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Cooperatives are self-
regulated in Nepal. Members of the cooperatives typically know little about the 
cooperative services. There is no specific set of regulations formulated by 
government to administer. Poor regulation and supervision has resulted in 
SACCOs' deficiencies in good governance, standard accounting systems, and poor 
management practices (South Asian Micro-entrepreneurs Network, 2011). In 
addition to members’ savings, SKBBL is the main source of financing to SACCO 
at 9.5% (South Asian Micro-entrepreneurs Network, 2011). 
2.9.3.4 Microfinance programmes through donors 
There are donor funded microfinance programmes that run for the rural poor in 
Nepal: Production Credit for Rural Women (PCRW), Micro-credit Project for 
Women (MCPW), Third Livestock Development Programme (TLDP), Poverty 
Alleviation Project in Western Terai (PAPWT), Rural Microfinance Project (RMP), 
Community Ground Water Irrigation Sector Project (CGISP), and Enhancing 
Access to Financial Services (EAFS).  
2.9.3.4.1 Production Credit for Rural Women (PCRW) 
It was established on 30 November 1988, aiming to support rural women by 
providing them with institutional loans for their improvement and productivity to 
improve their socio-economic status.  
2.9.3.4.2 Micro-credit Project for Women (MCPW) 
This was established in 1993 with similar aims to PCRW but including rural and 
urban women for their micro-businesses through microcredit programmes to 
improve their socio-economic status.  
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2.9.3.4.3 Third Livestock Development Programme (TLDP) 
This was launched in 1997, with the objective to engage rural poor in livestock 
management and productivity, aiming to increase their income and employment 
opportunities.  
2.9.3.4.4 Poverty Alleviation Project in Western Terai (PAPWT) 
This was launched in 1998 with the objective to lift the socio-economic situation of 
the deprived poor in the Western Terai region.  
2.9.3.4.5 Rural Microfinance Project (RMP) 
This was established in 1998 to increase the socio-status of rural poor. 
2.9.3.4.6 Community Ground Water Irrigation Sector Project (CGISP) 
This was launched in 1999 under the poverty alleviation programme with the 
objective of providing ground water irrigation facilities to deprived community 
farmers for agricultural productivity improvement.  
2.9.3.4.7 Enhancing Access to Financial Services (EAFS) 
The Nepalese Government programme, financially supported by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) and the World Bank, is pursuing an initiative to increase access to 
financial services especially for urban micro- and small-enterprises (MSEs), and 
urban and rural low-income households. The project consists of five closely 
interrelated components: a technical assistance fund to strengthen the capacity of 
financial institutions; technical assistance to support reforms of the legal/regulatory 
and supervisory framework for microfinance; a line of credit for financial 
institutions interested in serving MSE, especially previously unbanked MSEs; 
technical assistance to reform state-owned microfinance institutions, that is, the 
Rural Self-Reliance Fund and the Regional Rural Development Banks; technical 
assistance to fund a public information campaign, project implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. The support has been extended to nine strategic and 
eight innovative partners to enhance their capacity under the Fund for Inclusive 
Finance (FIF) component of the project. It was successfully completed in March 
2013  (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2013a). 
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2.9.3.5 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
The Asian Development Bank, Manila raises funds for the incomes of small and 
medium farmers project (RISMFP) to reduce the market and business risk in ten 
districts of Mid-western and Far-western development regions of Nepal. The idea 
is to support the increasing production of high value commodities (HVC) by small-
and medium-sized farmers. The Ministry of Agricultural Development manages the 
supply funds with different stakeholders participating, including the NRB.  
2.9.3.6 MFIs and Technology in Nepal 
Potentially, technology has a large role to play in the operations and productivity of 
MFIs. It is surprising that the majority of the MFIs in Nepal still use manual 
accounting systems. Some MFIs have a couple of desktop computers in their offices, 
used by the executives for major calculations, report preparation or data keeping. 
The high cost of technology could be the one of many reasons to have few 
computers and less use of technology. In addition to an erratic supply of electricity, 
internet facilities are not continuous and are more tenuous outside major urban 
centres. As a result, most of Nepalese MFIs are not connected to the internet and 




3 Chapter three - Literature review and hypothesis 
3.1 Literature review 
This chapter is a review of the literature relevant to this study. The literature 
available defines the different aspects of governance and its factors. Previous 
studies on the relationship between governance and MFI performance recommend 
that good governance improves firm performance. This chapter will describe the 
governance, governance factors and the influences on MFI outreach and financial 
performance. A review is made of the governance factors: board size, independent 
directors, percentage of female directors, CEO duality, minor directors and their 
impact on MFIs’ performance characteristics. The governance mechanism is 
explained of four control variables: firm size, firm maturity, number of employees, 
and staff productivity.  
3.2 Concept of corporate governance 
Governance is defined as how well MFIs achieve their goal (Mersland & Strøm, 
2009). Governance is concerned with the processes, systems, practices and 
procedures that govern institutions (Chenuos, Mohamed, & Bitok, 2014). The 
Cadbury Committee (1992) defined corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (para 2.5). “Corporate governance involves 
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders” (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 2004, p. 11) and it is related to an institution's internal operating and 
control procedures. “Corporate governance concerns mainly the relationships 
between various categories representing firm’s performance and the variables 
describing the governance level” (Gruszczynski, 2006, p. 252). Corporate 
governance is a manner of how rules, regulations (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010) and 
incentive (Adeusi, Akeke, Aribaba, & Adebisi, 2013) are applied and controlled. 
The Council of Microfinance Equity Funds (2012a) defines governance as a system 
of people and processes that keep an organization on track towards implementation 
of its major decisions. Furthermore, governing bodies are defined as being to 
maintain the organization’s goals and mission, guide major strategic directions, 
manage risks, maintain an organization’s health over time, and govern the entity’s 
operations, regulations and controls in the organization (About Microfinance, 2016; 
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Koning, 2010). The role of the board of directors with concern for shareholders’ 
rights and privileges, and executive decisions is defined as a corporate governance 
(Blair, 1995). BBVA Microfinance Foundation (2011) defines corporate 
governance as principles and rules that regulate an organization's operations to 
ensure that the organization achieves its goals. Corporate governance policies 
provide a framework that can be applied everywhere to any kind of organization. 
For MFIs, corporate governance is closely related to how the board of directors and 
the management manage the institution. Therefore, governance is fundamentally 
associated with an institution's internal operating and control procedures.  
“Corporate governance is affected by the relationships among participants in the 
governance system” (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
2004, p. 12). Weak governance structures and a lack of a unified code of conduct 
put MFIs in a critical situation (Vishwakarma, 2015) because of the nature of their 
business. Practitioners, scholars and researchers have discussed the mechanisms of 
corporate governance in different types of firms:  government, non-government or 
private. MFIs can “protect consumers, organizations, investors, employees and the 
other participants” (About Microfinance, 2016) and may achieve their social as well 
as financial objectives (Gohar & Batool, 2015) by adopting high standards of 
corporate governance. The standard corporate governance system helps institutions 
to increase their depositors, borrowers, counter parties, and investors as well as 
maximize shareholders’ wealth by reducing risks (Gohar & Batool, 2015). It 
improves “economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence” (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2004, p. 
11). It plays a key role in providing strategic direction that creates transparency and 
trust for investors and attracts capital (Vishwakarma, 2015). It also benefits 
government bodies as standard practice may reduce fraud and mismanagement. 
Thus, corporate governance becomes one of the safest ways to restore public 
confidence in MFIs (Kansiime, 2009).  
Corporate governance plays a role to balance corporate resources utilization and the 
interest of the stakeholders: shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, 
financiers, government and the community (Gupta & Singh, 2014). Governance 
addresses the leadership role in the institutional framework (Chenuos et al., 2014) 
that applies and follows the rules and regulations (Vishwakarma, 2015) to reach 
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economic and social goals. It involves the efficient use of resources, being 
accountable for using power, obtaining the institutional objectives, and maintaining 
or increasing the “shareholder value and satisfaction of other stakeholders in the 
context of its corporate mission” (Chenuos et al., 2014, p. 72; Kansiime, 2009).  A 
firm may suffer competitive disadvantage when it fails to maximize share values 
(Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2001). Moreover, governance is a framework that safeguards 
and controls the relevant players (managers, employees, customers, shareholders, 
executive directors/managers, suppliers and the board of directors) in the market 
(Hewa-Wellalage, 2012). It is a mechanism by which boards of directors control 
managers’ actions to increase the shareholders’ value (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2001) 
and it aligns managers with the shareholders’ interest (Lehmann & Weigand, 2000).  
“The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and fair markets, 
and the efficient allocation of resources. It should be consistent with the rule of law 
and support effective supervision and enforcement” (Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, 2015) . 
There is no question that corporate governance has a large role in solving the 
microfinance crisis. Vishwakarma notes that:   
MFIs need an effective governance because of their complex business 
to provide thrift, credit and other financial services and products of very 
small amounts mainly to the poor in rural, semi-urban or urban areas to 
enable them to raise their income levels and improve a living standard 
that leads to socio and economic development of the country. 
(Vishwakarma, 2015)  
In some cases, MFIs’ social responsibility is seen as cosmetic and time wasting 
activities on corporate governance practices (Kansiime, 2009). 
There is little literature on corporate governance and firm performance available 
from emerging economies. The scholars’ findings in developed economies are 
automatically assumed to be working in developing countries, which is not the case 
when culture, and general norms, uncertain capital markets, the pyramid structure 
of companies, and laws and regulations differ from one another in developing 
countries. This means most developing countries do not benefit from good 
corporate governance practices. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
77 
 
Development (2015) explains the “desirable mix between legislation, regulation, 
self-regulation, voluntary standards, etc., will therefore vary from country to 
country” (p. 13). Governance that works well for a firm in certain contexts and 
circumstances may not work well when the situation or location changes. Therefore, 
the governance framework needs to be adjusted (Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, 2015). 
Good corporate governance maximizes the “profitability and long-term value of the 
firm for shareholders” (Adeusi et al., 2013). Thus, companies have now realized 
that good governance practice improves returns and lifts customer confidence 
(Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008).  
3.3 Corporate governance and MFIs’ performance 
There is ongoing research appearing in the literature, focusing on corporate 
governance in MFIs, especially in relation to developing and LIC.  Corporate 
governance has become more of a byword in the financial industry. It is ever more 
fundamental to measure its social impact and financial positive return for MFIs 
sustainability and aspirations. With sound governance, MFIs are able to formulate 
and implement strategies to achieve their goals (Council of Microfinance Equity 
Funds, 2012) and they can encourage the efficient use of resources and provide 
accountability (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010). Good governance practice may mitigate 
risks and ensure adequate human and financial resources to maintain MFI health 
(Council of Microfinance Equity Funds, 2012). Odera (2012) finds poor 
governance in MFIs in Kenya because the staff in the cooperatives had no defined 
roles and responsibilities or chain of command for decision-making, incompetent 
employees, and lack of management trust. Steege (1998) finds MFI governing 
bodies lacked many of the controls and balances of power that they should have in 
Colombian MFIs, Corposol. Tadele and Rao (2014) find that poor governance 
forced MFIs to close down in Andhra Pradesh in India because of unethical loan 
practices. The lack of suitable corporate governance policies is one of the main 
obstacles for the MFI sector's growth. These days many institutions are facing 
problems due to the absence of good corporate governance policies. That is why 
good corporate governance rules are needed to improve MFI performance to reduce 
information asymmetry (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 2011).  
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A Microfinance Banana Skins survey done by the Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation (2008, 2012, 2016) consistently finds the lack of corporate governance 
policies as the second major risk for MFIs. Governance is widely perceived to be 
inadequate, failing to provide sufficiently strong leadership to keep MFIs on a 
healthy growth path. BBVA Microfinance Foundation (2011) says the lack of good 
corporate governance is one of the main challenges facing the sector in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
The literature has recognized good corporate governance as a key element for MFI 
success. Good corporate governance is a "system of people, values, criteria, 
processes and procedures that ensure an organization is managed properly and 
guides it towards its mission and vision" (Barreiro & Ducasse, 2012) by the efficient 
use of resources (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 2011). An institution with good 
governance will be more likely to achieve its objectives and goals (Aboagye & 
Otieku, 2010). Good governance practice improves the performance of an MFI and 
assures its long term survival (Thomsen, 2008). Good governance in MFIs is crucial 
(Bakker et al., 2014) for building up their image in their clients’ view, in order to 
build trust. Transparency is important for maintaining society's confidence in MFIs 
demonstrating their work in promoting the general welfare of society, which is 
typically in the public and the government’s interest (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010). 
The positive image of the institution through building up trust increases the number 
of customers and improves the performance of MFIs (Thrikawala, Locke, & Reddy, 
2013). Further, they explain that transparency in management governs the good 
governance and attracts the donors as well as investors. Good governance plays a 
key role in creating transparency and trust for investors to attract capital (BBVA 
Microfinance Foundation, 2011). Good corporate governance contributes to 
efficient management to make decisions and uses the organizational resources to 
benefit clients and stakeholders (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 2011; Odera, 
2012). Thus, good corporate governance certainly improves the institution’s 
reputation in the market and increases the clients’ trust and good corporate 
governance is a prime concern of owners and other stakeholders of these institutions 
(Aboagye & Otieku, 2010). Therefore, MFIs are adopting best corporate practices 
to increase investor and stakeholder confidence (Vishwakarma, 2015). 
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MFIs are wearing two caps (BBVA Microfinance Foundation, 2011): one for the 
social services that particularly serve low-income people; poor and ultra-poor for 
socio-economic development in the country by providing financial services. For the 
second, they are responsible for managing their resources in the best way possible 
to ensure financial sustainability. MFIs also need to survive on their own for their 
services' continuation because MFIs runs on the donations and funding from 
government and international organizations. This dual nature of social and financial 
goals conveys the MFI vision, mission and goals through their daily operations. It 
is becoming crucial for MFIs to govern their service in better ways to increase their 
performance in order to achieve their targets and protect the institutional assets over 
time (Bassem, 2009). Boards of directors and senior management are challenged 
with this complex task, to maintain the balance in the dual roles of MFIs by 
formulating the right strategic vision for the institution (Vishwakarma, 2015). Thus, 
MFIs’ governing bodies must have the right experience and knowledge to guide the 
institutions towards achieving their two-fold mission.  
Researchers have given little attention to MFIs and their work to improve the 
welfare of the poor; rather, they have focused on performance. Clearly, MFIs with 
little or no profit would be more likely to go out of business, as funders and donor 
agencies would be reluctant to invest. Only the MFIs with better financial 
performance could continue their services. Thus, MFIs’ better financial 
performance is a matter of concern “how MFIs can sustain themselves” (Quayes, 
2012) and continue their services as a blessing for poor to come out the poverty.  
The concern for measuring governance performance is vital because it provokes 
behavioural change in board directors (Drake, 2012). There is no proven 
mechanism of governance factors and performance of MFIs (Drake, 2012). The 
existence of good governance undoubtedly leads an organization to achieve its 
objectives through better financial performance and outreach (Brown & Caylor, 
2006; Chahine, 2004). Good governance has a numerical impact on the operating, 
monitoring and auditing cost that has an impact of MFIs’ survival for future service 
(Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Varottil, 2012). Thus, better corporate 
governance is a key to enhance MFIs’ feasibility (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland, 2011; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2009).  
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Increased outreach and better financial performance cannot be achieved without 
good governance in MFIs. Better governance means the MFI is organized better, 
plans its goals and strategies better and fulfils its mission more efficiently (Barreiro 
& Ducasse, 2012). MFIs with good governance would lead to achieving their 
objectives efficiently and fostering their strategy accordingly (Rock, Otero, & 
Saltzman, 1998).  
Unethical business practices in MFI governance, moving from non-profit to profit, 
can lead to disaster, as was the case in Andhra Pradesh, India, as MFIs distributed 
loans without pre-checking the creditworthiness of the clients (Tadele & Rao, 2014). 
Bassem (2009), in his self-conducted survey in the Euro-Mediterranean, reveals in 
his findings that the different mechanisms have differential impacts on the outreach 
and sustainability of MFIs. However, the right mechanism of governance and MFIs 
performance is yet to be determined (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009).  
Many academics and practitioners have argued the relationship between corporate 
governance and MFI performance. Some scholars specify various measures of firm 
performance as functions of measures of corporate governance, while other scholars 
specify corporate governance measures as functions of indicators of firm 
performance (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010). Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) 
found firm performance to be a function of corporate governance indicators while 
investigating corporate governance and firm performance in Africa. Gruszczynski 
(2006) states a firm’s corporate governance rating is a function of the firm’s 
financial statement ratios and their association with operating profit and debt ratio. 
However, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) use the firm’s performance, Tobin’s Q, as 
a function of corporate governance variables and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) use 
return on assets and return on equity as the dependent variables.  
There has been little research conducted and the need has come to the notice to 
measure the correlation of governance in MFIs and their outreach and financial 
performance (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). None of 
the research finds uniformity with the governance structure and firm performance. 
Different researchers offer with different answers on governance as an input and 
firm performance as an output. The literature struggles to identify the corporate 
governance mechanisms that influence MFIs’ performance (Hartarska, 2005; 
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Mersland & Strøm, 2009). However, these historical governance studies should be 
taken as lessons that may help today. Some of the research findings are briefly 
discussed below. Hartarska in 2005, Cull in 2007, Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei in 
2008, Mersland in 2009 and 2011, Kansiime in 2009, Bassem in 2009, Barry in 
2011, Wellalage in 2012, and Thrikawala in 2016 have done studies on the 
relationship between governance and its impact on MFIs outreach and financial 
performance.  
Hartarska (2005) uses data collected in three surveys for 1998-2002 from rated and 
unrated MFIs in Central and Eastern Europe to measure the relationship between 
governance and MFIs’ outreach and financial performance. In her study, with the 
variables management remuneration, board independence and diversity, external 
governance mechanisms, her findings revealed that not all known governance 
mechanisms affect MFIs’ performance. Furthermore, ‘different factors have 
different effects’ on outreach and sustainability. She also said that donor presence 
certainly increases the outreach of the organization but worsens financial 
performance. She also finds that performance-based compensation of managers is 
not associated with better-performing MFIs; the lower wages suggested for 
mission-driven organizations worsen outreach, while managers’ experience 
improves performance. Her financial finding was that independent directors on 
ROA resulted in better performance, but boards of non-executive directors give less 
outreach and lower financial performance. She found external governance 
mechanisms play a limited role in the region. 
Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) use the data from 124 MFIs from 49 
developing countries to measure the MFIs financial performance and outreach on 
the lending methodology. They found that MFIs with individual loan methodology 
enjoy higher profitability. However, individual loan methodology forces them to 
choose the wealthier customers, which places the institutions in mission drift 
situations. The researchers did not consider governance variables such as board 
characteristics or ownership type.  
Mersland and Strøm (2009) conducted research with 57 countries’ MFIs’ self-
constructed data, collected by third-party rating agencies. They considered the 
governance mechanism through board and CEO characteristics, ownership type, 
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competition and regulation, customer-firm relationship on the MFIs outreach and 
financial performance. They found that the firms performed well with female 
directors on the board. They found that there were no differences between non-
profit organizations and shareholder firms in financial performance and outreach. 
They argued that there was a need for an industry-specific approach to MFI 
governance. The MFIs financial performance on ROA increased with a female CEO, 
and with local directors. Their results show that split roles of CEO and chairman, a 
female CEO, and competition are important explanations. 
Mersland (2011) argues that better corporate governance of MFIs has been 
identified as a key to enhancing the viability of the industry. He finds saving banks’ 
survival may improve when bank associations, depositors, donors, and local 
communities monitor the institutions. Financial viability increases when MFIs 
consider the wealthier customers along with the poor. His findings suggest the 
mechanism of governance and firm performance should be reconsidered, stressing 
regulation, for-profit ownership, and traditional vertical board control. He 
suggested that governance with a broader and more stakeholder-based 
understanding is essential.  
Kansiime (2009), researching in Uganda, suggests that MFIs lose public trust, 
investment from donors and investors, and in some cases end up closing their 
services, when there is no good governance practice applied. She further explains 
that companies must adhere to the laws and business ethics in order to build and 
restore public confidence. She has also explored the reluctance of government 
interference in MFI operations because the nature of the business, to alleviate the 
poverty, makes MFIs suffer operationally and financially. 
Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008) use ten years of data (1995-2004) based on 
the financial statements from 52 MFIs in Ghana to examine governance indicators’ 
impact on MFIs’ performance measures on outreach and profitability. They used 
the panel data technique as a key analytical framework. They explain that 
governance plays a critical role in MFI performance and that independence of the 
board and a clear separation of CEO and board chairperson have a positive 
correlation with both performance measures. They find that larger board size is 
more profitable with less outreach. Bigger MFIs are more profitable, but they are 
83 
 
unable to utilise their assets to enhance their outreach. The impact of MFIs’ maturity 
is negative for both profitability and outreach.  
Bassem (2009) uses the survey data on 42 MFIs in 21 Mediterranean countries, 
conducted by the author in 2006, in order to test the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and the performance of Euro-Mediterranean microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in terms of outreach and sustainability. He finds that larger 
board size, and a higher proportion of unaffiliated directors delivers the trade-offs 
between MFIs’ outreach and sustainability. More women on the board increases the 
outreach of MFIs and reveals that external governance mechanisms help MFIs to 
achieve better financial performance. MFIs may have better sustainability with 
regulation and the use of individual lending methodology. He also explains MFIs, 
active as NGOs, are more consistent with their social mission than with their 
financial performance. 
Barry and Tacneng (2011) consider a panel of 281 MFIs in Sub-Saharan African 
countries registered in the Microfinance Information Exchange, including MIX, in 
their study over the period 1996-2008. They analyse microfinance institutions’ 
(MFI) organizational structure and external governance impact on their 
performance considering three aspects: sustainability, outreach, and portfolio 
quality or risk. They use outreach indicators as breadth, the number of clients – both 
borrowers and savers - as the depth: average loan balance per borrower (in US$), 
percentage of women borrowers, average loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita 
(%), average savings balance per saver (in US$) and average savings balance per 
saver/GNI per capita (%). Profitability and sustainability are measured on ROA and 
OSS. They highlight their two findings. Firstly, non-government organizations are 
the “most profitable, efficient, and productive in terms of outreach among all types 
of institutions but are not necessarily operationally self-sufficient” (p. 5). This 
suggests a possible need to raise additional grants and subsidies to cover losses. 
Secondly, a regulation system improves the efficiency and productivity but not the 
portfolio quality, and the latter regulated organizations perform better socially, and 
consider poor clients more effectively. However, external governance (overseas 
regulating bodies) has no effective impact on lowering portfolio risk. Further, they 
argue that more client borrowers and savers go to the larger MFIs but most clients 
are not poor. The results are robust through using the factor analysis method. 
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Hewa-Wellalage (2012) uses data for 2006-2010 of multinational company 
subsidiaries (MNCs) and local public companies' (LPCs) subsidiary companies in 
Sri Lanka. She measures the mechanism of corporate governance and firms' 
financial performance on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. She finds corporate 
governance positively correlates with financial performance. However, her finding 
on agency cost and financial performance with governance turns in a negative 
correlation, which differs for MNC and LPC. Some of mandatory corporate 
governance mechanisms have negative impacts on firm financial performance, 
which increases firm’s agency conflicts. This suggests that a corporate governance 
framework is appropriate for each organisation to function properly but that “one 
size does not fit all” should be taken into consideration in Sri Lankan MFIs. 
Another comparative study by Thrikawala (2016) on Sri Lankan and Indian MFIs 
with data from 2007-2012 sourced from the Mix Market and Indian microfinance 
network. She finds larger boards with more client representation increase the 
financial performance of both countries. More female representatives and outside 
directors on the board and an internal audit function negatively affect MFI financial 
performance in both countries. More international/donor representatives and fewer 
outside directors increases outreach in both countries. In Sri Lanka, the financial 
performance of MFIs improves with a female CEO, female chair, larger boards, 
client representatives on board and internal audit function. Financial performance 
declines with more female directors and more international/donor representatives 
on a board. More international/donor representatives and fewer client 
representatives on boards increases the outreach of Sri Lankan MFIs. 
International/donor representatives, client representatives, outside directors on the 
board, and an internal audit function increases the financial performance of Indian 
MFIs. A female CEO, more female directors and more international/donor agency 
representatives on the board increases the outreach of Indian MFIs. 
Some other academic researchers are taking consideration for further study. Thus, 
governance in MFIs is an academic concern and research is now involving 
performance measurement instead of just outreach.  
The MFIs outreach objective to serve the poor can only be possible when they can 
cover operating and financial costs. MFIs sustainability comes with operational 
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self-sustainability, when MFIs have ability to pay off their operational expenses and 
can generate operational revenues to have financial self-sufficiency (Hartarska, 
2005). The financial sustainability and outreach could lead MFIs in the 
commercialization of their services and the effects on the number (breadth of 
outreach) and socio-economic level (depth of outreach) of the clients that are served 
by microfinance institutions (Piot-Lepetit & Nzongang, 2014). 
3.4 Influence of governance variables in outreach and financial 
performance 
Scholars are using different variables to analyse MFIs’ outreach and financial 
performance. Measuring the social mission and financial performance of MFIs is 
challenging when designing corporate governance policy and balancing their social 
and financial goals. It is important to provide a balanced effort when measuring 
both financial performance and fulfilment of social goals (BBVA Microfinance 
Foundation, 2011).  
Most scholars use profitability, operational sustainability and financial leverage as 
a financial tool to measure institutional financial performance. Financial 
performance of MFIs is measured by the profitability of the institution and most 
scholars use Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) to measure 
profitability. Institutional operational sustainability is measured on Operational 
Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and financial leverage on Debt to Equity Ratio (DER). 
Profitability indicators summarize the MFIs’ performance over all.  However, 
profitability only does not explain the current state of the MFIs, but taking 
operational self-sufficiency into account suffices as an explanation. Profitability 
and self-sufficiency indicators show how well an institution is executing its 
operations. Therefore, whether an MFI is profitable or not can be shown from its 
ROA, ROE and OSS (Barry & Tacneng, 2011).  
MFIs’ social performance indicators are yet to be fully developed but they are a 
standardised form of  indicators (Bakker et al., 2014). Number of clients, breadth 
of clients (borrowers and savers) and loan size are the main measuring tools for 
their outreach. However, depth of the loan, deposit account and percentage of 
female borrowers are other tools for measuring outreach of MFIs. Higher breadth 
indicates an MFI’s higher social performance (Bakker et al., 2014). The breadth of 
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outreach is greater when MFIs serve more customers (Mori, Golesorkhi, Randøy, 
& Hermes, 2015). Breadth is an important measure because MFIs may face budget 
constraints to serve a number of clients with limited resources. Depth of outreach 
indicates how the net gain from microfinance of a given client is valued by society 
(Barry & Tacneng, 2011). Five outreach proxies: average loan balance per borrower 
(in NPR), percentage of women borrowers, average loan balance per borrower/GNI 
per capita, average deposit account; are considered as measures of MFIs’ outreach 
(Barry & Tacneng, 2011) in this study. 
Scholars have showed the association of governance with MFI performance. 
Aboagye and Otieku (2010) find that there is no relationship between governance 
and outreach and financial performance in Ghanaian rural and community banks. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that most corporate governance mechanisms have 
little impact on MFIs’ financial and outreach performance. Thrikawala et al. (2013) 
explain that good corporate governance improves the outreach and financial 
performance and reduces the risk in Sri Lankan MFIs. Further, as supported by 
Bassem (2009) and  Hartarska (2005), not all governance mechanisms have a 
substantial impact on MFI performance, but the different factors separately affect 
outreach and financial performance.  
The existing literature on the different internal governance factors that is board size, 
independent directors, percentage of female directors, CEO duality, and minority 
directors on the board, is discussed below.  
 Board size 
Board size can be defined as the number of board members that MFIs have. It is 
always argued that there is a greater relationship between the number of board 
members and MFI’s outreach and financial performance. It is claimed that board 
size has a significant impact on the institutional performance. It is not clear from 
previous literature what the optimal board number would be to have the better 
performance and outreach. However, Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) suggest 
that eight board members is an effective size to consider. However, Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) found the board size in their study ranged from seven to nine. Guest 
(2009) suggests that an optimal board size of fewer than ten leads to better firm 
performance. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012) suggest that board size ranging from 
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ten to twelve members is the optimal to increase outreach in community 
development loan funds (CDLF) in the USA. It has been researched by many of 
scholars and the evidence has contradictory results in different regions of the world. 
The findings of the board size and outreach and financial performance differ as to 
the region. Though smaller board size seems to dominate for consistency of better 
performance, a larger board provides better monitoring and decision-making with 
the integration of skills on the board. So, a larger board could turn in at the level of 
the situation where poor communication, co-ordination and cooperation reduces the 
effectiveness of the board causing firm performance to suffer (Guest, 2009). 
Mori et al. (2015) find board size is positively associated with loan size and 
negatively associated with the female customer when it is used as a control variable 
in their study in East Africa. Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) find that board 
size is positively related to profitability and negatively related to outreach. The 
larger board size gives better financial performance with more profit, but lower 
outreach because the CEO will experience less control with the larger board. Mak 
and Kusnadi (2005) argued in their research findings in Malaysia and Singapore on 
a multivariable test of Tobin’s Q that large board size is less effective in decision-
making eventually reducing the firm's performance, and increasing the cost of 
remuneration by increasing the number of board directors who act as a 
supplementary rubber stamp. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) find that the 
negative correlation between board size and profitability extends to small firms with 
small boards in Finland. They argued that a larger board consists of more outsiders 
in decision-making and thus are careful decision makers as the reputation cost in 
failure is higher than the private benefit in profit. Hartarska (2005), in her study of 
MFIs in central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States, found that MFIs 
with larger boards performed better than smaller boards on ROA measurement. 
Bassem (2009) found in his study in Euro-Mediterranean MFIs that larger boards 
increase MFI performance and give better results as their boards can make superior 
decisions with the mix of expertise and are less dominated by the CEO’s power. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) found that board size has a positive impact on the 
branch offices of MFIs; however, it reduces the monitoring capacity that would lead 
to cost effectiveness and thus affects the financial performance. Guest (2009) in his 
study of 2,746 UK-listed firms over 1981-2002 finds strong evidence of a negative 
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relation (Ness, Miesing, & Kang, 2010) between larger board size and firm 
performance measured on three different techniques; profitability, Tobin’s Q, and 
share returns for large firms.  
Different researchers are giving mixed findings when using board size as a variable 
when measuring firm performance for different regions. It is observed that the 
number of board members plays the key role in relation to firm performance as it 
relates to skill integration, better monitoring processes, and better decision-making, 
and overall it enhances the ability of boards in their governance functions. Thus, it 
is essential to take board size as a variable when testing MFIs performance in Nepal. 
 Board composition: Non-executive directors 
Non-executive director positions are part-time and are filled from outside the 
company (Pass, 2004).  Non-executive directors are involved in supervisory and 
balancing roles and control the executive directors’ activities to guarantee integrity 
and act as a safeguard for investors (Pass, 2004), thus playing a monitoring role 
(Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007) for the quality of the executive 
directors. Young (2000) indicates that shareholders become acutely accountable 
when the non-executive directors are present on the board. Non-executive directors 
work as professional referees to measure managers’ performance (Boeker, 1992) 
and protect the interests of shareholders (Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). 
Hartarska (2005) finds the more non-executive directors there are on a board, the 
better the outreach among MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. She also says 
that the firm performs more effectively and benefits with an independent board, 
achieving higher results. Mori et al. (2015) in their study on MFIs in East Africa 
find that independent directors are positively related with higher outreach; serving 
large numbers of clients with smaller than average loans. Aboagye and Otieku 
(2010) found that board independence has a positive impact on the outreach and 
financial performance of MFIs in Ghana (Bassem, 2009; Kyereboah‐Coleman & 
Osei, 2008). Thus, a higher proportion of non-executive directors should be 
promoted (Hartarska, 2005). Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2007) find non-
executive directors are significantly positively related with firm performance. 
Krivogorsky (2006) finds non-executive directors are positively related with firm 
profitability, measured on ROE in continental Europe. Dehaene, De Vuyst, and 
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Ooghe (2001) find that non-executive directors have a positive relationship with 
firm financial performance when measured against ROE. Dehaene et al. (2001) 
suggest that firms with more outside directors perform better. Dahya, Dimitrov, and 
McConnell (2008) find a positive relationship between the proportion of non-
executive directors and firm performance in cross-countries’ analysis for 22 
countries. 
Paul, Friday, and Godwin (2011) find a negative relationship with non-executive 
directors and firm performance when measuring ROE on firms in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012) find non-executive directors 
negatively affect firm value in New Zealand, measured on the ROE and ROA. On 
the other hand, Hutchinson, Nicholson, Wang, and Oliver (2009) find that there is 
no relationship between non-executive directors and firm financial performance in  
Australian companies. Finally, Finegold, Benson, and Hecht (2007) explain that 
firm performance also changes with different ratios of non-executive directors and 
insider directors; thus it is inconclusive (Bermig & Frick, 2007) to measure outsider 
presence and firm performance. Bermig and Frick (2007) find inconclusiveness on 
the relationship between board composition and firm performance in Germany. 
Similarly, Rashid (2011) finds inconclusive results of the relationship with non-
executive directors and firm performance in Bangladesh. Pistelli, Geake, and 
Gonzalez (2012) find no significant relation with non-executive directors and MFIs’ 
financial performance in sample of 162 MFIs across 57 countries on Mix Market 
data.  
The mixed findings on the relationship between non-executive directors and firm 
performance indicates an importance to study non-executive directors as a variable 
in this study.  
 Female directors on the board 
Gender diversity has been long discussed during ongoing reform practices of 
governance in firms in recent years (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and it is a growing 
area of research (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). The proportion of female directors in 
top management and on boards is low (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004), though the 
evidence of female involvement is increasing, due to government laws that require 
a proportion of female participants on boards (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). 
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Gender diversity escalates the effectiveness of boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) 
and integrates the talent and skills that enable boards to have higher outreach and 
better relations with stakeholders, which results in better MFIs’ performance 
(Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005), because a higher proportion of female directors 
on a board allows them to have more alternative perspectives when making 
decisions (Smith et al., 2006) and also enables them to reach poorer borrowers. 
Female directors have different work and non-work experiences and might also 
understand some parts of marketing better than men, which helps a board have 
better understanding of different situations, enhances the decision-making process 
and improves firms’ performance (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).     
Research on gender diversity has been done by different researchers. This has not 
led to any one answer as to the proportion of female directors as a key variable and 
its relation with firm performance. Some of the researchers found gender diversity 
on board positively affected firm performance while others found no relation 
between the two factors.   
Mori et al. (2015) find improvement in gender diversity on the board increases the 
number of customers (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2012; Hartarska, Nadolnyak, & 
Mersland, 2014; Wale, 2015), particularly females, but reduces the loan size (Mori 
et al., 2015). Mersland and Strøm (2009), and Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 
(2014) have found that female CEOs have a positive impact, improving the 
financial performance with higher ROA of the no-profit firms by reducing the 
operational cost and information asymmetry. They further state that female 
directors understand women clients better, thus they set comfortable terms for them. 
However, they found that female directors have no significant impact on the 
outreach on the number of credit clients’ increment because of loan size and 
borrowers are independent. Adams and Ferreira (2009) further supported this 
finding, that female directors on the board is positively related with financial 
performance as measured on Tobin’s Q and ROA in a firm that has a weak 
governance structure. In contrast, Strøm et al. (2014) found that female leaders have 
fewer board meetings, fewer internal audits and higher CEO duality,  resulting in 
weak governance, in their research for 329 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in 73 
countries covering the years 1998–2008.  
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Khan and Vieito (2013), in their research on US firms during 1992-2004, found 
firms with female CEOs are associated with an increase in performance compared 
to firms managed by male CEOs (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). They further say that 
female directors are more risk averse (Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery, 2010), than 
male CEOs. Lückerath-Rovers (2013) found female directors on a board relate to 
better financial performance on the ROE measurement in 116 Dutch companies 
listed on the Amsterdam Euronext stock exchange in 2007.  
Marinova et al. (2010) found in their research observed in 2007 for 186 listed firms, 
102 Dutch and 84 Danish, that the number of female directors on the board had no 
effect on firm performance by using Tobin’s Q as a performance measurement, 
where 40% of companies in the sample had one or more female directors. Lam, 
McGuinness, and Vieito (2013) also find there is a limited relationship between the 
proportion of female directors and firm performance in their research for 10,000 
Chinese firms between 2000 and 2008. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) find that women 
on boards have a positive impact on the firms’ financial performance measured on 
the ROA. Smith et al. (2006) conducted research in 2,500 firms in Denmark from 
1993 to 2001 and found that firm performance is significantly positively related to 
financial performance on the gross profit measurement rather than net income after 
tax. Thus, no significant relation occurs with firm performance and the accounting-
based measurement. They further explained that the significant positive 
performance relationship occurred more when female directors had university 
degrees compared with females who did not, and the relationship was also positive 
when staff members chose the board. Dezsö and Ross (2012) researched 15 years 
of data in US firms to find that the presence of female directors increases the firm 
performance but only to the extent that a firm is focused on innovation as part of its 
strategy. Bassem (2009) noted that MFI performance improves with a higher 
proportion of female directors.   
The academic research findings are contradictory, making it difficult to generalise 
for the theme of gender diversity and firm performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Wellalage & Locke, 2013). It seems there is no academic 
research yet on female directors on board as a variable in relation to MFIs’ outreach 
and financial performance in Nepal. Thus, this research will consider this female 
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director on board variable to test whether it has any impact on the MFIs’ outreach 
and financial performance in Nepal.  
 CEO/chairman duality 
Duality is defined as a person holding two positions, that of CEO and chair of the 
board. For  more than a decade (1999-2003), hundreds of the firms converted their 
leadership structure from duality to non-duality CEO leadership and some of them 
turn their leadership structure from non-duality to duality structure as well (Chen, 
Lin, & Yi, 2008). They explain they split the positions because it became too easy 
for the one person to abuse their power at the shareholders and companies’ expense. 
However, different scholars give varied results on CEO duality and firm 
performance.  
The findings of different researchers also do not support that separation of CEO and 
chairman positions will give better governance (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). The 
separation of position can create communication problems and the effectiveness of 
the firm is reduced (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggested that firm performance increased with the separation of CEO and 
chairman titles as duality restricts the principle of separation on decision-making 
and decision control, and obstructs the board’s ability to perform its monitoring 
function. Jensen (1993) also supported the idea that the effectiveness of the firm 
increases with the separation of positions. He further said the function of the 
chairman is to run board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, 
evaluating, and compensating the CEO, which is possible only when the positions 
are separated. Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1996) also support the separation of the 
CEO and chairman positions in their findings in the UK and find that  duality 
decreases a firm’s accounting performance (Pi & Timme, 1993). Dahya and Travlos 
(2000) support the positive correlation between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Dahya, Garcia, and Van Bommel (2009) found there is no correlation with CEO 
duality and firm performance in UK companies. Chen et al. (2008) support this; 
that there is no change in firms’ performance (Daily & Dalton, 1997) with change 
in leadership, whether duality to non-duality or non-duality to duality. Iyengar and 
Zampelli (2009) argue that there is no evidential relationship between CEO duality 
and financial performance of the firm measured on Tobins’ Q and ROA.  
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However, there is another opinion that states duality does improve firm 
performance as CEO duality enhances leadership strength, makes for efficient 
decision-making by management (Donaldson & Davis, 1994), and finds no 
competition between CEO and chairman. Duality saves the cost of non-duality and 
a degree of balance of power is also maintained (Faleye, 2007). Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) find that duality has a positive impact on outreach by increasing the number 
of credit clients but they also find duality decreases the individual average loan size, 
and with a female CEO the MFIs financial performance increases on ROA (Ness et 
al., 2010) only with higher operational costs, that is, the write-off ratio increases. 
Duality of CEO is negatively related with the outreach and profitability of MFIs 
(Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). 
The inconclusive findings prompt the consideration that the separation of CEO and 
chair does not work for all neither does duality, meaning “one hat does not fit all” 
(Faleye, 2007). The literature also suggests that the separation works well with 
some and duality works well with others. It is not a universal standard (Faleye, 
2007). Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008) give another view of 
duality and firm financial performance, that it is related to a firm’s environment. 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) suggest that there is little change in a firm’s 
operating performance with the change in leadership structure and duality has a 
weak evidential impact on a firm’s long-term performance. Thus, companies must 
consider their situation and environment before deciding to choose duality or 
separate CEO and chair. Academics and researchers have so far given inconclusive 
results on the matter. Therefore, it is important to consider CEO duality as a variable 
for this research. 
 Minority directors on the board 
It has become an essential element of good governance to consider the cultural and 
societal factors that may impact business performance. Social differences should be 
taken into consideration ensuring fairness and equity. In a multiracial society, it is 
important to balance the impact of changes to values within the nation on the whole 
while the ethnic groups in that society maintain their positions. Nepal is multiracial. 
Most small societies in Nepal have their own distinctive identity and values. 
Directors from minority groups as a variable are included in this study to measure 
their relationship with firm performance. 
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Che-Ahmad and Houghton (2001) explain how cultural differences, ethnicity and 
demography have influential effects on business practices, organisations, 
accounting disclosure practices and audit. The competitive advantage, strategic 
formation analysis and quality of decision-making improves with ethnic diversity 
on the board as it allows the  use of more diversified resources (Crano & Chen, 
1998). Greater board independence is achieved when minority directors are 
represented on the board. They exercise more debate and question the cultural 
impact more keenly than when there is no ethnic diversity on the board (Carter, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Ethnic minority directors are likely to have different 
functions than other directors on the board (Peterson & Philpot, 2007). For example, 
a director on a board drawn from an ethnic community, Dalit caste as a minority, 
may be better informed to guide policy development and implementation to such 
groups. Many professionals may be aware of issues that are important to lower caste 
folk and remote tribal groups.  
There are mixed findings concerning the impact of minority directors on firm 
financial performance. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) say ethnicity and cultural 
differences (Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 2006) play fundamental roles in business 
practices. Yatim et al. (2006) find a significant relationship for minority directors 
with firm performance decline in Malaysian companies.  
Carter et al. (2003) find that the percentage of ethnic monitory directors has a 
significant positive relationship with firm performance measured on Tobin’s Q in 
Fortune 1000 firms. Further, Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) find increased 
minority representation on the board is correlated with increases in firms’ financial 
performance measured by ROA and ROE for Malaysian firms. Miller and Triana 
(2009), using a sample of Fortune 500 firms, show a positive relationship between 
board racial diversity and both firm reputation and innovation. They suggest both 
partially mediate the relationship between board racial diversity and firm 
performance.  
Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza (2000) find racial 
diversity increases a firm’s value measured on productivity, return on equity, and 
market performance and enhances the firm’s business strategies to obtain 
competitive advantage. However, Roberson and Park (2006) find the presence of 
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minority directors in the board will negatively impact on firm performance when 
the board size grows to a point at the proportional level, after which further 
incremental addition of directors in the director proportion will uplift the firms' 
performance. 
Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) find ethnic diversity has no 
significant impact on the financial performance of firms in the USA. Wang and 
Clift (2009) find racial diversity does not significantly influence the financial 
performance of firms measured on ROA and ROE in a data set of the top 500 
Australian companies. 
Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007) find ethnic directors’ presence on the 
board has limited impact on firm performance in UK companies and they further 
argue that ethnic diversity is more influenced by the firm’s external business 
environment.  
3.5 Control variables 
 Firm size 
Firm size reflects the amount of output a firm can produce and is typically measured 
as total assets of the firm, reflecting that larger firms are able to utilise more 
resources for their services (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). Firm size commonly 
reflects the amount of output a firm can produce (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). Firm 
size is often used as a control variable (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Hartarska, 2005; 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009). Scholars (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; 
Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Strøm et al., 2014) argue that larger 
financial institutions may target the wealthier clients and focus less on female 
borrowers. Nevertheless, they may still have a larger number of customers when 
compared to smaller firms and they will also tend to be of higher value. 
Size is considered a measure of risk (Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015). It does not help 
MFIs to raise funds (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). Large MFIs can be more 
leveraged because large firms are less likely to be in bankruptcy (Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007). Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) argue that larger MFIs are 
able to diversify their services and products (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014) to cope 
with risk and enhance productivity (Bassem, 2009).  
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Aboagye and Otieku (2010), and Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008) find, for 
Ghana, that firm size is negatively related with outreach and positively related with 
profitability of MFIs. In contrast, Bassem (2009) suggests that firm size has 
significant positive impacts on MFIs performance and increases outreach. Mersland 
and Strøm (2009) observe that firm size is positively related with the number of 
clients it serves and negatively with the depth of loan, which is not what would be 
expected following Nurmakhanova et al. (2015). Hartarska (2005) finds no 
significant relationship with firm size and outreach of MFIs. Gropp and Heider 
(2010) find a negative relation between size and deposits in a sample of European 
banks. 
 It is argued that when firms get bigger they are less concerned with the gender of 
clients and are diverted from their social mission to serve more individual clients 
with higher loan portfolios (Bogan, 2012; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009; Nurmakhanova et al., 2015).  
It is assumed that firm size is positively correlated with profitability (Karim, Sami, 
Ali, & Ben-Khedhiri, 2010; Kosmidou, 2008). Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) 
find firm size positively related with profitability, ROA, because larger firms are 
able to improve their productivity by diversifying their products and services to 
reduce the risk. Therefore, firm operational self-sufficiency, OSS, increases with 
firm size (Bogan, 2012; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). A  bigger firm may enjoy 
a stronger reputation and therefore is more attractive to donors (Tchakoute 
Tchuigoua, 2015). 
Researchers (Bogan, 2012; Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; D'Espallier, Guérin, & 
Mersland, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009; Strøm et al., 2014; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015) use firm size, total 
assets, as an independent variable in their study. This study uses assets, that is, MFI 
size, as a control governance variable. 
 Maturity 
The maturity of the firm is measured by age; the number of years it has served the 
financial market (Hartarska, 2005; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; Mersland & 
Strøm, 2010; Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007). Maturity in this study is 
considered as the difference between the year a firm started its microfinance 
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operations and the year of data submitted by the institution (Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007). Maturity of the firm may be able to say which factor 
works or not during the years of operation to achieve profitability (Strøm et al., 
2014) and so increases the importance of maturity as a control variable. Maturity of 
the firm is one factor that creates a reputation in the market and faith among 
borrowers that the institution will be in the market for a long time, believing this 
has a greater impact on the repayment increment and long-term social value and 
results in greater outreach (Navajas et al., 2000). Caudill et al. (2009) explain the 
maturity of the firm gives an opportunity for managers to learn more, gain 
information and experience in particular institutions and economic environments. 
Thus, older MFIs may have effective producers to lower the costs for a given 
amount of lending output (Caudill et al., 2009).  
Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) find MFIs’ performance reduces as they mature, 
serving fewer clients, fewer female borrowers and serving richer clients with larger 
loans. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007); Mersland and Strøm (2009, 2010) find a 
positive relationship between the age of MFIs and the number of active borrower. 
Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) find that financial sustainability is positively related to 
maturity of the firm. They also suggest that efficiency in controlling costs gets better 
with age, resulting in increasing profitability and ROA (Caudill et al., 2009; 
Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). MFI age is positively related to profitability, 
ROA and self-sufficiently, OSS (Bassem, 2009). The firm self-sufficiency, OSS, 
increases with firm size (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). 
The age of the firm is commonly used as a control variable by researchers 
(D'Espallier et al., 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008; 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Nurmakhanova et 
al., 2015; Strøm et al., 2014) in their analyses. This study uses the age, that is, 
maturity, as a control governance variable. 
 Employees 
Total full-time equivalent employees are deemed to be a key resource for MFIs’ 
impact potential to provide financial services to the poor according to Haq, Skully, 
and Pathan (2010). Some research uses number of employees in MFIs as an input 
to measure MFI outreach (Alemayehu & Lemma, 2014; D'Espallier et al., 2009; 
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Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & Mar Molinero, 2007; Haq et al., 2010). It is 
necessary to have adequate employees to handle the loans’ portfolio for outreach 
increment purposes. Similarly, a proper number of employees helps institutions 
to monitor and understand clients’ conditions and assist them with credit services 
to accomplish both their and the MFIs’ social mission and increase their saving 
accounts (Alemayehu & Lemma, 2014).  
Haq et al. (2010) define employees as a scarce resource to provide the financial 
services to the poor. The total number of employees who are involved in providing 
the financial services to society is defined as the personnel of the firm 
(Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007). Further, Alemayehu and Lemma 
(2014) find employees play the  important role of serving clients before a loan and 
supervising them afterwards, which reduces the default rate and increases 
profitability. In Latin America, MFI loan portfolios increase when employee 
numbers are greater (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007). This study takes employees that 
is, personnel, as a control governance factor for MFIs in Nepal.  
 Staff productivity 
This is taken as the number of customers that each staff member deals with, that is, 
the number of borrowers, or number of depositors, per staff member (Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007). It is measured by the number of total clients divided 
by the number of employees (D'Espallier et al., 2009). There is a good relationship 
between MFIs’ efficiency and productivity (Baumann, 2005). The higher the 
number of borrowers is an indication of higher staff productivity because it 
maximizes the MFI’s services with minimal resources. of staff and funds 
particularly (Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, & Brown, 2005). MFIs’ efficiency levels 
become higher with higher productivity per employee (Microfinance Information 
Exchange, 2007). Thus, MFIs should improve their productivity and efficiency to 
reduce operating costs (Fernando, 2006). MFI productivity is measured on the 
number of borrowers and savers per staff member (Haq et al., 2010). Increasing 
client numbers per employee increases employee workload, which will eventually 
impact the staff’s capacity to accomplish and comply with the  outreach mission 
(Alemayehu & Lemma, 2014). This study takes staff productivity, that is, DPSM, 




3.6 Research questions 
The research addresses two specific questions and each of these involves a number 
of subsidiary issues. There are two main questions relating to outreach and 
governance and financial performance and governance. 
• Does the corporate governance structure affect MFIs’ outreach in Nepal? 
• Does the corporate governance structure affect MFIs’ financial performance 
in Nepal? 
• Can Nepalese MFIs have different board structures that will lead to 
improved outreach while maintaining financial performance?  
3.7 Hypothesis 
Several hypotheses are commonly used in considering the relationship between 
governance and MFIs’ performance.  
 Hypothesis development 
The scholars are inconclusive on the corporate governance correlation with MFI 
performance. Some of the researchers find a positive link between governance and 
MFIs’ performance while others find a negative link. However, some of them, as 
evidenced in the literature, do not find any impact or a weak impact on MFI 
outreach and financial performance. The different findings may be due to the 
processes or methodology that the scholars have used. The governance impact 
factors may also differ with different countries in cultural, economic and legal 
regulatory contexts (Malik, Wan, Ahmad, Naseem, & Rehman, 2014). There is no 
literature that supports the governance factors and MFIs’ performance in a Nepal 
context.  
Most research on governance, outreach and financial performance has been done 
either in developed economies or in different regions. Governance research and 
development practice codes have occurred in developed economies and passed on 
to the less-developed economies (Malik et al., 2014). However, the same set of 
practice codes may not work in developing countries because of the different 
financial and legal environments. There has been less work done in under-
developed countries on the set of governance codes of practice and very little 
research done in the developing region of South Asia.  
This study focuses on the governance factors’ correlational impact on MFI outreach 
and financial performance in Nepal. This study will help to understand the 
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governance practices and their influence on the Nepalese MFIs’ performance that 
may help administrators for institutional set up.  
The literature suggests different governance factors to consider that encourage good 
governance practices to improve MFI performance. This study considers board size, 
board composition, board diversity, gender diversity, CEO/chairman duality as 
governance characteristics to measure MFI’s performance in Nepal. The 
governance correlational impact on Nepalese MFIs’ outreach and financial 
performance will be examined.  
This section provides theoretical and empirical links between research questions 
and develops the research hypotheses. 
3.7.1.1 Board size 
The relationship between board size and firm performance is still a central concern 
for researchers. Academicians and researchers suggest different board sizes that 
differently affect MFI performance. Some suggest that a larger board improves firm 
performance while others suggest a smaller board has the same effect. Scholars are 
inconclusive on what is the optimal board size to improve firm performance.  It is 
difficult to settle on the optimal board size because the firms differ by region, size 
and industry. Adams and Mehran (2003) explain that financial intermediaries 
usually have larger boards than non-financial firms and their empirical findings 
show larger board size increases firm performance. Larger boards with a range of 
expertise (Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008) and better association with the 
external environment helps firms to make better decisions (Bassem, 2009), and may 
have greater monitoring and information sharing that increases firm performance.  
However, it is also harder for a CEO to control a larger board (Bassem, 2009). 
Larger boards may suffer from less monitoring effectiveness (Hartarska, 2005) and 
be less efficient (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2012). There is an increasing and then 
decreasing relationship between board size and efficiency (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 
2012).  
Hartarska (2005) finds evidence of a negative correlation with board size in Eastern 
European MFI performance. Mersland and Strøm (2009) explain a negative impact 
of board size across multiple financial parameters, ROA, OSS and depth of loan, 
but positive with the breadth of outreach on overall MFIs world data. However, 
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Bassem (2009) finds board size associates positively with financial performance for 
Mediterranean MFIs. Family firms’ financial performance is significantly 
positively related with the board size (Hewa-Wellalage, 2012). The larger board 
may enjoy lower costs because of the voluntary services provided by the members 
(Hartarska, 2005; Thrikawala, 2016). Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) find the 
larger board increases MFI profitability but reduces outreach. Larger boards have a  
negative impact on small- and mid-size Finnish firms’ profitability (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). Some researchers raised the concern that larger boards may suffer from 
coordination problems that reduce firm performance (Bassem, 2009). There are 
benefits to having larger boards but they exhaust themselves at about 10 members 
at which point possible free-riding may occur (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2012). 
Since free-riding is more likely in larger boards (Pathan et al., 2007), it reduces the 
firm’s value measured on ROA and a larger board is less effective in US 
corporations as well as in small firms (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996). 
Larger boards reduce Indian MFI performance measured on profitability, ROE and 
operating self-sufficiency, OSS (Durgavanshi, 2014).  
Vishwakarma (2015) finds board size does not significantly impact MFI 
performance in India. She further suggests that larger boards are better for MFI 
performance. Bhagat and Black (1999) find no relationship between board size and 
financial performance. Aboagye and Otieku (2010) find no governance association 
with the MFIs’ financial performance in rural and community banks in Ghana. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) find no significant correlation with the board size and 
MFIs’ performance. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) find an inverse relationship between 
board size and firm value in Malaysia and Singapore. Pathan et al. (2007) find a 
negative relation for board size and commercial banks in Thailand. Firm 
performance gets lower when boards get larger measured on OSS and ROA 
(Hartarska, 2005).  
Some researchers suggest having a smaller board to increase firm performance. 
They find smaller boards increase firm profitability measured on ROE and ROA 
(Pathan et al., 2007). Jensen (1993) suggests having eight directors on board for a 
better performance in US SMEs. Smaller boards are effective in monitoring bank 
managers (Pathan et al., 2007). Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012) suggest an 
efficient board size is 10 to 12 in serving their clients, and directors are better able 
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to satisfy their outreach mission in Community Development Loan Funds (CDLFs) 
in the US. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) suggest five board members are ideal for 
creating maximum value. The research findings are still inconclusive on what board 
size increases firm performance. However, optimal board size depends on a board’s 
organisational responsibilities, strategic direction and its funding needs 
(Thrikawala, 2016).  
These mixed research results indicate that there is inconsistency in the relationship 
between board size and firm performance. This suggests one size does not fit all for 
governance and firm value creation.  
As discussed above, prior research has investigated several issues about board size. 
These can be formalized as hypotheses and tested in turn.  
HNp1: Board Size has a significant impact on MFI outreach and financial 
performance in Nepal.  
3.7.1.2 Board composition: Non-executive directors 
Board composition as a governance factor and its effect on firm performance is one 
of the most researched areas. Executive and non-executive directors on a board 
work for the shareholders’ interest. Non-executive directors play a role in 
monitoring operations and the company’s performance (Fuzi, Halim, & Julizaerma, 
2016). Shareholders trust the non-executive directors to act on their behalf. Outside 
directors are widely considered to be central elements of good corporate governance 
(Black & Kim, 2012). The collapse of many big companies such as Enron and 
WorldCom emphasizes the need for non-executive directors on boards. The 1992 
Cadbury Report and the Tyson Report in 2003 pronounce the effectiveness of 
boards and the important role of non-executive directors. Regulators of developed 
and developing countries endorsed the guideline to have a minimum level of outside 
directors on boards, presuming that more outside directors will lead to better board 
decisions and, as a consequence, better corporate performance (Dahya & 
McConnell, 2007). 
Board independence is significantly positively related to firm performance 
(Agarwal & Sinha, 2010; Dahya et al., 2008), especially in countries with lower 
levels of investor protection (Dahya et al., 2008).  Muravyev, Talavera, and Weir 
(2014) suggest a positive relationship between the presence of non-executive 
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directors and accounting performance of the companies. They further assert that 
non-executive directors contribute to both the monitoring and advisory functions of 
corporate boards while they are executives in other firms. Black and Kim (2012), 
Dahya and McConnell (2007), and Black and Khanna (2007) explain that 
increasing board independence significantly improved firm performance on 
country-specific research in Korea, the UK, and India. Liu, Miletkov, Wei, and 
Yang (2015) find that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm 
operating performance in government-controlled firms and in firms with lower 
information acquisition costs in China. 
Muller-Kahle, Wang, and Wu (2014) find that independent directors are positively 
related with firm performance in the UK but there is no significant relation in US 
firms. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) explain that board composition does not 
impact firm performance in US firms. A moderate number of inside directors, (that 
is three to five on an average-sized board with eleven board members) may improve 
the firm value (Bhagat & Black, 1999). The first and most widely recognized 
Cadbury Committee (1992) recommends that UK listed firms should have at least 
three outside directors. However, Fuzi et al. (2016) suggest companies with a 
majority of independent directors may not necessarily enhance firm performance. 
The optimal number of independent directors could also depend on firm 
characteristics (Black & Kim, 2012). Higgs (2003) reports that 95% of non-
executive director appointments are made by personal contact and 4% with a formal 
interview. It is a biased recruitment process, but it fulfils regulation requirements. 
As a result, boards get fewer experts in the field than ideally they should have 
(Jensen, 1993). Non-executive directors’ board monitoring can be irrelevant, costly 
and a threat to board unity (Young, 2000). Therefore, monitoring effectiveness is 
reduced. The existence of independent directors on board should be monitored in 
order to bring positive shareholder value. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Yermack (1996) find a significant negative 
relationship between outside members on the board and firm performance. There is 
no significant relationship with non-executive directors and firms’ performance on 
accounting measures used in Indian listed firms (Ghosh, 2006). Garg (2007) finds 
board independence in India is no guarantee for improved firm performance 
because of the poor monitoring role of independent directors. Chatterjee (2011) 
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finds an insignificant effect of independent directors across all four categories of 
firms; stand-alone private Indian firms, group affiliated firms, public sector 
undertakings, and foreign subsidiaries in India. Non-executive directors do not 
improve MFI performance in India (Thrikawala, 2016). These research findings 
suggest having further detailed studies in this area in India.  
There is still little research available on MFIs. Hartarska (2005) finds more 
independent directors provide a better ROA, and lower financial performance and 
better outreach for MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mori et al. (2015) find 
that independent directors are positively related with higher outreach in MFIs in 
East Africa. Aboagye and Otieku (2010) found that board independence has a 
positive impact on profitability and outreach for MFIs in Ghana (Bassem, 2009; 
Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). Thrikawala (2016) finds non-executive 
directors are statistically significantly negatively associated with breadth of 
outreach and not statistically significant with financial performance in MFIs in Sri 
Lanka and India. Hewa-Wellalage (2012) finds non-executive directors in Sri 
Lanka are significantly negatively associated with MFIs’ financial performance, 
measured on profitability ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
The evidential findings are not conclusive, with a mixed association between 
proportions of independent directors and firm performance. The existence of 
independent directors on a board should be monitored in order to bring positive 
shareholder value. However, more non-executive directors do not necessarily 
improve firm performance. Thus, there is a need to find the right combination of 
non-executive directors and executive directors on the board to enhance firm 
performance. In line with prior studies’ findings relating to MFIs, the proposed 
hypothesis connecting to non-executive directors and firm performance is: 
HNp2: The board composition has a significant impact on MFIs’ outreach 
and financial performance in Nepal. 
The study includes a variable non-executive director as number of independent 
directors on board of directors.  
3.7.1.3 Female directors on board 
Board gender diversity is a growing concern for researchers and scholars at present. 
Gender diversity on boards may come with two viewpoints: firstly, women are as 
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competent as men and deserve the opportunity to be on boards as they increase 
human capital with external networks, information, and other characteristics; and 
secondly, gender diversity of directors results in better governance that results in 
better firm performance (Carter et al., 2010). Qualified women directors have 
unique characteristics that create additional value. Companies may provide benefits 
by recruiting female directors from linking with their stakeholders (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2013). Female representation in top management brings informational and 
social diversity benefits to the top management team (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). Gender 
diversity is considered a good governance practice (Smith et al., 2006) that 
increases board independence and reduces misalignment of manager and 
shareholder interests which results in better firm performances (Carter et al., 2003). 
Diversified boards are able to make better decisions through discussion, 
information exchange, ideas, new insights and perspectives more than homogenous 
boards or management groups (Smith et al., 2006). 
The number of females on the board and in higher management enhances firm 
performance (Jurkus, Park, & Woodard, 2011; Smith et al., 2006). More females 
on the board dedicate their efforts to monitor managers (Adams & Ferreira, 2009)  
enriching the managers' behaviours throughout the firm, and motivate women in 
middle management (Dezsö & Ross, 2012) that results in firm better performance. 
In China, Liu et al. (2014) find three or more women on boards have a stronger 
impact on firm performance compared to those with two or fewer women. 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) explains that firms with women directors perform better 
than those without women. MFIs serve mostly women as primary clients and they 
are mostly run by women. It is believed that female leaders significantly increase 
the number of female clients in MFIs (Strøm et al., 2014). More women in 
management and on the board improves governance and financial performance of  
firms (Strøm et al., 2014). The match up with the target clients and leaders may 
increase firm performance (Thrikawala, 2016).  
The empirical studies find positive and negative relationships between board 
diversity and firm performance or a non-significant relationship.  Hartarska et al. 
(2014) suggest that gender diversity at the top levels of MFI management is likely 
to have both social and financial benefits. In US firms, Carter et al. (2003) find a 
positive relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance. In 
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Danish firms, Smith et al. (2006) find women in top management and on boards 
improve firm performance. In China, Liu et al. (2014) find a positive significant 
impact of board gender diversity in firms mainly controlled by legal person owners 
and insignificant in firms mainly controlled by state owners. In US firms, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) find a negative relationship between the proportion of women 
on the board and financial performance. In Sri Lanka’s publicly listed firms, 
Wellalage and Locke (2013) find a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion of women on boards and firm value. Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that 
board gender diversity does not result in any value creation or deduction. Carter et 
al. (2010) find no significant relationship between gender diversity of the board and 
financial performance for a sample of major US corporations.  
The ambiguous result of gender diversity and firm performance supports 
formulation of this hypothesis: 
HNp3: Gender diversity has impact on MFI outreach and financial 
performance in Nepal. 
The study includes the proportion of women directors on board of directors. The 
presence of women as a variable is used as percentage of female directors among 
the total number of directors. 
3.7.1.4 CEO/Chairman duality 
CEO duality exists when the same person is chairman of the board and chief 
executive officer of the company (Paul et al., 2011). The board is expected to 
monitor the operations of the chief executive officer and his or her management 
team (Paul et al., 2011). Scholars and researchers raise questions on the relationship 
with CEO duality role and firms. Some argue in support of the duality: others in 
separating the CEO and chairperson role. The proportion of the firm that adopted 
separating CEO and Chairperson role stood at 55% in 1999 and approximately 70% 
in 2003 (Chen et al., 2008). The CEO dual role figure fell to 54% in 2010 in US 
firms (Yang & Zhao, 2014). The CEO is most often also the chairperson of the 
board in the US, but the CEO role is separated in UK and Europe. The CEO abuses 
its power at the shareholders and company's expense. In recent years, corporations 
have been facing strong pressure from regulatory bodies and shareholders to 
separate CEO and chairman roles in organisations. CEO duality may provide clarity 
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regarding the leadership and direction of the firm for better decisions (Dalton et al., 
1998).  
The shifts in leadership structure affect the cost–benefit assessment in governance 
mechanisms. CEO duality may provide unified command and reduce the 
information transfer and processing cost of firm-specific information (Dey, Engel, 
& Liu, 2011). The primary roles of the board are to effectively monitor the decisions 
and actions of management. CEO duality benefits the firm in saving information 
costs and making speedy decisions (Yang & Zhao, 2014). CEOs are 
characteristically opportunistic and receive intrinsic satisfaction from achievement, 
recognition, respect and reputation. This will motivate CEOs to enhance firm value 
by using the unity of command to manage the firm's resources (Duru, Iyengar, & 
Zampelli, 2016). Duality may control the board freedom of making decisions and 
perform the governance role independently (Millstein & Katsh, 2003). Dey et al. 
(2011) assert that CEO duality may hinder the governance effectiveness of the firm.   
The existing literature, however, has drawn quite diverse findings on CEO dual 
roles and firm performance. CEO duality has a negative impacts on firm 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Duru et al., 2016; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Hartarska & Mersland, 2012; Hewa-Wellalage, 2012; Jensen, 1993; Kyereboah‐
Coleman & Osei, 2008; Pi & Timme, 1993). It supports the separation (Dahya et 
al., 1996) of the CEO and chairperson roles because duality restricts the principal 
of separation on decision-making and decision control, and duality obstructs the 
board’s ability to perform its monitoring function. However, findings of different 
researchers (Dey et al., 2011; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Faleye, 2007; Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009) do not support that separation of CEO and chairman position will 
give better governance. Separation of position would also create communication 
problems and the effectiveness of the firm would be reduced (Dalton et al., 1998). 
Dahya and Travlos (2000), Donaldson and Davis (1994), Mersland and Strøm 
(2009), and Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) support the positive correlation 
between the CEO duality and firm performance. Baliga et al. (1996), Dahya et al. 
(2009), Iyengar and Zampelli (2009), and Thrikawala (2016) found there is no 
correlation or change in firm performance by the CEO duality role. Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) suggest having further research on whether the CEO duality or 
separation improves the MFIs’ performance. Chen et al. (2008) supports that there 
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is no change in firms’ performance (Daily & Dalton, 1997) with change in 
leadership whether from duality to non-duality or non-duality to duality.  
The empirical literature investigating CEOs’ duality impact on firm performance 
gives mixed empirical evidence. Based on the above-mentioned empirical studies 
on duality, this study proposes the following hypothesis:  
HNp4: Chairman and CEO duality has a significant impact on MFIs outreach 
and financial performance in Nepal.  
The study includes a variable CEO duality as a dummy indicated with 1 or else 0. 
3.7.1.5 Minority directors on board 
Ethnic diversity on the board and firm financial performance relationship has 
important implications for both public policy and the governance of firms (Carter 
et al., 2010). Senior management ethnic diversity helps an organization to align 
business strategies with current and future demographic and market trends to 
achieve organizational growth and profitability (McCuiston, Wooldridge, & Pierce, 
2004). Ethnic diversity in leadership improves the firm’s accounting and market-
based financial performance and generates shareholder value (Hewa-Wellalage, 
2012). Social barriers among directors on a board may reduce with higher 
proportional representation of minority directors leading to a greater access to 
resource achievement through their comprehensive network (Roberson & Park, 
2006). An ethnically diversified board may enjoy a broader range of perspectives, 
greater knowledge sharing, and skills that enhance decision-making capabilities, 
creativity and innovation (Crano & Chen, 1998; Miller & Triana, 2009). Minority 
representation on a board has a positive impact on the firm performance (Carter et 
al., 2003; Miller & Triana, 2009; Richard, 2000). In Malaysian listed firms, 
Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) find a significant positive relationship 
between ethnic diversity and firm financial performance using return on assets as a 
performance measure variable. Hewa-Wellalage (2012) find ethnic minority board 
directors have positive significant effects on financial performance. However, 
moderate levels of leader racial diversity may limit the potential performance 
effects of such diversity (Roberson & Park, 2006). On the other hand, ethnic 
diversity can decrease firm performance (Roberson & Park, 2006; Yatim et al., 
2006). Carter et al. (2010), and Wang and Clift (2009) find ethnic diversity has no 
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significant impact on the firm performance. Brammer et al. (2007) find the ethnic 
directors’ presence in the board has a limited impact on a firm's performance in the 
UK. 
The previous literature explains the mixed relationship between ethnic diversity on 
boardroom and firm performance. Most early studies are not robust in addressing 
the endogeneity of ethnic diversity. The actual relationship between ethnic diversity 
and firm performance is still uncertain. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
postulated regarding the minority board directors on a board:  
HNp5: Ethnicity diversity has impact on the MFIs outreach and financial 
performance in Nepal. 
The study includes a variable of MFIs’ having different ethnic directors as a 
percentage of total number of directors.   
110 
 
3.8 Estimation technique 
The first component of the mixed method analysis is a quantitative and empirical 
analysis of the governance and outreach and financial performance of MFIs in 
Nepal. The study uses the outreach and financial performance metrics for MFIs.  
The approach is schematically presented in Table 10. 















The outreach performance of MFIs is measured on two aspects: the number of 
active borrowers, and depth of the loan. The number of active borrowers (NAB), is 
a logarithm of active borrowers the MFI served, and depth of the loan (DEPTH) is 
the average loan size on the GNI per capita in Nepal.  
For robustness analysis, alternative outreach indicators will be used: Loan size, 
average loan balance per borrowers ALBPB that is loan portfolio/ credit clients, 
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number of deposit accounts is counted as total number of deposit accounts, and 
percentage of female borrowers is number of female borrowers in total borrowers.  
Outreach performance= α + β CG + Control Variables 
NAB= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
Loan Size = f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
Loan size/GNI= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
NOD= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
PFB= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
The financial performance of MFIs is assessed in terms of their profitability and 
efficiency. ROA is a commonly used metric for profitability and is calculated as 
profit before taxes/total assets. Profitability also depends on operational efficiency, 
which may be measured as ROE, an indicator ratio of how operating efficiency is 
translated into benefits to the owner, and calculated as earnings after taxes /owners 
fund.  
For robustness analysis, there will be some more alternative financial ratios that 
will also be used: operational self-sufficiency (OSS) that is revenue from operations 
/ (financial expense + loan loss expense + operating expense), and Debt to Equity 
Ratio (DER) that is measured on Debt / Equity. 
Financial Performance = α + β CG + Control Variables 
ROA= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
ROE= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
OSS= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
DER= f (CG, Control Variables, errors) 
The β parameters are the estimated coefficients for the constant and each of the 




 Glossary of variables 
The following Table 11 list the synchronized variables used in this study. 
Table 11:  Glossary of variables 
Variable Description 
NAB Number Of Active Borrowers 
ALBPB Average Loan Balance Per Borrower 
ALBPB/GNI Average Loan Balance Per Borrower / GNI Per Capita 
NOD Number Of Depositors 
PFB Percentage Of Female Borrowers 
OSS Operational Self-Sufficiency 
ROA Return On Asset 
ROE Return On Equity 
DER Debt To Equity Ratio 
Bod Board Of Directors 
IND BOD Independent Director 
PFONBOD Percentage Of Female On Board Of Directors 
DUALITY Duality 
CASTE DIV Caste Diversification 
ASSETS Assets 
AGE Age Of The MFI 
PERSONNEL Personnel 
Source: Mixmarket.com 
3.9 MFIs’ performance 
There are many aspects incorporated in the performance of MFIs. Various 
stakeholders are likely to have their own specific range of interests. Governments 
and policy makers may be interested in the contribution to sustainable economic 
development made by MFIs collectively. Donors may focus on outreach, the 
alleviation of poverty amongst the most poor. Regulators may consider operational 
efficiency, including solvency, loan collection and margins as important matters.  
The return on assets, net profit margin, and value at risk will be central concerns of 
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investors.  Borrowers will be concerned with ease of access, speed of transactions, 
clear and simple contract arrangements, and friendly support. There is likely to be 
tension between the various stakeholders’ foci and trade-offs will be made by MFIs 
and there will not be one optimum position. 
The literature on corporate governance relates to law, economics, sociology and 
many more disciplines. Not surprisingly, several theories are found within the 
literature and these are noted in the section above. From a finance perspective, 
agency theory provides the link between the principals, (that is the stakeholders) 
and the management of the MFI. Corporate governance in this context relates to the 
structure and policy framework that mediates between stakeholders and 
management, viz. the Board of Directors. 
Various metrics are appropriate for differing elements of MFI performance. For the 
purpose of this study, the performance measures and preferred metrics relating to 
the two performance measures of outreach and financial performance are drawn 
from the literature. 
There are huge portions of population who are failing to benefit from commercial 
and other financial intermediaries in Nepal because financial intermediaries 
consider the collateral based loan system. People living on or below the poverty 
line have few or no assets to put into financial institutions. MFIs are the alternative 
way of the providing credit to people living in poverty and vulnerable economic 
situations (Shu & Oney, 2014). 
Hofer (1983) defines the organizational performance measurement as a firm’s 
outcomes on allocated resources, management decisions, and execution of 
decisions in order to achieve the objectives. The deliberate observation on the 
achievement made in respect to mission is a process of performance measurement. 
It is a vital part of measuring the organization performance because it helps 
organization management to look on the mission and objective achievement as 
being aligned. Locke and Latham (1979) argue that firms’ performance 
measurement provides information to the managers and employees about how the 
agreed targets have been reached. Furthermore, it intensifies the use of 
organisational resources and allows adjustment of organization activities.  
114 
 
Stakeholders look forward to measuring MFI success on financial and outreach 
performance (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). It is a board responsibility to ensure sound 
financial performance to concerned parties. MFIs with sound financial performance 
could gain the attention and faith of service users which is necessary for MFIs’ 
further business purposes and their objective achievement (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010). 
MFIs are seen as the combat tool for creating changes in social economy and as a 
result, their performance parameters have also been non-financial. The non-
financial performance parameter hinders the measurement of MFIs’ financial health 
situation and their outreach. It became essential for MFIs to balance outreach and 
financial performance for their survival (Kipesha, 2013). However, donor 
reluctance to provide a constant supply of money to MFIs as agents for social 
change, and the recent trend of commercialization, forced MFIs to change from 
non-profit to for-profit and this attracted academics and scholars’ attention to 
research MFIs to measure their financial performance for service continuation. MFI 
performance has been measured against outreach and financial performance by 
different researchers (Bassem, 2009; Ledgerwood, 1998; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; 
Quayes, 2012).  
Various researchers have argued that serving the poorest of the poor with small 
loans incurs a higher cost per dollar than larger loans (Conning, 1999; Navajas et 
al., 2000; Schreiner, 2002). The financial performance of MFIs becomes less 
profitable because of the higher administrative and service costs on the increased 
depth of outreach (Quayes, 2012). Schreiner (2002) further argues that the greater 
depth of outreach demands higher services, which results in higher costs and poor 
financial performance, which is what forced institutions to reduce the number of 
small loans or depend on donors to finance small loans instead. However, he further 
said that in most cases the small loans have a structure that reduces the service cost. 
Different researchers and practitioners have used different tools to measure MFIs’ 
performance. Some used the socio-economic tool as a poverty reduction measure, 
considering the improvements in the borrowers’ household capacity for example,  
Hulme and Mosley (1996) used marginal change in yearly income. Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (2002) measures children’s education in Uganda, level of 
immunization, malnutrition in Bangladesh and encouraged most daughters (that is 
60%) of MFI clients to go to school compared to non-clients, achieved food deficit 
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reduction from three months to one month in Vietnam. Thapa, Chalmers, Taylor, 
and Conroy (1992) use all the improved people’s ability to spend on food, 
improvement in savings, increased employment and income generating activities in 
developing countries: India, Bangladesh, Philippines and Malaysia, as their socio-
economic measurement tool. 
Conning (1999), and Quayes and Khalily (2014) use breadth, number of clients 
MFIs served, depth, and poverty level of clients as a social outreach. Hisako 
(2009), and Quayes (2012) use the average balance of loan per borrower as the 
depth of outreach in their studies. It is assumed that the smallest loans reach the 
poorest clients.  
Other researchers such as Hartarska (2005), Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, and Brown 
(2005), and Mersland and Øystein Strøm (2009) use other factors to measure the 
MFI performance. Hartarska (2005), Lafourcade et al. (2005), and  Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) include the number of customers MFIs serve with their financial 
services to define outreach. Hartarska (2005), and Mersland and Strøm (2009) use 
profitability as a measure of financial performance. Some others use quality of loan 
portfolio, number of products and services offered, and cost to clients (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009), and staff productivity (Lapenu & Zeller, 2001). 
These definitions show there are no specific tools that researchers are using to 
measure the MFI performance. Most of the researchers used some of the tools and 
always recommend another tool to obtain better performance measurement.  
 Measuring outreach 
That MFIs reach the poorest of the poor has been much discussed recently. Navajas 
et al. (2000) find in Bolivia that MFIs are reaching to the poor who are above the 
poverty line or just near the poverty line, but they are not reaching the poorest of 
the poor who are the most financially vulnerable. MFI’s outreach is measured as 
the social value created in terms of the depth, breadth, loan size and dollar value of 
deposits (Navajas et al., 2000). Shu and Oney (2014) define enhancing outreach as 
a social mission of MFIs to alleviate poverty. It is defined as the number of clients 
that MFIs serve. Outreach at a glance means the number of clients served. It is 
assumed that the outreach of the MFIs is influenced by these factors: firm size, 
maturity of the firm, and number of employees. Size of the firms helps institutions 
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to diversify their products and services to reduce the cost of loans and increase 
outreach. 
Having determined the factors that stimulate outreach, there will be another step to 
consider; that is, what are the variables to consider when measuring MFI outreach? 
Some of these are breadth, depth, number of branch offices, average loan size, and 
number of depositors (Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007). Navajas et al. 
(2000) explain that there are six aspects to MFI outreach and social value creation:  
depth, breadth, worth of users, cost to users, length, and scope. 
Outreach is to measure the number of clients and loan size (Adhikary & 
Papachristou, 2014; Caudill et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Hasan & Hartarska, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009), 
that is defined on the MFIs individually. The Nepal Government regulation of the 
categorized system of loan size and number of clients does have impact on the profit 
of MFIs. Lafourcade et al. (2005) categorize the MFIs clients in two ways: number 
of borrowers, and number of savers. The growth trends of borrowers and savers 
would be the measuring tool for MFIs’ outreach performance (Lafourcade et al., 
2005). Average loan balance and average saving balance are used as an indicator 
for measuring the performance. The outreach measures are the average outstanding 
loan and the number of credit clients served and how well they have been served. 
Measuring the outreach performance is not limited to one or other variable. All 
variables are criticised by one or other academic or researcher. However, with the 
limitation of data viability, this study considers these variables as outreach 
performance measuring proxies: breadth – number of active borrowers, loan size – 
average loan balance per borrower, depth – average loan balance per borrower/GNI 
per capita, number of deposit accounts, and percentage of female borrowers.  
3.9.1.1 Breadth 
Breadth is defined as the number of clients that MFIs reach. The Microfinance 
Information Exchange (2007) defines breadth as the number of active borrowers 
with loans outstanding. This is the number of clients who are usually without 
collateral and who receive the small loans, which are costly for the MFIs. Navajas 
et al. (2000) explain that breadth is a matter of concern as the dollar amounts are 
small and number of the borrowers is high (Lafourcade et al., 2005). Researchers 
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(Bassem, 2009; D'Espallier et al., 2009; Fersi & Boujelbéne, 2016; Hartarska, 2005; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Lafourcade et al., 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; 
Shu & Oney, 2014) use this variable in their studies to measure MFIs’ outreach 
performance. The log transformation is used to reduce the disparity between the 
minimum and maximum values of number of active borrowers in Nepalese MFIs. 
3.9.1.2 Size of loan 
Average loan size of the borrowers comes with the total loan amount and the 
number of the borrowers. The Microfinance Information Exchange (2007) defines 
the average loan size as adjusted gross loan portfolio divided by adjusted number 
of active borrowers. Hisako (2009) uses average loan size per borrower to measure 
depth of outreach, calling it wide outreach. Researchers (D'Espallier et al., 2009; 
Schreiner, 2002) use this variable. “Loan size is a rough and indirect measure of 
outreach” (Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & Molinero, 2009, p. 108). Further, a 
lower than average loan balance indicates the MFI’s commitment to poverty 
reduction and it does explain that the value of money differs in different regions. 
Thus, depth needs to be considered as the next measurement of outreach with GNI 
per capita.  
3.9.1.3 Depth of loan 
Depth of loan will measure the clients’ poverty level that the MFIs’ are serving. 
Bassem (2009), Hartarska (2005), and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) measure 
depth as the average loan outstanding divided by GDP per capita. The Microfinance 
Information Exchange (2007) defines depth as the average loan balance per 
borrower divided by GNI per capita. It is calculated in percentages (Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2010) and measures the clients’ 
poverty levels (Shu & Oney, 2014). Microfinance Information Exchange (2007) 
defines the lower band of poorness as when depth is < 20% or average loan size < 
USD150, and the high end when depth is between 150% and 250%. The higher 
values show that the MFIs are serving the richer borrowers (Hartarska, 2005), 
calculated on average loan outstanding divided by GNI per capita in Nepal. It is 
necessary to measure how well the MFIs reach to the poorest of poor, "the value 
the society attaches to the net gain from the use of the micro credit by a given 
borrower" (Navajas et al., 2000; Schreiner, 2002). Lafourcade et al. (2005), and 
Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2010) define it as the socio-economic level of clients that 
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MFIs reach. Depth is a measure of MFIs’ reach to poor clients as it is said that poor 
clients are the ones who cannot reach other financial services and are always in a 
zone of defaulting on loan payments. Quayes (2012) defines depth as more poorer 
borrower deliberated in the credit disbursement of MFIs. Lower depth value is 
preferred, whereas higher value explains that fewer poor clients are served by MFIs 
(Bassem, 2009). Depth is a relevant measure of the MFI’s social mission as it 
considers the GNI per capita of the country  (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009). 
Researchers (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009; Luzzi & Weber, 2006; Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007; Quayes, 2012; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2010) use this 
variable to measure outreach performance. Because of the data availability and 
limitation, this study uses depth as an average loan balance per borrower divided 
by GNI per capita in Nepal.  
3.9.1.4 Number of deposit Accounts 
This is defined as the number of savings accounts that MFIs have in one period. 
MFIs are known as credit providers to the poor and they have started providing 
deposit services too. This is a social outreach indicator for the financial institution 
and some have considered it in their research. Recently it has been considered by 
some researchers and rating organizations (Lafourcade et al., 2005; Microfinance 
Information Exchange, 2007; Shu & Oney, 2014; Yaron, 1994) have used a deposit 
account as an outreach indicator. The increased number of depositors is considered 
as increased breadth of MFIs outreach (Lafourcade et al., 2005). As a result, this 
study considers number of deposit accounts as the outreach indicator in this study. 
3.9.1.5 Percentage of women borrowers 
Percentage of women borrowers is defined as a fraction of the number of women 
in the total number of active borrowers (Bakker et al., 2014; Lafourcade et al., 2005; 
Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007; Quayes, 2012). MFIs put woman 
clients as a priority in their mission to alleviate poverty. The majority of micro-
credit recipients are women (Quayes, 2012). Women are the most vulnerable group 
to be considered as target clients by MFIs, and among African MFIs in 2003, 61% 
of credit clients were women  (Lafourcade et al., 2005). Quayes (2012) explains 
MFIs’ outreach would increase with a higher proportion of women borrowers with 
smaller loan amounts, and he finds women were two-thirds of the borrowers in his 
study. Cull et al. (2007) argue that one of the main reasons for the success of 
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microfinance the women clients. MFIs often target women, in some cases 
exclusively (International Labour Office, 2009). 
The Nobel Prize winner and father of micro-credit, Muhammad Yunus, started the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh concentrating on women as credit clients. He saw 
women as having the key role as players for breaking the poverty cycle, investing 
in their children’s education and higher quality foods (Reed, 2015). Women also 
had better repayment records (D'Espallier et al., 2009), registering higher 
repayment rates,  which is a substantial business case when considering female 
clients (International Labour Office, 2009). 
MFIs as micro-credit providers help millions of poor people living in poverty with 
credit around the world, including women. Including women in micro-credit and 
improving their social status, which contributes to breaking the poverty cycle, and 
women’s empowerment is the agenda (International Labour Office, 2009). The 
International Labour Office (2009) reports that there are 85% female clients in MFIs 
outreach. Quayes and Khalily (2014) explain that MFIs provide financial services 
mostly to women in Bangladesh and in other developing countries. The 
Microfinance Information Exchange (2014) reports 92% of females are the females 
make up 92% of borrowers in MFIs in South East Asia. Reed (2015) reports there 
were 157.7 million female borrowers out of 211.1 million total borrowers in MFIs 
worldwide in 2013, up from 150.9 million in 2012. Of the 137.5 million poorest 
clients, Maes and Reed (2012) report 82.3%, or 113.1 million, are women who take 
their first loan. Further, they report that there was a 1001% growth in outreach to 
the number of poorest women from December 31, 1999 to December 31, 2010: 10.3 
million to 113.1 million. Therefore, MFIs has made a strong contribution to the 
realisation of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goal of poverty 
alleviation. 
Bakker et al. (2014) , and Luzzi and Weber (2006) suggest to take percentage of 
female borrowers as an outreach proxy because ‘loans to women are highly valued 
by society.’ Occasionally, social outreach is measured by considering women 
borrowers (Quayes, 2012). Thus, academicians or researchers are showing a lack 
of concern if they do not consider this variable to measure the outreach to women 
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(Quayes, 2012). Therefore, targeting women borrowers makes sense from a public 
policy standpoint (International Labour Office, 2009).  
Researchers (Bakker et al., 2014; Cull et al., 2007; D'Espallier et al., 2009; Fersi & 
Boujelbéne, 2016; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009; Luzzi & Weber, 2006; 
Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007; Schreiner, 2002; Shu & Oney, 2014) 
use this variable to measure the MFIs’ outreach performance. Therefore, this study 
uses percentage of women borrowers to the total number of active borrowers (PFB) 
to measure the outreach of MFIs. 
The other indicator of performance of a micro-finance institution is its financial 
sustainability. Financial sustainability can be divided in two parts: operational 
sustainability and financial self-sustainability. This study is considering the 
operational self-sustainability (OSS) in this study because of data availability. 
 Financial performance 
Scholars and researchers attention has been focused onto the MFIs financial 
performance for their sustainability to continue MFIs services to poor. Most MFIs 
are non-profit institutions established to provide financial services to the poor who 
are often excluded from financial services offered by commercial banks. MFIs’ 
objective is to improve the social economy as well as reduce poverty. Financial 
performance indicates the effectiveness of financial management which goes with 
the periodic financial analysis (Ledgerwood, 1998). Ledgerwood further explains 
that the financial performance determines the efficiency, viability and outreach of 
MFIs’ operations for donors, practitioners and consultants. Financial performance 
is measured by analysing the financial data collected from the MFIs in the form of 
ratios, that is, a comparison of one piece of financial data with another. Comparison 
of financial performance for a period of time shows how an MFI financially 
progresses, which is called trend analysis (Ledgerwood, 1998). Financial ratio 
analysis in the context of other ratios helps to determine the overall financial 
performance of an MFI. However, financial analysis provides the information about 
existing or potential problems that may be occurring in the institution, information 
that is useful for the board to make changes in policies or operations for today’s 
decisions (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009) which leads again to 
enhanced financial performance (Ledgerwood, 1998). Financial analysis is a tool 
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that helps the decision-making process within a company and enables investors and 
other stakeholders to get a sense of the company’s financial health (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). 
There are MFIs operating as for-profit and still achieving their outreach objective. 
In addition to the argument for either for-profit or non-profit, it is a concern of 
funding agencies and donors to see an MFI’s financial performance efficiency. A 
better financial performance allows MFIs to continue their financial services 
independently and the credit line to run smoothly. Thus, it has become an essential 
goal of all MFIs, even the non-profit institutions, to strive for better financial 
performance (Quayes, 2012). Quayes states that the Indonesian MFIs with better 
financial performance achieve outreach and continue their services without 
incurring any subsidies. Policy makers, donors, Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (2009) and investors are stressing MFIs’ financial performance and 
eliminating reliance on donations.  
Profitability is the most used measurement of financial performance for commercial 
banks as well as MFIs. Profitability is good for the MFIs as it helps them to continue 
their services. However, it negatively impacts the donors who may choose to 
allocate their money to other institutions (Nanayakkara & Iselin, 2012) because 
they think some other struggling institutions need financial help. A profitability-
based measurement is arguable, particularly for non-profit MFIs. In addition to 
these all-financial facts of MFIs’ financial performances, donors and investors are 
willing to invest in the profitable institutions for their long-term service 
continuation regardless of their status of for-profit or non-profit institutions.  
Financial performance measures whether MFIs have an operating profit or could 
reach break-even, having enough operating income to cover operating expenses 
such as salaries, supplies, loan losses, and other administrative costs. This measure 
will show whether MFIs can also cover the costs of funds and other forms of 
subsidies received when they are valued at market prices. A lower default rate is 
better for financial sustainability. 
Profitability and sustainability ratios reflect an MFI’s ability to continue operating 
and grow in the future (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). Sustainability 
of an organisation is a key factor and MFIs’ sustainability is measured through 
122 
 
profitability and self-sufficiency (Sa-Dhan: The Association of Community 
Development Finance Institutions, 2016). MFIs' profitability and self-sufficiency 
can be determined by using these financial ratios: Operational Self Sufficiency 
(OSS), Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) (Sa-Dhan: The 
Association of Community Development Finance Institutions, 2016). “Non-
commercial MFIs with low debt/equity ratios can often achieve higher ROA than 
their commercial counterparts, because they have low financial expenses and pay 
fewer taxes” (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009, p.403). Different 
stakeholders will focus on different profitability ratios (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2009). Strøm et al. (2014) measure operational efficiency on ROA 
and ROE and operational self-sufficiency (OSS) for a firm’s financial performance. 
Hartarska (2005) explains "sustainability is measured by ROA, and OSS" (p. 1633). 
Hasan and Hartarska (2009) use ROA to measure the financial sustainability for 
cross-country MFIs. Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) use OSS to measure MFIs 
financial performance instead of using ROA and ROE because of the MFIs 
diversity and their accounting practices. However, an unleveraged firm will have 
the same value of ROA and ROE.  
ROA and ROE are widely used in evaluating firm performance. However, this 
accounting based measure is criticised as being an historical firm performance. The 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009) explains "sustainability can be 
negatively impacted by the MFI focusing solely on efficiency, portfolio quality, or 
profitability, but it can also be negatively impacted if any one of these areas is 
excluded" (p.19). Barres et al. (2005) assert that managers may consider the average 
debt to equity ratio "over a period of time to get a clearer picture of the risk" (p. 74). 
A higher DER enhances the rate of return on equity capital during good economic 
times as well as "increasing the riskiness of the firm’s earnings stream" (Muriu, 
2011, p.?). The optimal capital restructure of the balance of debt and equity is done 
to increase the owners’ wealth. This study measures financial performance of the 
MFIs on these variables: Return on asset (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Debt to 
equity ratio (DER), and Operational self-sufficiency (OSS).  
3.9.2.1 Return on asset (ROA) 
ROA is an indicator ratio of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. 
It is a measuring tool of the firm’s profitability (Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; 
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Mersland & Strøm, 2009) and the operational efficiency (Strøm et al., 2014) in 
utilizing the assets (Hartarska, 2005) to generate profit regardless of capital 
structure (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). ROA does not differentiate 
MFIs that are primarily funded through equity (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2009). It is one of the most used (Bassem, 2009) financial performance-
measuring (Strøm et al., 2014) tools to compare a company’s performance 
(Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007).  
Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2010) note that ROA is the appropriate tool to measure 
common profitability of different forms of MFIs that differ in operational approach, 
but all have the same interpretation in all categories of MFIs, and facilitate 
comparisons.  
It is measured by operating income, net income excluding the donation, divided by 
the total assets.  
ROA  =  Net Income after Tax and Before Donation 
Total Assets 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009) expects higher value of ROA that 
indicates an effectiveness of the firm’s management in managing their assets to 
generate profits. However, lower ROA may indicate inefficiency of the 
management in achieving the firm’s profitability (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2009).  
ROA is a good measurement to compare commercial and non-commercial MFIs 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). Researchers and academicians (Shu 
& Oney, 2014; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2010)  use this to measure the MFIs financial 
performance in Cameroon MFIs. Other researchers and academicians (Barry & 
Tacneng, 2014; Bassem, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003; Galema, 
Lensink, & Mersland, 2012; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009; Hartarska, 2005; 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Nurmakhanova et 
al., 2015; Strøm et al., 2014) use this variable to measure the firms’ financial 
performance. This study considers return on assets, ROA, as a financial 
performance-measuring tool for MFIs in Nepal. 
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3.9.2.2 Return on equity (ROE) 
Return on equity is an indicator ratio of how that operating efficiency is translated 
into benefits to the owner. This is the second complementary approach to measure 
the profitability (Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009) of return on investment (the 
first is ROA). ROE is an indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total 
equity. ROE is the indicator of the operating efficiency that contributes to the 
owners’ wealth while ROA indicates the operating efficiency of the company. The 
ROE is defined as 'Net income for the full fiscal year and considered as being 
earnings after tax (EAT).' ROE is the most important profitability ratio 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009) to measure the performance for fund 
suppliers. ROE is calculated as net income divided by total book value of equity 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007; 
Sa-Dhan: The Association of Community Development Finance Institutions, 2016) 
ROE =  Net Income 
Total Equity 
The positive value of ROE indicates an MFI is profitable and it is also sustainable 
because it covers all of its costs as well as generates capital growth (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). 
Donor funds are considered as the equity. Researchers (Shu & Oney, 2014; 
Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2010) use this variable to measure the Cameroon MFIs’ 
performance on equity. Other researchers and academicians (Carter et al., 2003; 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; Nurmakhanova et al., 2015) use this variable 
to measure financial performance. This study uses return on equity, ROE, as a 
profitability-measuring tool for MFIs in Nepal. 
3.9.2.3 Debt/ Equity Ratio (DER) 
 DER is a measure of MFIs' financial leverage and indicates what proportion of 
equity and debt the company is using to finance its assets. Sa-Dhan: The 
Association of Community Development Finance Institutions (2016) explains debt-
equity ratio as a parameter to measure the extent of leveraging of equity to raise 
outside debt. This ratio measures the overall leverage of the institution and “how 
much cushion it has to absorb losses after all liabilities are paid” (Barres et al., 2005, 
p. 66). DER disciplines the manager (Barres et al., 2005) to increase profitability 
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(Muriu, 2011) to meet their obligation and increase the owners’ wealth. Debt to 
equity ratio levels differ considerably between MFIs (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). It 
is assumed MFIs have lower leverage than commercial banks because their ability 
to obtain commercial debt is limited. This leverage is generally understood as a 
multiple of their own capital amount (Sa-Dhan: The Association of Community 
Development Finance Institutions, 2016). Muriu (2011) explains changes in 
financial leverage affect firm value which makes it important for investors and 
lenders to check the capital risk that they may have to bear (Barres et al., 2005). 
Microfinance institutions with higher debt in their capital structure are more 
profitable (Muriu, 2011). 
“MFIs receive subsidies in the form of donations and cash”, where donors do not 
expect any returns (Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015, p. 316). Subsidized equity is part 
of MFIs’ equity (Barres et al., 2005; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015). Debt to equity 
ratio is the proportion of total debt borrowed, including voluntary savings, to the 
total equity held at a given point of time (Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007; 
Sa-Dhan: The Association of Community Development Finance Institutions, 2016). 
Debt to Equity Ratio =  Total debt 
Total Equity 
The lower value of the DER shows the lower financial risk with lower cost of debt. 
Researchers (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010; Muriu, 2011; Sa-Dhan: The Association of 
Community Development Finance Institutions, 2016; Shu & Oney, 2014) use this 
variable to measure financial performance. This study uses debt to equity ratio 
(DER) as a financial proxy to measure Nepalese MFIs’ operational performance. 
3.9.2.4 Operational self-sufficiency (OSS)  
Operational self-sufficiency is an indicator of MFIs’ financial self-sufficiency in 
their operational capability. It shows whether MFIs need outside funding support 
or whether they can operate on their own financial resources to cover all their costs 
incurred by doing business (Schäfer & Fukasawa, 2011). It is a more relevant tool 
to measure MFIs’ financial performance because OSS focuses on the MFI’s core 
business revenues and expenses (Schäfer & Fukasawa, 2011). MFI performance in 
terms of financial sustainability is measured by OSS (Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). 
Strøm et al. (2014) define OSS as portfolio revenues divided by operational 
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expenses. “This measure is free from bias resulting from different capital structure, 
access to subsidized funding and possible differences in default policies in the MFI” 
(Strøm et al., 2014, p. 63). 
Operational self-sufficiency measures how well the MFI can cover its operating 
costs through operating revenues (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007). OSS measures the managers’ ability to operate the business and 
cover operating costs (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). 
Mersland, D’Espallier, and Supphellen (2013) define OSS as a measure of 
“operational income that covers operational, financial and default costs” (p. 155). 
This is an appropriate financial proxy to measure the MFIs’ operational 
performance because fund providers want to see MFIs’ self-sustainability rather 
than their profits (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). 
When OSS is above 100% it indicates the MFI is self-sufficient to operate its 
business, equal to 100% is a break-even point for an MFI operation and a ratio 
below 100% indicates that the MFI is incurring losses and relies on continued 
outside funding to maintain its current level of operation (Schäfer & Fukasawa, 
2011). 
The Mersland and Strøm (2009), Microfinance Information Exchange (2007), and   
Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2010) calculate OSS by using Revenue from operations / 
(Financial expense + net loan loss expense + operating expense) . 
OSS =    Revenue from operations 
(Financial expense + net loan loss expense + operating expense) 
OSS is widely used as a financial proxy to measure institutional financial 
sustainability (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Researchers (D'Espallier et al., 2009; 
D’Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 2011; Luzzi & Weber, 2006; Nurmakhanova et 
al., 2015; Schäfer & Fukasawa, 2011; Shu & Oney, 2014; Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 
2010) use this variable to measure the operational performance of firms. This study 
uses operational self-sufficiency (OSS) as financial proxy to measure Nepalese 
MFIs’ operational performance. 
3.10 Independent variables 
Nepalese MFIs’ outreach and financial performance are measured on the corporate 
governance factors. Governance factors are taken on the availability of data that are 
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extracted from the accounting statement of individual firms for each study year.  
The governance factors have been taken from earlier studies by other researchers in 
different regions of the world. The governance factors for MFI performance show 
the positive and negative correlational impact in different studies, which prompted 
the use of these variables for MFIs in Nepal. Brief descriptions of the independent 
variables follow. 
 Board size 
This study takes board size (BOD) as the number of board members (Kyereboah‐
Coleman & Osei, 2008) in individual MFIs in each year studied in Nepal. It is a 
major component of the governance input factor to measure the firms’ performance. 
Academicians and researchers in their studies to measure firms' performance have 
used board size as a governance characteristic. Corporate boards of directors play a 
central role in the corporate governance of modern companies (Guest, 2009).  Board 
efficacy can be influenced by board size (Hartarska, 2005). There are different 
arguments about whether the smaller or larger board size gives better performance. 
Larger board size may smooth the board functioning but it starts reducing firm 
performance at the point when larger boards suffer from coordination and 
communication problems (Jensen, 1993). Bassem (2009), and  Kyereboah‐
Coleman and Osei  (2008) suggest that MFIs need large boards for better 
performance.  Malik et al. (2014) find larger boards have a positive relationship 
with performance under specific cultural aspects. Bermig and Frick (2007), 
Eisenberg et al. (1998), Yermack (1996), and  Eisenberg et al. (1998) suggest 
smaller boards are more effective at monitoring top managers due to lower 
coordination costs that generate a superior firm performance. As a result, the 
optimal board size for better firm performance is so far inconclusive. The different 
countries’ institutional characteristics differ on the institutional background that 
plays its role on the firms’ performance with board size as an input factor (Guest, 
2009). Hence, understanding the relationship of board size and firm performance 
(Guest, 2009) becomes an important factor for this study. 
 Independent directors 
Independent directors who are neither employee nor related to the firm are expected 
to act as better monitors and advisors to the firm (Hartarska, 2005). Independent 
director positions are part-time and from outside the company (Pass, 2004). Being 
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outsiders, they are believed to provide better benefits to the firm (Bassem, 2009). 
Rock et al. (1998) highlight the importance of independent directors on board as 
they show good governance practice that helps MFIs to improve their monitoring 
of management. Their presence on boards reduces the  conflict of interest and 
measures the executives’ performance objectively (Bassem, 2009). An 
“Independent board serves as an effective check on management and protects the 
interest of shareholders” (Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008, p. 242). The 
monitoring quality of the board is also measured by the proportional presence of 
independent directors (Bhagat & Black, 1999). Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei 
(2008) argue that a firm has a more independent board when it has a larger 
proportion of outsiders. However, the literature from previous studies does not 
support the governance input factor that a number of independent directors 
improves overall firm performance any more than firms without such boards 
(Bhagat & Black, 1999). Thus, it is taken as a higher attention as governance 
variable to consider (Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). This study takes 
independent director (INDBOD) as the number of non-executive directors on board 
in individual firms for each year.  
 Percentage of females on boards 
The percentage of females on a board is measured as the number of female directors 
on the board against the total number of board members. Female involvement in 
director positions is being discussed more widely. The recent discussion on 
governance reform explicitly stresses the importance of gender diversity in the 
boardroom (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The literature evidence is that the presence 
of women on boards has shown a slow but steady rise across the world (Wellalage 
& Locke, 2013). Wilson and Altanlar (2009) find that the presence of at least one 
female board director reduces company bankruptcy costs in the UK. The presence 
of women on boards of directors has an important association with firm 
performance (Carter et al., 2003) with better governance leading to more 
profitability (Carter et al., 2010). Adams and Ferreira (2009) conclude that the 
“fraction of women on boards appears to be an important determinant of the 
turnover performance sensitivity” (p. 301). The improvement in percentage of 
females on boards or number of female directors improves firm performance (Liu 
et al., 2014). Female directors on boards are found to be more efficient and to 
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increase board effectiveness more than independent directors (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009). A number of female directors who play active roles contribute to firm 
performance rather than having one token female on a board (Kanter, 1993). 
Presence of one or more female directors on the board relates positively to firm 
profitability (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Kramer, Konrad, and Erkut (2006), and Liu 
et al. (2014) find that three or more women on a board contribute to good 
governance and they are able to influence the content and process of board 
discussions more substantially. Further, they state that three or more women create 
the likelihood that woman’s voices and ideas are heard. This supports the saying 
“one is a token, two is a presence, and three is a voice” (Kristie, 2011). Kristie 
suggests “three or more women on any board make it a more effective board” (p. 
22). “Women bring a collaborative leadership style that benefits boardroom 
dynamics by increasing the amount of listening, social support, and win-win 
problem solving” (Kramer et al., 2006, p. 2). Gender diversity may enhance board 
decision-making by combining alternative and complementary views. Most MFIs 
with a social mission target female clients, which makes it more appropriate for 
them to have women on their boards (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010; Strøm et al., 2014). 
Recently, there have been more studies on the effect of women directors on firm 
performance. However, the extant literature of studies on firms in the US and some 
other developed economies provide inconclusive evidence, not concluding the 
relationship and firm performance is in only one direction. Thus, this study 
undertakes percentage of female on board (POFOB) as a governance input variable 
for MFIs in Nepal. 
 CEO duality 
CEO duality is recognized as the one person holding the two positions of CEO and 
board chairperson in a firm. This is measured on dummy variables; 1 for duality 
held, otherwise 0. It is a long-discussed governance factor by scholars, whether a 
firm’s performance increases with the dual role, or whether the roles should be 
separated. Mersland and Strøm (2009) assert that duality may enhance decision-
making effectiveness. The dual role leads to conflict of interest and firm 
performance suffers (Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008). However, Chen et al. 
(2008) explain "separating the position may increase information sharing costs, 
positional conflicts and inefficiency, decision making process and execution may 
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both be less efficient, difficult to blame for bad company performance". Most firms 
will benefit by separating the two positions as suggested by the activist shareholders 
and regulators (Faleye, 2007). 
Academicians and researchers (Chen et al., 2008; Dahya et al., 2009; Dahya et al., 
1996; Dahya & Travlos, 2000; Daily & Dalton, 1997; Faleye, 2007; Kyereboah‐
Coleman & Osei, 2008; Mersland & Strøm, 2009) have taken duality as a key 
governance factor for their studies in different regions. The scholars are unable to 
give one decisive direction for CEO duality and firm performance, which leads this 
study to take this variable as an input to measure the performance of MFIs in Nepal.  
 Minority directors on the board (CASTEDIV)  
Minority directors on the board is the proportion of minority/different caste 
directors on the board. A higher proportion of minority members indicates higher 
diversity in the firm, which indicates the firm may have higher performance. It is 
assumed that leadership diversity is critical to firm financial success (Roberson & 
Park, 2006). This board diversity may result in better governance that improves the 
firm’s profitability (Carter et al., 2010). Racial diversity in senior management  may 
help firms to align business strategies (Roberson & Park, 2006) with current and 
future demographic and market trends to achieve organizational growth and 
profitability (McCuiston et al., 2004). Racially diversified boards can gain a 
competitive advantage by having social and capital assets that increase the number 
of ideas, promote creativity, and lead to innovation (Miller & Triana, 2009). 
Navajas et al. (2000) explain that racial diversity helps firms to shape their strategies 
for targeting cultural clients by utilizing their racial resources. Minority directors 
on a board enhance board independence and reduce cultural questions and impact 
on business (Carter et al., 2003). Brammer et al. (2007) find ethnicity has a minor 
impact on firm performance. However, racial minorities are traditionally 
underrepresented on boards (Miller & Triana, 2009). Little attention is paid to the 
relationship between firm performance and board racial diversity (Roberson & Park, 
2006). Several scholars (Brammer et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 
2003; Miller & Triana, 2009; Richard, 2000; Roberson & Park, 2006) have used 
this variable for their studies. Nepalese society has a hierarchal caste system and 
decisions are made on a cognitive cultural basis. While there are 125 official castes 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014) in Nepal only a few are to be found on the board 
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of MFIs. The family title of a board member explains the individual caste. Caste is 
measured by reference to the individual’s title, name and the type of work they 
undertake. Thus, it can be easily identified who belongs to which caste. The number 
of board members from different castes are transformed into the percentage for 
analysis purposes.  
In a case of inter-caste marriage, the family title after the marriage is the one that 
indicates his/her caste affiliation. The two MFIs, BISCOL and UNYC, are an 
example. There are four members in BISCOL who are from different castes. This 
has been calculated in total as 33% and the one member in UNYC from a different 
caste results (14%). This indicates minor directors (CASTEDIV) on boards should 
be a key input governance factor in relation to MFIs’ performance in Nepal. 
BISCOL  BOD diversity                    4/12=0.33 
Mr. Pradip Thapa 
Chairperson 
Mrs. Januka Devi Bhattarai  
Vice Chairman 
Mr. Ram Sharan Bhandari 
Secretary 
Mr. Dorendra Raj Sapkota  
Member 
Mr. Bhimsen Pd. Sapkota 
Member 
Mr. Achut Pd. Guragain  
Member 
Mr. Ramhari Sharma 
Timalsina, Member 
Mr. Shanta Kumar Shrestha 
Treasurer 
Mr. Govinda Pd. Adhikari 
Member 
Mrs. Samita Banjara   
Member 
Mrs. Chandika Wagle 
Member 
Mr. Surya Narayan Napit  
Member 
 
UNYC   BOD diversity                 1/7=0.14 




Mr. Ram Kumar Tharu  
Treasurer 
Mr. Radheshyam Tharu, 
Member 
Mr. Mahadev Chaudhary 
General Secretary 
Mrs. Radha Chaudhary, 
Member 





4 Chapter four – Data 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the collection of data from different resources for the period 
2004 to 2012 for MFIs in Nepal. The treatment methods for gap filling in collected 
data are explained in this section. The governance factors and their collection are 
described. In terms of the empirical research, an interesting part of the analysis 
relates to the small sample sizes and issues with data. Mix Market data have been 
used for analysis purposes, as other sources do not provide the useful and evidential 
reports for a longer period than 2004 to 2012.   
4.2 Sources of data 
There are various sources of data available in Nepal presenting MFI-related 
information in different formats and different languages. The lack of contiguous 
series and disruption to nearly all official statistics as a result of the 2015 earthquake 
has made this exercise more difficult than it might otherwise have been. Domestic 
and international labour movements in Nepal are available through Department of 
Labour (DOL) publications and reports. The ratio of the absent population to total 
population was obtained from Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS): the population 
profile and its sub-section reports and publications provided a fact sheet for this 
study. World Bank (WB), online publications from the Centre for Financial 
Inclusion (CFI) and The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) provided 
support for ensuring the robustness of the data included. Secondary data were 
collected from the self-reporting of individual MFIs’ annual financial reports on 
their websites and from institutions such as Rural Microfinance Development 
Centre (RMDC) and Nepal Central Bank (Nepal Rastra Bank, NRB) and other 
online sources in order to ensure that most of the MFIs’ reports have been 
considered. The individual MFI’s online websites were used as a source to obtain 
their annual financial reports: Income Statement, Balance Sheet, Cash Follows and 
information on governance structure. For analysis purposes in the study, the 
derivatives, variables: dependent, independent and control data were taken from the 
self-reported financial data. However, it is not the same case for all the MFIs. MFIs 
with fewer technological facilities, report to the RMDC and the NRB. Thus, 
attempts were made to collect the data from both RMDC and NRB. 
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Table 12 below shows the data sources, institutions and time periods. Initially data 
were collected from three sources: Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), Rural Microfinance 
Development Centre (RMDC) and Mix Market. NRB provides data on MFIs for 
2012, 2013 and 2014. RMDC provides data covering member MFIs, NGOs, and 
cooperatives for 2011, 2012, and 2013. Mix Market covers MFIs, NGO, INGO, and 
cooperatives from 2000 to 2012. Although there are overlaps in the time periods, 
there are inconsistencies between the sources, relating to institutions covered and 
the numbers reported, which means chaining the time periods is not straightforward. 
Table 12: Data sources 
Sources Institutions Time periods 
NRB MFIs 2012, 2013, 2014 
RMDC Members only: MFIs, NGO/INGO, COOP 2011, 2012, 2013 
Mix Market MFIs, NGO/INGO, COOP 2000-2012 
 
RMDC has a time series report on the members of Nepalese MFIs and their 
performance in general. This provided a financial indicator report on current trends 
of the individual MFIs and all the members as a whole. It gives an opportunity to 
collect the data and compare it with other members. It has a yearly analytical report 
as well as a descriptive report that helped this study to collect the required 
information within the required timeframe. It gathers the information from all its 
members and reports it publically. Thus, missing information from MFIs’ reports 
and ratios were gathered from this site. There are some data on relevant variables 
that were not available on this site which have been checked with the NRB online 
site and reports on MFIs in Nepal.  
The NRB gives an opportunity to see the performance of individual MFIs as well 
as whole industries in Nepal. It also gives information on the directories and 
guidelines of all Nepalese MFIs. However, it does not provide all the information 
on financial ratios and variables, which have been taken from MFIs’ individual 
online sites, RMDC and the Mix Market site. 
Data from RMDC and NRB are useful for cross-sectional analysis but do not cover 
sufficient periods for time-series analysis. The data availability and accessibility the 
study to use the time-period of nine years in this study. The initial panel dataset was 
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created from Mix Market for nine years from 2004 to 2012. It was the most current 
data available on Mix Market, which was taken for analysis purposes. The year 
2004 has been taken as a beginning year in the study for analysis due to the 
information on governance and financial reports available for all the MFIs. The 
2012 year was the most recent year’s data available on the Mix Market at the time 
of the data collection for analysis.  
The information on corporate governance was collected from the MFIs’ annual 
reports and their websites. The governance variables were taken to suit the analysis 
and reduce the complexities on the data availability for the continuous years from 
2004 to 2012. The governance factor information was obtained manually by 
calculating the number of directors on the board, number of independent directors 
on the board, and determining the CEO’s duality role for each firm for each year 
from 2004 to 2012. Percentage of females on board was calculated by counting the 
number of females on the board divided by the total number of board directors for 
each year of the data collection period. Other control variables; total assets, firm 
age, and employees were taken from the Mix Market set of data and checked with 
the annual report for each firm yearly. Staff productivity was taken as the total 
number of clients divided by the number of employees for each firm yearly. 
The variable caste diversity is recognized by the names of directors. The Hindu 
hierarchical system puts people in different castes and caste titles to recognize easily 
who belongs to which caste. The researcher can distinguish whether a board is 
caste-diversified by members’ names and titles. Caste diversity as an independent 
variable on the board has been taken as the number of board members from different 
castes and transformed into a percentage for analysis simplicity. 
The data set is an unbalanced6 (Park, 2011) panel and it contains 314 observations 
of MFIs for years 2004 to 2012 because the shortest time period for a firm is three 
years and longest is nine years in this panel set. The STATA package was used for 
data analysis and interpretation purposes.  
                                                 
6 Unbalanced panel data occurs when each entity in a data set has different numbers of observations 
for at least one of the time-periods. 
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4.3 Data filling 
There are a limited number of years for which data on NGOs and INGOs are 
available. The data are kept for the analysis and the years where there are no entries 
are recorded as missing data. The analysis assumed that NGOs and INGOs were 
operating for specific projects that were completed and there are no missing data 
associated with these entries in the database. 
It is common to have gaps in secondary data, which needs to be considered in initial 
stages of data analysis for correct interpretation (Pigott, 2001). The default setting 
of STATA does not take the missing data in statistical analysis, which indicates a 
need to fill the data gap to take the variable into consideration. There are gaps in 
the dataset and consideration was given to appropriate ways in which these gaps 
could be filled without compromising the veracity of the observations.  
In the literature, several different ways are suggested to replace missing 
observations in a data series. While no approach is perfect, four are commonly used: 
Interpolation, Extrapolation, Average Method (using years before gap year & after 
gap year), and Growth Rate Method of the mentioning series (Pigott, 2001).  
Interpolation is used to fill the gap in a graphical calculation between two given 
points assuming that the estimated curve passes through all the known points. The 
four forms of the graphical curve: Linear, Cubic, Cosine and Hermite can be used 
to find the unknown members along with the known ones (Bourke, 1999). The 
extrapolation method estimates data to fill the gaps by accelerating the convergence 
of sequences beyond the known observation. Linear, Polynomial, Conic, and 
French curves are used to estimate the next observation depending on the nature of 
data (Ouyed & Dobler). The average method is used to fill the gaps by taking data 
before and after the gap. To be unbiased, years before and after data have been taken 
into consideration while using the average method (Raghunathan, 2004). Growth 
rate method estimates the missing value on the percentage change from one period 
to another. 
Choosing the right methodology is crucial and the right methodology application 
depends on where the gap is: at the beginning, middle or end of the series. The 
nature of the data and normal time factors suggested using the average and growth 
rate methods to fill the gaps in the data in this study. The data has been compared 
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with the competitive institutions with full sets of data in the industry to check 
whether the study is filling the gaps correctly. There are a limited number of years 
for which NGO and INGO data are available. The data are kept for the analysis and 
the years where there are no entries recorded as missing data. The analysis assumes 
that NGOs and INGOs were operating for specific projects that were completed and 
there are no missing data associated with these entries in the database. The gap 
filling may be not perfect but it gives a better reflection than simply omitting data 
would do. Multiple imputations have been used to fill the missing values with mean 
and median where it is appropriate to do so. 
Gaps in the data are filled in to increase the number of observations and enhance 
the robustness of the statistical analysis undertaken.  For each institution, the time-
series of each variable and the cross-sectional relationship between variables are 
examined in determining the most appropriate method for estimating each missing 
item of data. Where no obvious pattern or relationships are apparent, an averaging 
approach and last value carry forward methods are used to fill the gap in the dataset. 
The expectation, when commencing this research was that further years of data 
would become available. The earthquake of 2015 resulted in a cessation in the 
publication of data. Unfortunately, post-quake in Nepal, financial statistics and even 
financial reporting have not been a matter of priority. Consequently, the most 
current data available on the different sources were used in the study. A continuous 
search was made to collect the most recent data to increase the credibility of the 
study. 
4.4 Sample size and procedure 
The central bank of Nepal, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), regulates the financial 
banking systems in Nepal. Every firm has to seek registration from the NRB to run 
their financial services. Therefore, the regulated organizations, Rural Banks (RB), 
Non-Government Organizations (NGO), and Cooperatives (COOP), that provide 
the financial services to the deprived sector have been taken in the sample. The 
research excludes unregulated organizations, moneylenders and other informal 
organizations from the sample because they do not provide the financial statement 
and governance information to the government of Nepal. The study has analysed 
the governance factors and firms’ outreach and financial performance, which 
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requires having governance information as an input for the output association. This 
information can be extracted from the regulated firms but not from the unregulated 
firms.   
Mix Market provides the financial and social information on region-based MFIs 
around the world. It collects data through consultants and regional networks to 
provide individual MFIs’ financial data and reports (Lafourcade et al., 2005). This 
site has information on MFIs in Nepal. It provides the financial and outreach reports 
on MFIs in Nepal. Mix Market database has been used as the source of the data for 
research analysis in this study because this database provides the full set of data 
with the different variables that are useful for analysis purposes. Other sources have 
been used to fill the gaps and support the arguments. Researchers (Adhikary & 
Papachristou, 2014; Cull et al., 2007; Cull, Navajas, Nishida, & Zeiler, 2015; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Hasan & Hartarska, 2009; Hisako, 2009; Lafourcade 
et al., 2005; Quayes, 2012) have used the Mix Market for their study and suggested 
using this database particularly for MFIs. Caudill et al. (2009), and Hasan and 
Hartarska (2009) assert that Mix Market collects and provides data for research 
analysis more in recent years for MFIs than in 1990. Hisako (2009) finds the Mix 
Market database has high quality financial data. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
regard the Mix Market data as being the best database for MFIs with a 1 to 5-star 
rating system for the complete set of variables and individual’s financial and 
outreach data which can be retrieved. The Mix Market database contains extensive 
financial and outreach information for MFIs (Lafourcade et al., 2005; Quayes, 
2012), and classifies the information from MFIs self-reported data (Lafourcade et 
al., 2005; Quayes, 2012). 
The sample years are 2004 to 2012 as this was the most recent data available on the 
Mix Market database. Most firms’ financial statements were available on the mix 
database and other resources from 2004. For the purpose of research data uniformity, 
2004 is taken as the beginning year in analysis and 2012 as the last observation, as 
it was the most recent available. The Mix Market database contains most of the 
firms that are regulated by NRB in Nepal and they are involved with non-collateral 




5 Chapter five – Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This section specifies the research model and data analysis technique used to test 
the relationship between corporate governance and MFI performance on outreach, 
number of customers served, and financial factors in this study. This study discusses 
an empirical approach I have been pursuing concerning microfinance institutions in 
Nepal. Different methods are used to test the collected data for specification of the 
suitable regression model for analysis. The panel data tests are done to check the 
suitability of the panel regression for the panel data for the period 2004 to 2012. 
The normality test of the data is done to check the suitability of a parametric or 
nonparametric approach for further analysis. The correlation test is done on 
governance factors to find the correlation matrix of independent variables. The test 
for the different subgroups is done to check whether their performance is the same 
or whether it changes during the period 2004-2012. These tests enable the 
researcher to decide the correct model for the empirical data analysis and the 
regression results. A cross-sectional non-parametric regression approach is used on 
data 2004 and 2012 to identify the correlation of the governance factors and the 
outreach and financial performance of MFIs in Nepal. 
5.2 Normality test of data 
The first step is to check that the data distribution is symmetric. A normality check 
of data is necessary before deciding the correct methodological model for further 
data analysis. The bell-shaped data distribution with left and right shape equal to 
each other from the centre fold is recognized as symmetric. The skewness test 
explains the normality of the data. The data is symmetric when skewness is 0. 
Kurtosis explains the peakedness of data distribution; that data are heavy-tailed or 
light-tailed distributed. The implication is that a higher value of kurtosis indicates 
heavy tails, or outliers of data distribution and low kurtosis explains light tails, or 
lack of outliers. In addition, the graphic presentation of a histogram of data is 
checked with the help of STATA software. The histogram shows the skewness of 
data and suggests transforming the data for symmetric distribution. The natural 
logarithm is used on variables that have large values to transform them to symmetric 
behaviour. Three variables, viz. asset size, number of active borrowers, and number 
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of depositors are subject to a log transformation. However, the data distribution 
after the log transformation is tested on skewness and kurtosis, which indicates that 
data is not normally distributed. Differences between mean and median combined 
with an examination of the skewness and kurtosis suggests that most variables are 
not normally distributed. The skewness and kurtosis tests for normality, STATA 
reject the null hypothesis of normality of data with the exception of size of assets, 
age of the institution, number of active borrowers, and number of depositors. 
Accordingly, a nonparametric approach is adopted for future analyses. 
The shape of data distribution can be influenced by the presence of outliers. Outliers 
are observations that are vastly different from the other observations, by being too 
small or too large. Outliers are problematic and may give biased outcomes 
(Cousineau & Chartier, 2010). A small sample size is easily influenced by outliers, 
more than a larger sample size (Cousineau & Chartier, 2010; Daszykowski, 
Kaczmarek, Vander Heyden, & Walczak, 2007). This study has a small sample size. 
Thus, it needs to take precautions for the existence of outliers. The statistical test, 
Grubb’s test, assumes the normality of data distribution. The Grubb’s test is used 
to identify the outliers one at a time by using 1 for outlier or 0 otherwise. The test 
is repeated and outliers removed until none remains. The winsorization, assigning 
the value closer to the other sample values (Ghosh & Vogt, 2012), was used to 
overcome the Grubb’s test limitation. Winsorizing protects the data from the 
harmful effects of outliers (Ghosh & Vogt, 2012). 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
The data set is downloaded from the Mix Market, which consists of MFIs, 
cooperatives, NGOs, and INGOs in a sample set for analysis. There are 314 
observations. Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 13. Table 13 
illustrates the variables, the number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum, variance, skewness and kurtosis values of each 
variable. The variables in the table are divided into two parts; dependent and 
independent. The dependent variables are divided into two categories: outreach and 
financial. There are five outreach variables: number of active borrowers (NAB), 
average loan balance per borrowers (ALBPB), average loan balance per borrower 
per GNI(ALBPB/GNI), number of depositors (NOD), and percentage of female 
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borrowers (PFB); and four financial variables: return on asset (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), debt to equity ratio (DER), and operational self-sufficiency (OSS).  
This study considers the governance factors as board size (BOD), independent 
directors (INDBOD), CEOs duality role (Duality), percentage of females on board 
(PFONBOD), caste diversification (CASTEDIV), and staff productivity (DPSM). 
There are three control variables; firm size (total asset), maturity (age of the firm), 
number of employees (PERSONNEL), which are considered input factors for the 
dependent variables. The dependent variables are regressed with the independent 
variables as input factors.  
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Explanatory Variables       
BOD 314 7.2675 7.0000 3.0003 2.0000 15.0000 9.0017 0.8340 3.6800 
INDBOD 314 0.4841 0.0000 1.0551 0.0000 5.0000 1.1132 2.2734 7.4577 
PFONBOD 314 0.3559 0.2500 0.3618 0.0000 1.0000 0.1309 0.9059 2.3387 
DUALITY 314 0.9331 1.0000 0.2502 0.0000 1.0000 0.0626 -3.4676 13.0241 
CASTEDIV 314 0.2685 0.2667 0.2143 0.0000 1.0000 0.0459 0.9408 4.8863 
DPSM 314 246.9506 248.5000 123.2706 8.000 906.0000 15195.6400 1.3518 7.8235 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
LNASSETS 314 18.6423 18.7842 1.7196 13.1843 21.9938 2.9570 -0.4413 2.6350 
AGE 314 12.2484 13.0000 4.6899 1.0000 23.0000 21.9956 -0.3784 2.5238 
PERSONNEL 314 90.0825 49.0000 100.7358 2.0000 561.0000 10147.7000 1.5312 5.4280 
OUTREACH VARIABLES       
LNNAB 314 8.7500 8.9167 1.6499 4.5326 11.6436 2.7220 -0.2856 2.1115 
ALBPB 314 20910.1500 12579.0000 27086.6800 1116.4380 273265.0000 734000000.0000 4.3913 31.6238 
ALBPBGNI 314 49.1786 29.4648 67.6072 3.8739 683.1623 4570.7270 4.8565 34.7229 
LNNOD 314 9.1051 9.3078 1.6431 3.4012 12.8683 2.6996 -0.5763 3.1480 
PFB 314 0.9142 1.0000 0.2068 0.1899 1.0000 0.0428 -2.3287 6.8981 
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Financial Variables       
OSS 314 1.1783 1.1677 0.4990 0.2002 7.6754 0.2490 7.4472 95.0629 
DER 314 17.7262 8.4550 51.6105 -14.6100 510.8400 2663.6420 7.8177 70.3230 
ROA 314 0.0138 0.0167 0.0603 -0.4830 0.4093 0.0036 -0.9499 30.3281 
ROE 314 0.2208 0.1705 1.2948 -8.7586 12.3500 1.6764 4.6624 61.1997 
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Table 13 shows Nepalese MFIs' average board size of 7.3 (median 7 members) 
which varies from a minimum of two members to a maximum of 15, supports the 
findings (Guest, 2009; Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 2008; Mersland & Strøm, 
2009). Hewa-Wellalage (2012) finds the average board size for Sri Lankan MFIs is 
7.61, which is similar to Nepalese MFIs’ average board size.  Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) found the board size in their study ranged from seven to nine. Kyereboah-
Coleman and Osei (2008) suggest that eight board members is an effective size to 
consider. Guest (2009) suggests an optimal board size is less than ten, leading firms 
to have better performance. Galema et al. (2012) find average board size is 7.34 
with a median of seven in 280 MFIs from 60 countries gathered during 2000–07. 
Bassem (2009) finds average board size is 5.82, varying from four to 16. The 
Council of Microfinance Equity Funds (2012) suggests boards with fewer than five 
perform poorly and the ideal board size is seven to nine members but effective 
boards may have “as few as five or as many as 11 or more” (p. 14). Hedrick and 
Struggles (2014) find the ideal European average board size is 12. The average 
board remains lowest in Finland at 7.5, with Germany at 17, Portugal at 14.1 and 
Belgium at 12.5. 
The average number of independent directors on boards in Nepalese MFIs is 0.48 
which is significantly lower than the average European number of  non-executive 
directors which is 80%; that varies from 59% in Poland and 98% in Norway, while 
Switzerland, Sweden and France have more than 90% non-executive representation, 
and Portugal and Poland have around 60% (Hedrick & Struggles, 2014). Bassem 
(2009) finds proportional independent director mean value is 0.457 and it varies 
from 0 to 0.213 in Mediterranean countries. The independent directors’ number 
varies from minimum 0 to maximum five in Nepalese MFIs. The higher number of 
independent directors could be because of the government requirement to have at 
least one independent director on the board. 
The average percentage of females on boards in Nepalese MFIs is 0.36 (median 
0.25), which is quite near to Bassem's (2009) finding of the average proportion of 
women on boards being 0.398 in Mediterranean countries, and higher than the 
proportion of women on European boards which stands at 17%, and higher than 
Portugal (8%) and Poland (8%) (Hedrick & Struggles, 2014). The minimum value 
is 0 and maximum value is 1 that is 100% of percentage of females on boards in 
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Nepalese MFIs. It is likely that the higher percentage of females on boards in 
Nepalese MFIs is due to the government regulation to have at least one female 
director on the board, and some NGOs, INGOs and cooperatives are run by females 
who target female clients. 
Ninety-three percent of Nepalese MFIs have CEO/Chairman duality. Only 7% of 
Nepalese MFIs separate the roles in their governance operation. This shows the 
higher presence of CEO/Chair duality in Nepalese MFIs. The descriptive statistics 
of higher presence of CEO dual role does not support Hedrick and Struggles, (2014) 
findings of 20% of European firms suggested to have CEO duality role where 
Netherland stands at 68%, Austria and France at 65% and United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden, Poland at 0% of CEO duality role. 
The mean proportion of ethnic representation on the board is 27% (median 27%) in 
Nepalese MFIs. The minimum ethnic representation in Nepalese MFIs stands at 0% 
and the maximum is 1, (100%). This shows the presence of ethnicity on the board 
in Nepalese MFIs. This figure is higher than Carter et al. (2003) who find a mean 
of 5.9% for Fortune 1000 firms. Miller and Triana (2009) find an average 10% in 
Fortune 500 firms and average ethnic representation in Nepalese MFIs is  smaller 
than Marimuthu's (2008) finding of an average 53% in Malaysian companies. 
Staff productivity mean value is 246.95 (median 248.5). Table 13 shows Nepalese 
MFIs’ staff productivity ranges from a minimum value of 8 and maximum value of 
906. Lafourcade et al. (2005) find the average staff productivity in number of savers 
stands at 213 and borrowers at 143 in African MFIs. Haq et al. (2010) find average 
staff productivity in number of borrowers per staff at 198 and saver per staff at 266 
in 39 MFIs across Africa, Asia and Latin America. D'Espallier et al. (2009) find 
average staff productivity of 129 in 350 MFIs in 70 countries for 2001 to 2006. 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) find average staff productivity in number of borrowers 
is 259.2273, ranging from 50 to 511, and number of savers is 28.772, ranging from 
0 to1293 in 22 five-star rated MFIs in India. He further explains that Indian MFIs 
are not being able to utilize their employees to full capacity.  
Firm size is calculated as the total assets of Nepalese MFIs. Natural log is taken for 
data smoothness. Average mean value of the firm size, LNASSETS, is 18.64 
(median is 18.78) which is near to Bassem's (2009) finding of firm size mean value 
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of 17.634 in Mediterranean countries. Mersland and Strøm (2009) find mean firm 
size of 14.88 in a dataset of 278 MFIs from 60 countries for 2000 to 2007. Galema 
et al. (2012) find board size mean and median are 14.97 in 280 MFIs from 60 
countries gathered during 2000–07. Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) find firm size 
16.01 in a dataset of 450 MFIs from 71 countries over 2006–2008. Hartarska (2005) 
finds firm size is 13.97 for MFIs in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find average firm size is 14.97 
for 114 MFIs from 62 countries. The Nepalese MFI size varies from 13.18 to 21.99.   
Maturity of the firm, age, is taken as the number of the years Nepalese MFIs have 
operated in the financial market. The average age of the Nepalese MFIs is 12.24 
and median stands at 13, which is near to the Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) 
finding  from Ghanaian MFIs being young with a mean age of 13 years. Galema et 
al. (2012) finds average age of MFIs is 11.06 in 280 MFIs from 60 countries for 
2000–07. Mersland and Strøm (2009) find the average mean age of MFIs is 9.2 for 
278 MFIs from 60 countries for 2000 to 2007 which is also supported by Mersland 
et al. (2013) in a dataset of 405 MFIs operating in 73 countries worldwide for 2001 
to 2010. Strøm et al. (2014) find the mean average is 9.36 for 329 MFIs in 73 
countries for 1998–2008. Galema et al. (2012) find the average age is 11.06 in the 
dataset of 280 MFIs from 60 countries gathered during 2000–07. Mersland and 
Strøm (2010) find the average age of MFIs is 8.912 in 379 rated MFIs in 74 
countries for 2001-2006. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find the average age is 
8.08 for 114 MFIs from 62 countries and Hasan and Hartarska (2009) find the same 
average age of 8 from cross-country data of individual MFIs for 60 countries over 
the period 1998-2002. The minimum age of the Nepalese MFIs is 1 and the 
maximum is 23. 
Personnel is defined as the number of employees that MFIs have in Nepal. The 
average number of employees stands at 90 (median 49) in Nepalese MFIs. 
D'Espallier et al. (2009) find the average number of employees in MFIs stands at 
89, ranging from 2 to 1893 employees in 350 MFIs in 70 countries for 2001 to 2006. 
The employees in Nepalese MFIs vary from minimum 2 to maximum at 561. 
The natural log has been applied to active borrowers variable to reduce the 
dispersion. The number of active borrowers, LNNAB, in Nepalese MFIs’ mean 
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value stands at 8.75 and median at 8.92. Bassem (2009) finds the average NAB is 
8.238 in Mediterranean countries. The number of active borrowers varies from 4.53 
to 11.64 in Nepalese MFIs. The standard deviation is 1.65.  
Loan size is defined as the average loan balance per borrower. The mean value of 
the Nepalese MFIs’ ALBPB stands at NRs 20910.15 and the median is at NRs 
12579. Its standard deviation is 27086.68. The minimum value is at NRs 1116.44 
and maximum value is at NRs 273265, which shows there is a huge dispersion in 
loan size among Nepalese MFIs.  
Depth of the loan is measured as the average loan balance per borrower per GNI 
per capita in Nepal. The average depth in Nepalese MFIs stands at 49.18% and the 
median is 29.47%. The standard deviation is 67.6%. The depth of Nepalese MFIs 
varies from a minimum value 3.87% to a maximum of 683.1%, which shows the 
MFIs’ loan deviation is high. The higher depth value serves fewer poor clients 
(Microfinance Information Exchange, 2007). The Nepalese MFIs average is higher 
than the Microfinance Information Exchange (2007) that measures the depth of loan 
of the poor clients when it is 20% and less. This shows that Nepalese MFIs serve 
more mid- and higher-range clients. Bassem (2009); Hartarska (2005) explain lower 
average depth values mean MFIs serves poorer people, which is preferred from a 
poverty alleviation perspective. 
Number of depositors is counted as the number of deposit accounts that MFIs hold 
in Nepal. A natural logarithm is taken to smooth the data and reduce the spreading. 
The average number of deposit accounts in Nepalese MFIs stands at 9.1 and the 
median is at 9.3. The minimum deposit account is at 3.04 and maximum is at 12.86. 
Percentage of female borrowers mean value stands at 91.42% in Nepalese MFIs 
which is similar to the Microfinance Information Exchange (2014) report of an 
average 92% female borrowers in South East Asia. Mersland et al. (2013) find the 
mean value of percentage of female borrowers is 0.73 and median 0.74 in 405 MFIs 
operating in 73 countries for 2001-2010. D'Espallier et al. (2009) find the 
percentage of borrowers mean is 73% in 350 MFIs in 70 countries for 2001 to 2006. 
The median value is 1, that is 100%. The minimum value of the percentage of 
female borrowers is 19% and maximum is 100%. The standard deviation is 21%. 
This shows that Nepalese MFIs are focused more on female borrowers and serve 
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only female clients. However, there are some MFIs that also target male clients in 
Nepal. 
Operating self-sufficiency (OSS) average value is 1.18 and the median is 1.17.  This 
is similar to Mersland et al. (2013) who find the OSS average is 1.14 and median 
1.11 in 405 MFIs operating in 73 countries for 2001-2010. Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) find the OSS mean value at 1.0773 in 114 MFIs from 62 
countries. Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2010) finds the average value of OSS is 1.145 in 
202 MFIs for 2001-2006. Mersland and Strøm (2009) find the OSS mean is 1.119 
in 278 MFIs from 60 countries between 1998 and 2007. D'Espallier et al. (2009) 
find the OSS mean value at 1.12 in 350 MFIs in 70 countries for 2001 to 2006. 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) find mean and median values of OSS are 1.264 and 1.121 
respectively, ranging from 0.5946 to 3.3565 in 22 five-star rated MFIs in India. 
Strøm et al. (2014) find the OSS mean 1.56 in 329 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
in 73 countries covering the years 1998–2008. Bassem (2009) finds the OSS mean 
value is 85.41% in Mediterranean countries. The mean and median values are 
higher than 1 which indicates that MFIs are operating effectively in Nepal. The OSS 
minimum value is 0.2 and maximum value is 7.67.  
The average value of debt to equity (DER) ratio is 17.73 and the median is 8.45 in 
Nepalese MFIs. This shows that Nepalese MFIs are depending 17.73 times more 
on external sources than their internal input to operate. Shu and Oney (2014) find 
the average DER is 5.58375 and the median is 6.86 on panel data for the six major 
MFIs in Cameroon from 2007 to 2009.  Agarwal and Sinha (2010) find the mean 
value of DER is 11.5386 and median is 8.52, ranging from 2.11 to 37.2 in 22 five-
star rated MFIs in India. DER standard deviation is 51.6 for MFIs in Nepal. The 
debt to equity ratio of Nepalese MFIs ranges from -14.61 to 510.84. The negative 
value of DER appears because some of the MFIs started their operation with the 
help of donations.  
Return on asset (ROA) mean value is 1.38% and median is 1.67%. This value is a 
little higher than Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2010) found in his study. Agarwal and 
Sinha (2010) find the ROA’s mean and median values are 0.0304 and 0.01365 
respectively, ranging from -0.1288 to 0.3086 in 22 five-star rated MFIs in India. 
Bassem (2009) finds ROA mean value of 5.935%, ranging from –7. 58% to 33% in 
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Mediterranean countries. The standard deviation is 6.03%. The average positive 
return is indicating that MFIs are utilizing their assets effectively, which improves 
operating profitability in Nepal. It shows that the shareholder’s return has improved 
in the period 2004-2012. ROA minimum value is -48.3 and maximum value is 
40.93% in Nepalese MFIs. The negative value of the ROA occurs because of the 
non-profit MFIs working in Nepal. The lower ROA in Nepalese MFIs indicates that 
the MFIs are asset-intensive and some of them may require more money to be 
invested into the business to continue generating earnings. 
The return on equity (ROE) mean value is 22.08% and median is 17.05% of MFIs 
in Nepal. This positive mean value indicates MFIs create value for their 
shareholders and operate efficiently for the owners’ benefits.  Agarwal and Sinha 
(2010) find the mean and median ROE values are 0.374195 and 0.1602, ranging 
from -0.3965 to 2.1238 in his study of 22 five-star rated MFIs in India. The ROE 
value varies from -875.86% to 1235% in Nepalese MFIs. The high negative value 
appears because some MFIs run entirely on owners’ equity for some years and they 
require investment in assets to provide further services.  
5.4 Correlation of independent variables 
The pairwise correlation matrix of the independent variables is presented in Table 
14. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, appropriate for the nonparametric 
variables, are presented in Table 14. While similar to Pearson’s coefficients, it is 
necessary to stipulate the significance level for the correlations, which are based on 
the ranking of the variables. The significance level for showing the coefficient is 
0.1 and the star is at 0.05. The correlations of the variables are in a range of -1 to 
+1. When the correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 0.8 it is 
suggested this will result in multicollinearity problems when both are used in a 
regression (Gujarati, 2011). Percentage of female borrowers is correlated with firm 
size, assets at -0.5366* and personnel at -0.5424*. Personnel is correlated at 
0.9087* with firm size. Most of the explanatory variables are less than 0.5, which 
is considered a low correlation between the explanatory variables, thus, giving less 
cause for concern about the multicollinearity problem.  
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Table 14: Spearman rank correlation for independent variables 
 BOD INDBOD PFONBOD DUALITY CASTEDIV DPSM LNASSETS AGE PERSONNEL 
BOD 1 
        
INDBOD 0.0757 1 
       
PFONBOD -0.1554* -0.1223* 1 
      
DUALITY -0.0770 -0.2126* 0.1295* 1 
     
CASTEDIV 0.0415 0.2846* 0.077 0.0587 1 
    
DPSM 0.2318* 0.1254* 0.0572 -0.1528* 0.0089 1 
   
LNASSETS 0.2340* 0.1611* -0.5366* -0.2152* 0.0638 0.3077* 1 
  
AGE 0.2339* 0.1200* -0.0093 0.0375 0.0017 0.2023* 0.2950* 1 
 




5.5 Model specification 
Correct specification of the model, including all relevant variables, and excluding 
irrelevant variables, is very important to ensure unbiased estimators. The starting 
point for the estimation process commences with an ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model. The diagnostics point of OLS to the need to introduce other forms 
of linear models is tested. Careful scrutiny of the data, ensuring it meets the 
necessary conditions for OLS, is undertaken as the outputs from each model are 
used.  
The initial panel dataset is created from the Mix Market for 9 years from 2004 to 
2012. The study sample takes panel data and a cross-sectional approach for analysis 
and comparison purposes.  
The homogeneity nature of panel data needs to be tested. Panel data is tested for the 
robustness of panel regression and whether a cross-sectional approach is 
appropriate for analysis in this study. Panel regression in corporate governance 
research is now common. However, the likelihood of governance variables 
changing each year may be low.  If this is the case, then panel regression results 
will be biased. The panel data are tested for poolability to determine suitability for 
panel regression analysis and following Baltagi, Javier and Li, (1996), a Roy-
Zellner test is applied.  
The null hypothesis of the poolability test is: H0: βik = βk 
The null hypothesis of poolability assumes slope coefficients are homogeneous. 
The Roy-Zellner statistic across firms is 197.43 with p-value 0.000 and across time 
is 81.71 with p-value 0.000. The results are significant in both instances, indicating 
that the null hypothesis of poolability is not supported. A panel method of 
regression is not appropriate and a cross-sectional regression method is an 
appropriate method.   
To test the correlation between the five dependent variables a Friedman test is 
appropriate for a small sample size of more than three dependents groups. The 
results, presented in Table 15 indicate Friedman’s chi-square has a value of 
1.00E+03 and p-value of 0.000 on outreach performance and is statistically 
significant. Friedman’s chi-square has a value of 1.20E+03 and p-value of 0.000 on 
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financial performance and it is statistically significant. The Kendal value, presented 
as part of the Friedman test for outreach is 0.8201 and financial 0.9146, indicating 
a greater degree of unanimity among the various responses of outreach and financial 
raters 7 . Hence, there is evidence that distribution of dependent financial and 
outreach variables are significantly different from each other. 





A non-parametric regression approach appears appropriate for the data. The 
significance of the Friedman test and skewness of the variables as described in 
descriptive statistics favours the use of quantile regression, which is more robust, 
and gives a more comprehensive picture than OLS of the effect of the predictors on 
the response variable. Quantile regression will give experimental exploration of the 
relationship between a set of predictor variables and specific quantiles of the 
dependent variable, which specifies changes in the quantiles of the response. 
Quantile regression outcome changes with coefficients of dependent variables in 
the particular quantiles with a unit change in predictor variables. This flexibility is 
limited in the OLS with the change in the size of the dependent variables’ 
coefficient with a unit change in the predictors. Quantile regression is appropriate, 
as the variables are continuous. 
5.6 MANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test 
It is possible that not all MFIs have similar levels of performance. Rural banks, 
NGOs and cooperatives may place emphasis on different forms of performance. To 
consider the possibility that outreach and financial performance differ between rural 
banks, NGOs and cooperatives groups, a hypothesis is tested assuming that their 
performance is the same.  
Ho: RBOo=NGOSo =COOPSo. 
                                                 
7 Comparing ratings of the same objects that were done by raters from two different groups/classes 
 
FINANCIAL   
Friedman = 1.20E+03 
Kendall = 0.9146 
p-value = 0.0000 
OUTREACH  
Friedman = 1.00E+03 
Kendall = 0.8201 
p-value = 0.0000 
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There are five proxies for outreach and four proxies for financial performance used, 
so the null hypothesis is tested on each of these. 
The MANOVA test is used to check whether there is a difference between the mean 
of three subgroups: Rural Banks (RB), Non-Government Organizations (NGO), and 
Cooperatives (COOP) for five outreach variables: NAB, ALBPB, ALBPB/GNI, 
NOD and PFB and four financial: OSS, ROA, ROE, and DER. The test results 
indicate that three subgroups differ as presented in Table 16.  
Table 16: MANOVA 
W = Wilks' lambda   L = Lawley-Hotelling trace   P = Pillai's trace   R = Roy's largest 
root 
Source Statistic F(df1, df2) F Prob>F 
 
group W 0.3892 18 606 20.3 0.0000 e 
 
P 0.6702 18 608 17.02 0.0000 a 
 
L 1.4165 18 604 23.76 0.0000 a 
 
R 1.2989 9 304 43.87 0.0000 u 
Number of obs =  314     e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound on F 
Residual 311 Total 313 
 
A robustness test using Kruskal-Wallis procedure is used. The significance result 
of the MANOVA test indicates the need to have a further mean ranking equality 
test of the subgroups: Rural Bank, NGO, Cooperative, over the outreach and 
financial performance proxies. The Kruskal-Wallis, a rank-based nonparametric 
test, is conducted which allows the comparison of nine proxies of MFIs’ outreach 
and financial performance independent groups. It hypothesizes that the population 
mean ranks of the subgroups: Rural Bank, NGO, COOP, are the same on the 
dependent variables of outreach and financial proxies. The test results shown in the 
following Table 17 indicate that the mean rankings of all subgroups are statistically 






Table 17: Kruskal-Wallis test results 





P Value Findings 
NAB 104.997 104.997 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
ALBPB 133.346 133.347 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
ALBPB/GNI 156.894 156.895 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
NOD 87.361 87.361 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
PFB 37.220 70.124 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
OSS 28.284 28.284 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
DER 58.516 58.516 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
ROA 24.103 24.103 0.0001 Statistically significantly different 
ROE 14.013 14.013 0.0009 Statistically significantly different 
 
5.7 Regression method 
A quantile regression is the appropriate method given the Friedman test, skewness 
of the variables, and noting data are continuous and not ordinal. This provides an 
experimental exploration of the relationship between the set of predictor variables 
and specific quantiles of the dependent variable, specifying changes in the quantiles 
of the response. A quantile regression estimates the changes in the size of dependent 
variable coefficient in the particular quantiles with unit changes in predictor 
variables.  
The relationship of corporate governance, outreach and financial performance is 
investigated on the different levels of the quantiles. The different levels of quantile 
explain the distribution of the dependent variables on the governance factors. The 
sign of the coefficient explains the magnitude of corporate governance with the 
variables at the different levels of outreach performance.  
To achieve the best results for regression, it is essential to get the right quantile. 
Various combinations of quantiles, in this instance four quantiles, are tried 
sequentially looking to the results for improvement. The data on 15, 50, 75 and 85th 
quantiles have significance for 2012 data and independently were found best for the 
2004 data. The quantiles for both years, 2004 and 2012, are approximately the same.  
Two cross sectional estimations are made for 2004 and 2012. The estimated 
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coefficients and sign of coefficients of the dependent variables are different at 
different quantiles of years 2004 and 2012. However, there are similarities when 
50th quantile is taken as a median on (+/-) relationships with the variables. Some 
coefficients on particular dependent variables get weaker and others get stronger. 
Dependent variables are in complete opposite relation with individual independent 
variables when years 2004 to 2012 are compared. 
The outreach performance proxies are number of borrowers, loan size, depth of 
loan, number of depositors, percentage of female borrowers; and financial 
performance proxies are return on assets, return on equity, operating self-
sufficiency, and debt to equity ratio, all have been explained above. The quantile 
regression coefficients, reported in Tables 19 to 24, and 25 to 29, show the effect 
of governance on the outreach and financial performance of MFIs differs at 
different levels of quantiles. The most significant quantiles differ for 2004 and 2012. 
The cross-sectional regressions for performance show different relationships with 
governance through the quantiles. Each-year quantiles from 2004 to 2012 are taken 
into consideration to identify the relationship of governance and MFIs’ outreach 
and financial performance.  
5.8 Difference in difference 
There are changes between the 2004 and 2012 variables, including time difference, 
but there may be other factors that contribute to the changes, such as regulatory 
changes. Requirements concerning duality did not change. So, this can be used as 
a treatment variable for Difference in Difference (DID) regression presented as 
Table 18. This shows there are both time and variable differences in some quantiles. 
The failure of the poolability test on the panel data suggests using DID for cross-
sectional causal inferences for years 2004 and 2012. Difference in difference 
analysis provides insights into how relationships between variables changed 
between the periods. 
DID is appropriate for evaluating performance proxies cross-sectional 
interpretation (Villa, 2013), and it allows an opportunity for contributing 
interpretations when combining with quantile regression (Meyer, Viscusi, & Durbin, 
1995). DID is used to review differences across time, comparing the difference that 
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occurs in the nine years. A time dummy is created to observe the effectiveness of 
time periods on governance over the period. 
Table 18: DID Quantile regression results for diff LNNAB, (Duality) 
Outcome var. LNNAB 
   
 
q15 q50 q75 q85 
Baseline         
Control 8.464 9.11 9.11 9.11 
Treated 6.163 7.639 9.214 10.178 
Diff (T-C) -2.301 -1.471 0.104 1.068 
S.Err. 1.376 1.472 0.718 0.81 
significance 0.100* 0.321 0.885 0.192 
Follow-up         
Control 8.807 10.706 11.644 11.644 
Treated 6.594 9.282 10.489 10.773 
Diff (T-C) -2.213 -1.424 -1.154 -0.871 
S.Err. 1.283 1.382 0.666 0.755 
significance 0.090* 0.307 0.088* 0.253 
Diff-in-Diff 0.088 0.046 -1.259 -1.939 
S.Err. 1.882 2.019 0.98 1.107 
significance 0.963 0.982 0.204 0.085* 
 
The dual role of CEO shows a significant impact in decreasing the number of active 
borrowers in the upper quantile with a coefficient of -1.939. The duality has a 
significant difference at 10% in the lower quantile q=15 for baseline and follow-up 
years, 2004, 2012 consecutively, but it does not show the significance in DID at the 
same year 2004 and 2012. A potential explanation is that duality creates an 
unfavourable impression of the institution. This may relate to its viability in 
maintaining services and clients’ concerns about getting caught up in a fraud trap. 
As international markets move away from duality, the concern is noted at the higher 




6 Chapter six – Analysis 
6.1 Outreach performance 
The quantile regression results of year 2012 for five outreach proxies; number of 
active borrowers, size of loan, depth of loan, number of depositors, percentage of 
female borrowers are shown in Tables 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. 
 Outreach regression result for 2012 
The quantile results indicate that the effect of governance factors are statistically 
significant in lower quantiles q > = 15 and in upper quantiles 75 <= q.  
6.1.1.1 Number of active borrowers (NAB) 
The number of active borrowers’ coefficient and its relationship with governance 
independent variables differs at different levels of quantiles as reflected in Table 19.  
Table 19: 2012 Quantile regression results for number of active borrowers 
NAB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -0.174*** 0.0282 0.0458 -0.0935** 
 (0.0468) (0.0759) (0.0332) (0.0343) 
INDBOD -0.341*** 0.0281 0.0497 0.0449 
 (0.0895) (0.145) (0.0636) (0.0656) 
PFONBOD 0.0161 -1.194 -1.133** -0.755* 
 (0.581) (0.943) (0.413) (0.426) 
DUALITY -0.345 0.0106 0.138 0.321 
 (0.429) (0.696) (0.305) (0.314) 
CASTEDIV 0.324 0.497 0.508 -0.845* 
 (0.591) (0.958) (0.419) (0.433) 
DPSM 0.00218* 0.000932 0.000808 0.00169** 
 (0.00109) (0.00177) (0.000773) (0.000798) 
LNASSETS 1.234*** 0.762** 0.829*** 0.695*** 
 (0.199) (0.323) (0.141) (0.146) 
AGE 0.0292 0.0366 0.0365** 0.0311* 
 (0.0241) (0.0391) (0.0171) (0.0177) 
PERSONNEL 0.00238 0.000771 0.000115 0.00142 
 (0.00161) (0.00262) (0.00115) (0.00118) 
Constant -15.53*** -6.375 -7.751*** -4.058 
 (3.730) (6.051) (2.648) (2.732) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 




Board size is significantly negatively correlated at lower and upper quantiles at 
q=15 and 85. The strongest explanatory power at q=15 indicates that MFIs with 
larger boards will have lower outreach in Nepal.   
The variable independent directors on the board has significant negative correlation 
at the lower quantile at q=15. It indicates that MFIs perform poorly in their social 
mission to serve the number of credit clients in Nepal when independent directors’ 
involvement increases.  
The percentage of females on the board is strongly negatively correlated at the 
upper quantile q=75 and 85. This indicates that highly gender-diversified boards 
reduce Nepalese MFIs’ enrichment of the number of credit clients. It is likely that 
the female on board is used as a token as well, as they are less involved in MFIs’ 
policy formulation and operational activities.  
Caste diversity is significantly negative in the upper quantile q=85. This indicates 
that when boards have high caste diversity the number of credit clients MFIs served 
is reduced. It is likely that more directors on board from different castes increases 
the caste polarity that reduces the effectiveness of operational activities and policy 
formation.  
Staff productivity is positively significantly correlated at q=15 and 85. The lower 
explanatory power of staff productivity indicates that Nepalese MFIs with higher 
staff productivity may lead to a greater number of credit clients in their service. It 
is likely that staff productivity increases because of the group lending process. 
Assets of the firm are positive in all quantiles q=15, 50, 75, and 85. It is strongest 
at q=15 and its explanatory power gets weaker as it goes into upper quantiles. The 
strongest positive significance at the lower quantile indicates that smaller MFIs will 
have greater social outreach, that is, a higher number of active borrowers in Nepal. 
Age of the firm is significantly positive in upper quantiles at q=75 and 85 but with 
weaker explanatory power. It indicates that the number of credit clients increases 
with the maturity of firm.  
6.1.1.2 Size of the Loan (ALBPB) 
Size of loan is explained as the average loan portfolio outstanding per client. Table 
20 shows the quantile regression results for size of loan, ALBPB. 
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Table 20: 2012 Quantile regressions for size of loan 
ALBPB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -66.51 1,605 4,502** 9,124*** 
 (237.3) (1,945) (2,074) (2,115) 
INDBOD -1,467*** -791.3 -2,212 -6,452 
 (454.2) (3,723) (3,970) (4,049) 
PFONBOD 2,633 17,058 60,479** 44,307 
 (2,948) (24,157) (25,759) (26,272) 
DUALITY -8,650*** -1,480 9,333 -5,258 
 (2,178) (17,847) (19,031) (19,410) 
CASTEDIV 17,458*** 6,000 -27,760 -40,477 
 (2,996) (24,556) (26,185) (26,706) 
DPSM 16.39*** 12.82 -14.05 -30.63 
 (5.527) (45.29) (48.30) (49.26) 
LNASSETS 1,560 3,619 13,783 -7,674 
 (1,010) (8,281) (8,830) (9,006) 
AGE -647.9*** -1,085 -1,183 498.7 
 (122.3) (1,002) (1,069) (1,090) 
PERSONNEL -14.85* -35.59 -102.3 70.13 
 (8.188) (67.11) (71.56) (72.98) 
Constant -8,147 -52,090 -250,932 129,133 
 (18,924) (155,083) (165,370) (168,663) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
Board size is positively significantly correlated at upper quantiles q=75 and 85. The 
strongest coefficient at q=85 suggests that a larger board size increases the loan size. 
Independent directors are significantly negatively related at lower quantile q=15. 
This may explain why MFIs with fewer independent directors are focused on the 
social mission by serving credit clients with smaller loans. 
 Percentage of females on the board is significantly positively correlated at the 
upper quantile q=75; however, insignificantly positive at quantiles q=15, 50, 85. 
159 
 
The significance in the higher quantiles may mean that the loan portfolio gets bigger 
when gender diversity increases on the board in Nepalese MFIs. 
Caste diversification is significantly positively related at lower quantile q=15. It 
indicates that the loan size gets bigger with higher caste diversification in Nepalese 
MFIs. It is likely that the moneylender presence and openness to the relationship-
based loan may give borrowers easy access to moneylenders. However, the 
presence of minorities on the board may influence larger loan amounts, which may 
attract credit clients to knock on MFIs’ doors. 
Staff productivity is positively significantly related at q=15. It indicates that the 
loan size increases with staff productivity. It is likely that staff want to deal with 
fewer clients in rural regions but with bigger loans. 
Age is significantly negative in the lower quantile q=15. It indicates that loan size 
gets smaller as firms gets older. 
Personnel has significantly negative impacts at the lower quantile q=15. This 
indicates that the loan size gets smaller when MFIs increase the number of 
employees. It is likely that more employees in MFIs increases their capacity for 
handling the small number of loans on the economic scale. However, MFIs with a 
lower number of employees tend to increase the loan size to minimize the 
operational cost. 
6.1.1.3 Depth of loan (ALBPB/GNI) 
It is a measure of the target customers’ poverty level. Quantile regression results 




Table 21: 2012 Quantile regressions for depth of loan 
ALBPBGNI (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.722 1.976 5.010 5.953 
 (0.537) (2.508) (5.918) (5.509) 
INDBOD -1.664 -1.651 3.439 2.245 
 (1.027) (4.802) (11.33) (10.55) 
PFONBOD -0.931 43.06 89.68 106.4 
 (6.665) (31.16) (73.52) (68.44) 
DUALITY -0.251 6.813 29.29 37.32 
 (4.924) (23.02) (54.32) (50.56) 
CASTEDIV 18.92*** -5.086 -27.41 -42.42 
 (6.775) (31.68) (74.74) (69.57) 
DPSM 0.0511*** 0.0194 -0.00496 -0.0859 
 (0.0125) (0.0584) (0.138) (0.128) 
LNASSETS 1.617 4.749 23.29 31.85 
 (2.285) (10.68) (25.20) (23.46) 
AGE -0.153 -1.891 -0.462 0.568 
 (0.276) (1.293) (3.050) (2.839) 
PERSONNEL 0.00847 -0.0457 -0.167 -0.214 
 (0.0185) (0.0866) (0.204) (0.190) 
Constant -32.87 -59.18 -451.5 -612.2 
 (42.79) (200.1) (472.0) (439.4) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
Caste diversity is positively significantly correlated at the lower quantile q=15 
which indicates that Nepalese MFIs target the richer clients when caste diversity 
increases on a board. 
Staff productivity is significantly positively related at the lower quantile q=15 with 
weaker explanatory power. It indicates that the depth of loan increases with staff 
productivity. With higher staff productivity, the more likely the MFI is to slip from 
its social mission to serve richer clients.  
161 
 
6.1.1.4 Number of depositors (NOD) 
This is counted as the number of deposit accounts the MFIs hold in service. The 
quantile regression results for number of depositors are shown Table 22.  
Table 22: 2012 Quantile regressions for number of depositors 
NOD (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -0.102*** -0.0136 -0.0290 -0.0710** 
 (0.0216) (0.0588) (0.0310) (0.0303) 
INDBOD -0.160*** 0.00788 0.0213 -0.0161 
 (0.0414) (0.113) (0.0593) (0.0581) 
PFONBOD -0.245 -0.941 -0.791** -0.383 
 (0.269) (0.731) (0.385) (0.377) 
DUALITY 0.152 0.139 0.269 0.315 
 (0.199) (0.540) (0.284) (0.279) 
CASTEDIV 0.232 0.541 -0.255 -0.671* 
 (0.273) (0.743) (0.391) (0.383) 
DPSM 0.00392*** 0.00272* 0.00166** 0.00137* 
 (0.000504) (0.00137) (0.000721) (0.000707) 
LNASSETS 0.942*** 0.602** 0.631*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0922) (0.251) (0.132) (0.129) 
AGE -0.00800 0.0453 0.0405** 0.00930 
 (0.0112) (0.0303) (0.0160) (0.0156) 
PERSONNEL 0.00160** 0.00169 0.00146 0.00137 
 (0.000747) (0.00203) (0.00107) (0.00105) 
Constant -9.651*** -3.426 -3.253 -0.706 
 (1.726) (4.693) (2.470) (2.420) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
Board size has a negative significant correlation at lower and upper quantiles q=15, 
and 85. The strongest coefficient at q=15 suggests that the impact of not having 
depositors is greater with smaller boards, which lowers when board size increases 
in Nepalese MFIs.  
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Independent directors are significantly negatively related in the lower quantile at 
q=15. This indicates that the involvement of independent directors reduces the 
number of deposit accounts. It is likely that the depositors’ faith in the institution 
reduces with the higher number of independent directors. 
Percentage of females on the board is significantly negatively related at q=75 but 
insignificantly negatively related at all other quantiles q=15, 50, and 85. This 
indicates that gender diversity adversely affects belief in the institutions’ credibility, 
and therefore affects the number of depositors.  
Caste diversity is negatively related in the upper quantile at q=85. This explains that 
the number of deposit accounts decreases with more caste-diversified institutions.  
Staff productivity is significantly positive at all quantiles q=15, 50, 75, and 85. The 
explanatory power is weaker in all quantiles but strongest at q=15. This indicates 
that MFIs with high staff productivity may have more deposit accounts. MFIs with 
greater staff productivity are able to serve more clients.  
Firm size, total assets, is positive at all quantiles q=15, 50, 75, and 85. The strongest 
significant positive relationship is at lower quantile q=15, which explains why 
smaller MFIs may have more depositors.  
Age of the firm is significantly positively related in the upper quantile at q=75 and 
insignificantly positive in upper quantiles q=50 and 85. This indicates that the 
maturity of the firm attracts more depositors. It is likely that longer serving firms 
earn better service credibility, which leads to clients placing faith in the MFI and to 
deposit their savings there. 
Personnel is significantly positive in the lower quantile at q=15 but insignificantly 
positive in all other quantiles q=50, 75 and 85. However, the explanatory power is 
weak at all quantiles. This shows that MFIs with higher numbers of employees can 
expect to have higher numbers of depositors. MFIs with more employees are able 
to reach to the rural and more difficult geographical regions to serve poor clients. 
Clients feel more comfortable to deposit in institutions rather than keeping their 
money at home or staying with moneylenders.  
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6.1.1.5 Percentage of female borrowers (PFB) 
This is counted as the percentage of female borrowers that MFIs have in their credit 
clients. The quantile regression results for percentage of female borrowers are 
shown in Table 23.  
The regression worked well till the q=15, 50 but started misbehaving from q=60. It 
gives too small coefficients in upper quantiles. It could be because 83% of MFIs 
are serving only female clients and approximately 17% are serving both male and 
female borrowers.  
Table 23: 2012 Quantile regressions for percentage of female borrowers 
PFB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -5.554*** -0.0221 -0** 0*** 
 (1.282) (1.068) (0) (0) 
INDBOD 3.348 0.0148 -0 -0* 
 (2.454) (2.044) (0) (0) 
PFONBOD 3.593 0.00704 -0 0*** 
 (15.92) (13.26) (0) (0) 
DUALITY 18.05 -0.0676 0 -0 
 (11.76) (9.798) (0) (0) 
CASTEDIV 14.38 -0.0611 -0** -0 
 (16.19) (13.48) (0) (0) 
DPSM 0.0411 -7.83e-05 -0** 0 
 (0.0299) (0.0249) (0) (0) 
LNASSETS 5.689 0.00332 0 -0*** 
 (5.458) (4.546) (0) (0) 
AGE -1.914*** -0.00176 0** 0*** 
 (0.661) (0.550) (0) (0) 
PERSONNEL 0.00412 0.000166 0 0*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0368) (0) (0) 
Constant 1.216 100.2 100*** 100*** 
 (102.2) (85.14) (0) (0) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Board size has a significant negative relationship in lower and upper quantiles at 
q=15 and 75 and is significantly positive at q=85. This shows that the impact of 
having a lower percentage of female clients and smaller board size is greater than 
for larger boards. 
Maturity of the firm is significantly negatively related with percentage of female 
borrowers in the lower quantile q=15. This indicates that new firms are more 
focused on female credit clients than more mature firms are. It is likely that mature 
firms consider the mixed male and female clientele in their long period of services.  
 Outreach regression result for 2004 
Table 24 shows the quantile regression results of year 2004 for five outreach proxies; 
number of active borrowers, size of loan, depth of loan, number of depositors, 
percentage of female borrowers. 
Table 24: 2004 quantile regression results for the five outreach dependent 
variables; NAB, ALBPB, ALBPB/GNI, NOD, and PFB  
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6.1.2.1 Number of active borrowers (NAB) 
NAB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.0222 -0.0118 0.0426 0.00506 
 (0.0435) (0.0594) (0.0355) (0.0206) 
INDBOD 0.506*** 0.184 0.121 0.124 
 (0.158) (0.215) (0.129) (0.0746) 
PFONBOD -0.296 -0.0996 -0.146 -0.0332 
 (0.422) (0.576) (0.344) (0.199) 
DUALITY 1.214** 0.310 -0.0871 -0.252 
 (0.516) (0.705) (0.421) (0.244) 
CASTEDIV 0.757 -0.523 0.945* 1.485*** 
 (0.565) (0.773) (0.461) (0.267) 
DPSM -0.00186 0.000370 0.00251 0.00367*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00294) (0.00175) (0.00102) 
LNASSETS 0.488*** 0.492*** 0.399*** 0.391*** 
 (0.106) (0.144) (0.0861) (0.0499) 
AGE -0.152*** -0.0256 -0.0325 -0.0257 
 (0.0347) (0.0474) (0.0283) (0.0164) 
PERSONNEL 0.00957*** 0.00628* 0.00687*** 0.00710*** 
 (0.00225) (0.00308) (0.00184) (0.00106) 
Constant -1.829 -0.911 0.416 0.636 
 (1.690) (2.308) (1.378) (0.799) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Independent director is significantly positively correlated at q=15. 
Duality is strongly significantly positively correlated at lower quantile q=15. 
Caste diversity is positively significantly correlated in upper quantiles q=75 and 85. 
Staff productivity is significantly positively weakly correlated in upper quantile 
q=85. 
Firm size, total asset, is significantly positively correlated in all quantiles q-15, 50, 
75 and 85. It is likely that the MFIs with a larger firm size leads to achievement of 
higher outreach in 2004. 
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The maturity, age, is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile q=15. It 
is likely that the MFIs were in young age to build their reputation that attracts clients 
to receiving their services. 
Personnel is positively correlated in all quantiles q=15, 50, 75 and 85. This is 
indicative that the MFIs leads to have higher number of active borrowers when they 
increase the number of employees.  
6.1.2.2 Size of the loan (ALBPB) 
ALBPB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -197.4*** -52.57 422.9 -633.8 
 (63.85) (622.1) (1,880) (1,893) 
INDBOD -778.8*** -1,515 -3,838 -16,396** 
 (231.5) (2,256) (6,816) (6,864) 
PFONBOD -2,348*** 9,104 13,394 -8,844 
 (619.1) (6,032) (18,228) (18,356) 
DUALITY 3,863*** 7,303 -6,125 -20,469 
 (757.9) (7,385) (22,315) (22,472) 
CASTEDIV -3,580*** -6,609 -9,958 -6,544 
 (830.2) (8,089) (24,443) (24,614) 
DPSM -2.505 12.40 35.76 21.29 
 (3.158) (30.77) (92.98) (93.64) 
LNASSETS 2,107*** 2,480 3,464 12,767** 
 (155.0) (1,510) (4,563) (4,595) 
AGE -105.9* 338.0 1,047 4,015** 
 (50.98) (496.8) (1,501) (1,512) 
PERSONNEL -23.41*** -30.33 -64.86 -302.8*** 
 (3.306) (32.21) (97.34) (98.03) 
Constant -30,039*** -44,191* -54,338 -175,132** 
 (2,480) (24,169) (73,033) (73,545) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 




The independent director is significantly negatively correlated at quantiles q=15 
and 85. 
Percentage of female on board is significantly negatively correlated at lower 
quantile q=15.  
Duality is significantly positively correlated at lower quantile q=15. 
Caste diversity is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile q=15. 
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at quantiles q=15 and 85. 
Maturity is significantly positively correlated at upper quantile q=85 and 
significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile q=15. It is likely that the MFIs 
that are matured increase the size of loan in comparison to the young MFIs in 2004.  
Personnel is significantly negatively correlated at lower and upper quantiles q= 15 
and 85. It is likely that the MFIs provide a smaller size of loan when they increase 
the number of employees in MFIs.  
6.1.2.3 Depth of the loan (ALBPB/GNI) 
ALBPB/GNI (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -0.486 -0.170 1.562 -2.352 
 (0.312) (2.381) (7.229) (7.023) 
INDBOD -3.089** -3.089 -15.50 -61.04** 
 (1.131) (8.633) (26.21) (25.46) 
PFONBOD -9.189*** 29.37 50.70 -31.63 
 (3.025) (23.09) (70.09) (68.10) 
DUALITY 14.32*** 23.54 -24.84 -77.15 
 (3.703) (28.26) (85.81) (83.37) 
CASTEDIV -13.31*** -17.57 -37.53 -25.18 
 (4.056) (30.96) (93.99) (91.31) 
DPSM 0.00182 0.0372 0.152 0.0972 
 (0.0154) (0.118) (0.358) (0.347) 
LNASSETS 7.491*** 7.445 13.42 47.02** 
 (0.757) (5.779) (17.54) (17.04) 
AGE -0.327 0.543 4.115 15.00** 
 (0.249) (1.901) (5.773) (5.608) 
PERSONNEL -0.0792*** -0.0598 -0.251 -1.119*** 
 (0.0162) (0.123) (0.374) (0.364) 
Constant -110.7*** -131.0 -212.8 -647.1** 
 (12.12) (92.50) (280.8) (272.8) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 




Independent directors are significantly negatively correlated with the depth of the 
loan at quantiles q=15 and 85.  
Percentage of female on board is significantly negatively correlated at q=15. 
Duality is significantly positively correlated at lower quantile q=15.  
Caste diversity is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile q=15.  
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at quantiles q=15 and 85. Maturity 
of the firm is significantly positively correlated at quantile q=85. 
Personnel is significantly negatively correlated at quantiles q=15 and 85.  
6.1.2.4 Number of depositors (NOD) 
NOD (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.0193 0.0150 0.0651* 0.0423*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0537) (0.0346) (0.0112) 
INDBOD -0.0130 0.180 0.0147 0.105** 
 (0.104) (0.195) (0.125) (0.0407) 
PFONBOD -0.807*** -0.296 -0.0187 0.423*** 
 (0.279) (0.521) (0.335) (0.109) 
DUALITY -0.545 0.225 -0.698 -0.599*** 
 (0.341) (0.638) (0.410) (0.133) 
CASTEDIV 0.127 0.744 1.004** 1.082*** 
 (0.374) (0.698) (0.449) (0.146) 
DPSM 0.0150*** 0.00881*** 0.00692*** 0.00573*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00266) (0.00171) (0.000555) 
LNASSETS 0.167** 0.269* 0.325*** 0.338*** 
 (0.0698) (0.130) (0.0839) (0.0273) 
AGE 0.0222 0.00552 -0.0268 -0.0314*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0429) (0.0276) (0.00897) 
PERSONNEL 0.00922*** 0.00850*** 0.00670*** 0.00681*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00278) (0.00179) (0.000581) 
Constant 2.373** 1.004 1.536 1.494*** 
 (1.117) (2.086) (1.343) (0.436) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 




Board size is significantly positively correlated at quantiles q=75 and 85 with 
number of depositors. 
Independent director is significantly positively correlated at quantile q=85.  
Percentage of female on board is significantly negative correlated at q=15 and 
significantly positively correlated at q=85. 
Duality is significantly negatively correlated at quantile q=85. 
Caste diversity is positively correlated at q=75 and 85. 
Staff productivity is significantly positively correlated in all quantiles q=15, 50, 75 
and 85. 
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at all quantiles q=15, 50, 75 and 85.  
Maturity of the MFIs is significantly negatively correlated at quantile q=85. 
Personnel is significantly positively correlated at all quantiles q=15, 50, 75 and 85. 
6.1.2.5 Percentage of female borrowers (PFB) 
PFB (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -3.995*** -0 0*** -0 
 (0.406) (1.463) (0) (0) 
INDBOD 10.53*** 0 0*** -0 
 (1.473) (5.304) (0) (0) 
PFONBOD 36.38*** 0 0*** 0 
 (3.939) (14.18) (0) (0) 
DUALITY 25.72*** -0 0*** 0 
 (4.822) (17.36) (0) (0) 
CASTEDIV -0.227 -0 0*** -0 
 (5.282) (19.02) (0) (0) 
DPSM -0.0128 -0 0** -0 
 (0.0201) (0.0724) (0) (0) 
LNASSETS 7.773*** 0 0*** -0 
 (0.986) (3.550) (0) (0) 
AGE -1.830*** 0 0 -0 
 (0.324) (1.168) (0) (0) 
PERSONNEL 0.0739*** -0 -0*** -0 
 (0.0210) (0.0757) (0) (0) 
Constant -59.16*** 100* 100*** 100 
 (15.78) (56.83) (0) (0) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Board size is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile q=15. 
Independent director is significantly positively correlated at lower quantile q=15.  
Percentage of female directors is significantly positive correlated at lower quantile 
q=15.  
Duality is significantly positively correlated at q=15. 
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at q= 15. 
Maturity of the MFIs is significantly negatively correlated at q=-15. 
Personnel is significantly positively correlated at q=15. 
6.2 Financial performance 
The significance of the governance factor differs in different quantiles. The quantile 
regression results indicate that the effect of governance factors are statistically 
significant in lower quantiles q > = 15 and in upper quantiles 75 <= q.  
The quantile regression results of year 2012 for four financial proxies; return on 
asset, return on equity, debt to equity ratio, and operational self-sufficiency, are 
shown in Tables 25, 26, 27 and 28. 
 Financial regression result for 2012 
The governance factors and their relationship with financial proxies: ROA, ROE, 
DER, and OSS are explained on the coefficient Tables 25, 26, 27 and 28. 
6.2.1.1 Return on Asset (ROA) 
Quantile regression results of ROA with independent governance variables are 




Table 25: Quantiles regression results for ROA, 2012 
ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.00388 0.00142 0.000757 0.00186* 
 (0.00681) (0.00222) (0.00167) (0.00102) 
INDBOD 0.00318 -0.00412 -0.000957 -0.00542** 
 (0.0130) (0.00425) (0.00320) (0.00196) 
PFONBOD 0.0261 0.0201 0.0341 0.00934 
 (0.0846) (0.0276) (0.0208) (0.0127) 
DUALITY -0.00680 -0.0100 -0.0122 -0.0123 
 (0.0625) (0.0204) (0.0154) (0.00940) 
CASTEDIV -0.0326 0.0340 0.00912 0.00386 
 (0.0860) (0.0280) (0.0211) (0.0129) 
DPSM -2.41e-05 4.47e-05 5.91e-05 2.06e-05 
 (0.000159) (5.17e-05) (3.90e-05) (2.38e-05) 
LNASSETS 0.00839 0.00659 0.00302 -0.00530 
 (0.0290) (0.00945) (0.00713) (0.00436) 
AGE -0.000333 0.000562 -0.00103 -0.00265*** 
 (0.00351) (0.00114) (0.000863) (0.000528) 
PERSONNEL -1.32e-05 -3.21e-05 -3.58e-05 3.17e-05 
 (0.000235) (7.66e-05) (5.78e-05) (3.53e-05) 
Constant -0.173 -0.140 -0.0295 0.175** 
 (0.543) (0.177) (0.134) (0.0817) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size shows the significant positive correlation in upper quantiles at q=85. 
This explains that larger boards may have higher return on assets. It is likely that 
larger boards are more efficient at utilizing assets. 
Independent directors are significantly negatively correlated in the upper quantile 
at q=85. This indicates that increasing the number of independent directors 
adversely affects return on assets. It is likely that independent directors adversely 
impact the utilization of assets. 
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Maturity of the firm is significantly negatively related in upper quantile q=85. It 
indicates that ROA reduces as firms mature in Nepalese MFIs. 
6.2.1.2 Return on Equity (ROE)  
Quantile regression results of ROE with independent governance variables are 
explained in Table 26.  
Table 26: Quantiles regression results for ROE, 2012 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size is positively significantly related with ROE at lower quantile q=15. This 
explains that Nepalese MFIs’ profitability increases as the numbers of board size 
ROE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.0232** 0.00558 -0.00320 -0.00352 
 (0.00961) (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.00771) 
INDBOD -0.00736 -0.0282 -0.0129 -0.0130 
 (0.0184) (0.0367) (0.0328) (0.0148) 
PFONBOD -0.139 0.0900 -0.109 -0.0754 
 (0.119) (0.238) (0.213) (0.0958) 
DUALITY -0.385*** -0.225 -0.629*** -0.640*** 
 (0.0882) (0.176) (0.157) (0.0708) 
CASTEDIV 0.129 0.113 -0.0915 -0.0760 
 (0.121) (0.242) (0.216) (0.0974) 
DPSM -0.000170 5.92e-05 -0.000431 -0.000423** 
 (0.000224) (0.000447) (0.000399) (0.000180) 
LNASSETS -0.0155 0.0104 0.0763 0.0880** 
 (0.0409) (0.0817) (0.0730) (0.0328) 
AGE 0.00576 0.00639 -0.0284*** -0.0289*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00988) (0.00883) (0.00397) 
PERSONNEL 0.000137 0.000144 -0.000748 -0.000796*** 
 (0.000332) (0.000662) (0.000592) (0.000266) 
Constant 0.460 -0.0471 0.226 0.00964 
 (0.766) (1.529) (1.367) (0.615) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
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increase. A smaller board may incur smaller returns on their equity. However, the 
explanatory power is weaker. 
Duality is significantly negatively correlated in lower and upper quantiles at q=15, 
75 and 85. This indicates that duality has a negative impact on Nepalese MFIs.  
Staff productivity is significantly negatively correlated in upper quantile at q=85. 
This explains that the profitability of the firm decreases when staff productivity 
increases. However, the staff productivity has too small explanatory power, which 
may have a negligible impact on profitability of MFIs. Therefore, a small amount 
of MFIs profitability is lessened when staff productivity is higher in Nepal.  
Firm size is significantly positively correlated in the upper quantile at q= 85. This 
indicates that MFIs with higher assets may enjoy greater profitability. It is likely 
that they are able to diversify their products in order to reduce their costs in serving 
their clients. 
The maturity of the firm is significantly negative in upper quantiles at q=75 and 85. 
It is strongest at q=85. This explains that profitability gets lower when firms mature. 
It is likely that the skilled and experienced employees move away as MFIs gain 
maturity. 
The number of employees is significantly negatively correlated in the upper 
quantile at q=85. This explains that firms’ profitability reduces as employee 
numbers increase. It is likely that the local employees are not as skilful at loan 
disbursement. It is likely that MFIs face a higher employee turnover.  
6.2.1.3 Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) 
Quantile regression results of DER with independent governance variables are 




Table 27: Quantiles regression results for DER, 2012 
DER (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -0.0825 -0.268 -0.309 -0.572** 
 (0.165) (0.318) (0.308) (0.217) 
INDBOD 0.542* -0.0316 -0.961 -1.275*** 
 (0.316) (0.608) (0.590) (0.416) 
PFONBOD -0.315 -6.341 -1.035 -3.969 
 (2.052) (3.947) (3.830) (2.700) 
DUALITY -3.515** -4.322 -4.405 -4.995** 
 (1.516) (2.916) (2.830) (1.995) 
CASTEDIV 0.779 -1.575 3.059 4.664 
 (2.086) (4.012) (3.893) (2.745) 
DPSM 0.0109*** -0.000603 -0.00831 -0.0112** 
 (0.00385) (0.00740) (0.00718) (0.00506) 
LNASSETS -0.187 -0.720 1.389 1.192 
 (0.703) (1.353) (1.313) (0.926) 
AGE 0.139 0.138 0.328** 0.161 
 (0.0851) (0.164) (0.159) (0.112) 
PERSONNEL 0.0123** 0.00792 -0.00407 -0.00473 
 (0.00570) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.00750) 
Constant 4.998 27.30 -12.17 -0.452 
 (13.17) (25.34) (24.59) (17.34) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size is significantly negatively related at upper quantile q=85. This indicates 
that the larger board will have less debt to equity ratios.   
Independent directors are significantly positively correlated in lower and upper 
quantiles at q=15 and 85. This is significantly positive at q=15 and significantly 
negative at q=85: strongest at q=85. This explains that firms with fewer independent 
directors’ have higher debt to equity ratios. Higher involvement of an independent 
director reduces the debt to equity ratio in Nepalese MFIs.  
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Duality is significantly negative in lower and upper quantiles at q=15 and 85. This 
indicates that duality adversely affects the debt to equity ratio.  
Staff productivity is significantly positively correlated in the lower quantile at q=15 
and is significantly negatively correlated in upper quantile at q=85. This explains 
that MFIs with higher staff productivity will have lower debt to equity ratios 
whereas MFIs with lower staff productivity will have higher debt to equity ratio in 
Nepal.  
Maturity is significantly positively correlated in upper quantiles at q=75. This 
explains that mature firms have higher debt to equity ratios.  
The number of employees is significantly positively related in the lower quantile at 
q=15. This indicates that the debt to equity ratio increases with the number of 
employees in Nepalese MFIs.  
6.2.1.4 Operating self-sufficiency (OSS) 
Quantile regression results of OSS with independent governance variables are 
explained in Table 28.   
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Table 28: Quantiles regression results for OSS, 2012 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size is significantly positively correlated in the lower quantile at q=15. This 
explains that firms’ operational self-sufficiency increases with the board size 
increases. However, it may explain that smaller boards are efficient at business 
operation in Nepalese MFIs. 
Independent directors are significantly negatively correlated in lower and upper 
quantiles at q=15 and 85. This is strongest at q=85. This indicates that when there 
OSS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.0553*** 0.00208 -0.0225 0.00424 
 (0.0145) (0.0226) (0.0200) (0.0173) 
INDBOD -0.0606** -0.0176 -0.0488 -0.0697** 
 (0.0278) (0.0432) (0.0383) (0.0331) 
PFONBOD 0.384** 0.153 -0.0633 0.229 
 (0.180) (0.280) (0.249) (0.215) 
DUALITY -0.261* -0.175 -0.262 -0.358** 
 (0.133) (0.207) (0.184) (0.159) 
CASTEDIV -0.421** 0.140 0.282 -0.0689 
 (0.183) (0.285) (0.253) (0.218) 
DPSM -5.55e-05 0.000444 0.00122** 0.00120*** 
 (0.000338) (0.000526) (0.000466) (0.000403) 
LNASSETS 0.150** 0.0584 0.0578 -0.0685 
 (0.0618) (0.0961) (0.0853) (0.0737) 
AGE -0.0329*** -0.000785 -0.00456 -0.0137 
 (0.00748) (0.0116) (0.0103) (0.00891) 
PERSONNEL -0.000514 -0.000171 -0.000469 0.000424 
 (0.000501) (0.000779) (0.000691) (0.000597) 
Constant -1.626 -0.0335 0.266 2.830* 
 (1.158) (1.800) (1.597) (1.380) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
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is a greater number of independent directors in Nepalese MFIs, operating self-
sufficiency is reduced.  
Percentage of female directors is significantly positive, correlated in lower quantiles 
at q=15. This indicates that operational self-sufficiency improves as the percentage 
of females on the board increases. 
Duality is significantly negatively correlated in lower and upper quantiles at q=15 
and 85. It is strongest at q=85. This indicates that duality reduces the operational 
self-sufficiency of MFIs in Nepal.  
Caste diversity is significantly negatively correlated in lower quantiles at q=15. 
This indicates that caste diversity adversely impacts operational self-sufficiency in 
MFIs in Nepal.  
Staff productivity is significantly positively correlated at upper quantiles q=75 and 
85. It is strongest at q=75. This indicates that the improvement in staff productivity 
increases the operational self-sufficiency of MFIs in Nepal.  
Firm size is significantly positively related at lower quantile q=15. This indicates 
that operational self-sufficiency improves as firm size increases. The lower quantile 
significance explains that MFIs with smaller firm size are having better operational 
self-sufficiency in Nepal. 
Maturity is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile at q=15. This 
explains that the operational self-sufficiency is lower in new firms. This suggests 
that Nepalese MFIs depend more on donations to run their operations regardless of 
their age.  
 Financial regression result for 2004 
Table 29 shows the quantile regression results with independent governance 
variable of year 2004 for four financial proxies; return on asset, return on equity, 
debt to equity ratio, and operational self-sufficiency. 
Table 29: 2004 quantiles regression results for four financial proxies; ROA, 
ROE, DER, and OSS 
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6.2.2.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD -1.47e-05 0.00261 0.00637 0.0231*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00207) (0.00582) (0.00626) 
INDBOD 0.00532 -0.0117 -0.00481 -0.0168 
 (0.00710) (0.00750) (0.0211) (0.0227) 
PFONBOD 0.0311 0.0149 -0.00471 -0.0843 
 (0.0190) (0.0201) (0.0565) (0.0607) 
DUALITY 0.0229 -0.0424* -0.0341 0.0129 
 (0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0691) (0.0743) 
CASTEDIV 0.0440* 0.0556* 0.0851 0.0845 
 (0.0255) (0.0269) (0.0757) (0.0814) 
DPSM -2.90e-05 3.47e-05 9.87e-05 0.000209 
 (9.69e-05) (0.000102) (0.000288) (0.000310) 
LNASSETS 0.00745 -0.00140 -0.0122 -0.0425** 
 (0.00475) (0.00502) (0.0141) (0.0152) 
AGE -0.000717 -0.000869 -0.00165 -0.00409 
 (0.00156) (0.00165) (0.00465) (0.00500) 
PERSONNEL -5.57e-05 9.20e-06 0.000110 0.000175 
 (0.000101) (0.000107) (0.000302) (0.000324) 
Constant -0.160** 0.0471 0.214 0.671** 
 (0.0761) (0.0804) (0.226) (0.243) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size is weakly positively correlated at q=85. 
Duality is weakly significantly correlated at q=50. 
Caste diversity is significantly positively correlated at lower quantiles q=15 and 50.  





6.2.2.2 Return on equity (ROE) 
ROE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.166*** 0.0569 0.196 0.772* 
 (0.0539) (0.0378) (0.357) (0.420) 
INDBOD 0.163 -0.0381 -0.0806 -0.257 
 (0.196) (0.137) (1.293) (1.523) 
PFONBOD 1.545*** 0.150 -0.181 -2.369 
 (0.523) (0.367) (3.459) (4.073) 
DUALITY 0.387 -0.108 0.232 1.453 
 (0.640) (0.449) (4.234) (4.986) 
CASTEDIV 1.966** 0.277 0.390 0.480 
 (0.701) (0.492) (4.638) (5.461) 
DPSM -0.00193 0.000388 -0.000532 0.00203 
 (0.00267) (0.00187) (0.0176) (0.0208) 
LNASSETS 0.336** -0.00814 -0.174 -1.075 
 (0.131) (0.0918) (0.866) (1.019) 
AGE -0.108** -0.0201 -0.0741 -0.272 
 (0.0431) (0.0302) (0.285) (0.335) 
PERSONNEL 0.00181 0.000249 0.00146 0.00558 
 (0.00279) (0.00196) (0.0185) (0.0218) 
Constant -8.145*** 0.0138 2.581 16.77 
 (2.095) (1.469) (13.86) (16.32) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Board size is significantly positively correlated at quantiles q=15 and 85.  
Percentage of female on board is significantly positively correlated at q=15.  
Caste diversity is significantly positively correlated at q=15. 
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at q=15. 
Maturity of the MFIs is significantly negatively correlated at q=15.  
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6.2.2.3 Debt to equity ratio (DER) 
DER (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
     
BOD 1.593 0.726 -2.851 -1.071 
 (48.89) (1.577) (14.18) (15.59) 
INDBOD 3.431 2.399 10.44 8.489 
 (177.2) (5.719) (51.41) (56.54) 
PFONBOD 11.04 2.911 -33.07 -3.203 
 (474.0) (15.29) (137.5) (151.2) 
DUALITY 0.136 0.0321 41.25 94.13 
 (580.3) (18.72) (168.3) (185.1) 
CASTEDIV -25.45 -1.107 -42.88 -67.71 
 (635.6) (20.51) (184.4) (202.7) 
DPSM 0.0343 -0.00265 0.00272 0.223 
 (2.418) (0.0780) (0.701) (0.771) 
LNASSETS -1.733 1.131 -3.665 29.53 
 (118.6) (3.828) (34.41) (37.85) 
AGE 0.407 -0.212 0.811 12.30 
 (39.04) (1.259) (11.32) (12.45) 
PERSONNEL 0.0473 0.00338 -0.0786 -0.856 
 (2.531) (0.0817) (0.734) (0.807) 
Constant 8.887 -16.88 92.89 -571.5 
 (1,899) (61.27) (550.9) (605.8) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
There is no statistical significant relationship of independent variables with the debt 







6.2.2.4 Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) 
OSS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_50 q_75 q_85 
BOD 0.000141 -0.00210 0.00873 0.0243 
 (0.0127) (0.0244) (0.0216) (0.0143) 
INDBOD -0.0806* -0.0140 0.0497 0.0205 
 (0.0461) (0.0884) (0.0783) (0.0518) 
PFONBOD 0.266** 0.269 0.264 0.357** 
 (0.123) (0.236) (0.209) (0.139) 
DUALITY -0.522*** -0.00397 -0.153 -0.315* 
 (0.151) (0.289) (0.256) (0.170) 
CASTEDIV 0.193 0.220 0.570* 0.850*** 
 (0.165) (0.317) (0.281) (0.186) 
DPSM 0.00229*** -4.09e-05 -0.000335 0.00126* 
 (0.000628) (0.00121) (0.00107) (0.000707) 
LNASSETS 0.0572* 0.112* 0.0998* 0.0488 
 (0.0308) (0.0591) (0.0524) (0.0347) 
AGE 0.0344*** 0.00638 -0.00140 -0.00295 
 (0.0101) (0.0195) (0.0172) (0.0114) 
PERSONNEL 0.000275 -0.000968 -0.000594 0.000157 
 (0.000658) (0.00126) (0.00112) (0.000740) 
Constant -0.435 -1.045 -0.653 0.00665 
 (0.493) (0.947) (0.839) (0.555) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Independent director is significantly negatively correlated at q=15. 
Percentage of female on board is significantly positively correlated at quantiles 
q=15 and 85. 
Duality is significantly negatively correlated at q=15 and 85.  
Caste diversity is significantly positively correlated at q=85.  
Staff productivity is significantly positively correlated at q=15 and 85. 
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at q=15, 50 and 85.  
Maturity is significantly positively correlated at q=15.  
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7 Chapter seven – Findings 
7.1 Comparison of regression results 2004 and 2012 
A comparison of the quantile regression for 2004 and 2012 is presented in Tables 
30, 31, 32, 33 and 34; where variables differ between two years in terms of their 
statistical significance these are explained. The quantile regression results indicate 
that the effects of outreach and financial variables and governance differ across the 
quantiles. 
 Compiled outreach regression results for 2012 and 2004  
Compiled outreach regression results for 2012 and 2004 are shown in Tables 30, 
31, 32, 33 and 34. 
7.1.1.1 Number of active borrowers  
This indicates the change of number of active borrowers in MFIs during 2004 and 
2012 as shown in Table 30 below.  
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Table 30: Compiled NAB for 2012&2004 
The quantiles regression results on governance and number of active customers differ at various quantiles. 
Number of active Borrowers 
 (1) q_15 (2) q_50 (3) q_75 (4) q_85 
VARIABLES 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
BOD 0.0222 -0.174*** -0.0118 0.0282 0.0426 0.0458 0.00506 -0.0935** 
 (0.0435) (0.0468) (0.0594) (0.0759) (0.0355) (0.0332) (0.0206) (0.0343) 
INDBOD 0.506*** -0.341*** 0.184 0.0281 0.121 0.0497 0.124 0.0449 
 (0.158) (0.0895) (0.215) (0.145) (0.129) (0.0636) (0.0746) (0.0656) 
PFONBOD -0.296 0.0161 -0.0996 -1.194 -0.146 -1.133** -0.0332 -0.755* 
 (0.422) (0.581) (0.576) (0.943) (0.344) (0.413) (0.199) (0.426) 
DUALITY 1.214** -0.345 0.310 0.0106 -0.0871 0.138 -0.252 0.321 
 (0.516) (0.429) (0.705) (0.696) (0.421) (0.305) (0.244) (0.314) 
CASTEDIV 0.757 0.324 -0.523 0.497 0.945* 0.508 1.485*** -0.845* 
 (0.565) (0.591) (0.773) (0.958) (0.461) (0.419) (0.267) (0.433) 
DPSM -0.00186 0.00218* 0.000370 0.000932 0.00251 0.000808 0.00367*** 0.00169** 
 (0.00215) (0.00109) (0.00294) (0.00177) (0.00175) (0.000773) (0.00102) (0.000798) 
LNASSETS 0.488*** 1.234*** 0.492*** 0.762** 0.399*** 0.829*** 0.391*** 0.695*** 
 (0.106) (0.199) (0.144) (0.323) (0.0861) (0.141) (0.0499) (0.146) 
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AGE -0.152*** 0.0292 -0.0256 0.0366 -0.0325 0.0365** -0.0257 0.0311* 
 (0.0347) (0.0241) (0.0474) (0.0391) (0.0283) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0177) 
PERSONNEL 0.00957*** 0.00238 0.00628* 0.000771 0.00687*** 0.000115 0.00710*** 0.00142 
 (0.00225) (0.00161) (0.00308) (0.00262) (0.00184) (0.00115) (0.00106) (0.00118) 
Constant -1.829 -15.53*** -0.911 -6.375 0.416 -7.751*** 0.636 -4.058 
 (1.690) (3.730) (2.308) (6.051) (1.378) (2.648) (0.799) (2.732) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Board size is negatively and significantly correlated in lower quantile q=15 with (-
0.174***, 2012) and upper quantile q=85 with (-0.0935**, 2012) in 2012 but there 
was no significance in 2004. This explains that the impact of board size on the 
number of active borrowers has been significant through the years. The change in 
board size has significant impact on the reduction of active borrower clients in 2012 
but not in 2004.  
Independent directors are significantly positively related in 2004 with (0.506***, 
2004) at q=15 but significantly negatively related in 2012 with (-0.341***, 2012) 
in the lower quantile at q=15. This shows that independent directors impact 
adversely on organizational outreach performance in 2012 compared with a positive 
outreach performance in 2004. Numerically, it explains that the outreach of MFIs 
will reduce by 34.1% by having one additional independent director on the board 
in 2012 compared with 50.6% outreach achievement in 2004 in Nepalese MFIs. 
Percentage of females on the board is significantly negatively related in upper 
quantiles at q=75 with (-1.133**, 2012) and at q=85 with (-0.755*, 2012) in 2012 
and insignificantly negative in 2004 at all quantiles q=15, 50, 75 and 85. It is likely 
that females have less or negligible involvement in strategic formulation and 
implications for institutional social mission in Nepal.  
Duality of CEO is significantly positively related at q=15 in 2004 with (1.214**, 
2004) coefficient but with no significance in 2012. Duality may have increased the 
outreach of a firm by 121.4% in 2004 but it does not have any significance in 2012. 
Caste diversity is negatively significantly related at q=85 in 2012 with coefficient 
(-0.845*, 2012) and positively significantly related in 2004 with coefficient 
(1.485***, 2004) at q=85. The caste diversity results show the impact on serving 
borrowers reduces 84.5% when a board involves one minority in 2012, whereas it 
improves 148.5% in 2004 when change happens. This shows that caste is becoming 
less of a concern in recent times.  
Staff productivity has a significantly positive relationship at q=85 in 2012 with 
(0.00169**, 2012) and (0.00367***, 2004) in 2004at q=85. This explains that staff 
productivity is less results-oriented in 2012 than in 2004. It indicates that when staff 
productivity improves by one, it may lead to serving approximately 20% fewer MFI 
clients in 2012.  
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The control variable firm size shows a significant positive relationship at all 
quantiles q=15, 50, 75, and 85 in 2012 and 2004. The strongest impact is at q=15 
with coefficients (1.234***, 2012) and (0.488***, 2004). This explains that the 
firm with fewer assets may have improved outreach by 123.4% in 2012 compared 
with 48.8% in 2004 when their assets improved by one unit.  
Another control variable, age, has shown a significant positive impact on the 
number of borrowers to serve at q= 75, and 85 and is insignificantly positive in all 
quantiles in 2012, significantly negatively related at q= 15, and insignificantly 
negative at all quantiles in 2004. This shows that as a firm matures year by year, 
the number of borrowers it serves increases, by 3.65% in 2012. The maturity of the 
new firm increases by one, reducing the outreach coverage by 15.2% in 2004. This 
gives an impression that maturity of the firm is a factor considered by borrowers 
when choosing institutions for credit. It is likely that firms that started in 2004 or 
before have matured by 2012, thus improving the MFIs’ credibility.  
Employees play a significant positive relationship at all quantiles q=15, 25, 50, 75 
and 85 in 2004 but insignificant in all quantiles in 2012. The weaker explanatory 
power in 2004 explains that number of employees was less of a concern in 2004 
when choosing an MFI for credit.  
7.1.1.2 Size of loan 
This explains the change that may have occurred with the governance factors during 
2004 and 2012. The median regression does not show any significant relation 
during 2004 and 2012. The different quantiles show the different significance 
relationship in 2004 and 2012 as shown in Table 31 below.  
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Table 31:  Compiled ALBPB for 2012 & 2004 
ALBPB (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
 q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
BOD -197.4*** -66.51 -52.57 1,605 422.9 4,502** -633.8 9,124*** 
 (63.85) (237.3) (622.1) (1,945) (1,880) (2,074) (1,893) (2,115) 
INDBOD -778.8*** -1,467*** -1,515 -791.3 -3,838 -2,212 -16,396** -6,452 
 (231.5) (454.2) (2,256) (3,723) (6,816) (3,970) (6,864) (4,049) 
PFONBOD -2,348*** 2,633 9,104 17,058 13,394 60,479** -8,844 44,307 
 (619.1) (2,948) (6,032) (24,157) (18,228) (25,759) (18,356) (26,272) 
DUALITY 3,863*** -8,650*** 7,303 -1,480 -6,125 9,333 -20,469 -5,258 
 (757.9) (2,178) (7,385) (17,847) (22,315) (19,031) (22,472) (19,410) 
CASTEDIV -3,580*** 17,458*** -6,609 6,000 -9,958 -27,760 -6,544 -40,477 
 (830.2) (2,996) (8,089) (24,556) (24,443) (26,185) (24,614) (26,706) 
DPSM -2.505 16.39*** 12.40 12.82 35.76 -14.05 21.29 -30.63 
 (3.158) (5.527) (30.77) (45.29) (92.98) (48.30) (93.64) (49.26) 
LNASSETS 2,107*** 1,560 2,480 3,619 3,464 13,783 12,767** -7,674 
 (155.0) (1,010) (1,510) (8,281) (4,563) (8,830) (4,595) (9,006) 
AGE -105.9* -647.9*** 338.0 -1,085 1,047 -1,183 4,015** 498.7 
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 (50.98) (122.3) (496.8) (1,002) (1,501) (1,069) (1,512) (1,090) 
PERSONNEL -23.41*** -14.85* -30.33 -35.59 -64.86 -102.3 -302.8*** 70.13 
 (3.306) (8.188) (32.21) (67.11) (97.34) (71.56) (98.03) (72.98) 
Constant -30,039*** -8,147 -44,191* -52,090 -54,338 -250,932 -175,132** 129,133 
 (2,480) (18,924) (24,169) (155,083) (73,033) (165,370) (73,545) (168,663) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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The significant negative relation at the lower quantile q=15 with (-197.4***, 2004) 
in 2004 explains that MFIs with smaller boards target smaller loans. However, the 
positive significant correlation at upper quantile q=75 with (4,502**, 2012) and q=85 
with (9,124***, 2012) explains that MFIs with larger boards are more likely to divert 
from their social mission and target individual, rather than collective, loans. 
Independent directors on board correlates significantly negative at lower quantile 
q=15 in 2004 and 2012 with the coefficients (-778.8***, 2004) and (-1,467***, 
2012). Statistically, this explains that the loan size reduces by almost half when 
MFIs add one additional independent director in 2012 compared to 2004. It is likely 
that independent directors from different castes encourage MFIs to become focused 
on their social mission by issuing smaller loans. 
The positive significant relation of the percentage of female directors in the upper 
quantile at q=75 in 2012 with the coefficient (60,479**, 2012) explains that the loan 
size increases with more female involvement on the board. 
Duality has a significant positive correlation in 2004 with coefficient (3,863***, 
2004) but a significant negative correlation in 2012 with coefficient (-8,650***, 
2012) at quantile q=15. It shows that the MFIs with CEO duality are more focused 
on their social mission in 2012 compared with 2004 through issuing smaller loans.   
Caste diversity is positively significantly correlated in 2012 with the coefficient 
(17,458***, 2012) and negatively significantly related in 2004 with the coefficient 
(-3,580***, 2004). That shows that MFIs with more cast diversity are likely to issue 
larger loans. It is likely that the increased presence of moneylenders forces MFIs to 
issue larger loans when their boards are more caste diversified.  
The positive significant correlation of staff productivity in 2012 with coefficient 
(16.39***, 2012) explains that MFIs may increase loan size by 16.39% when it 
increases employees by one unit.  
Firm size does not have any significant relationship in 2012 but is positively 
significantly correlated in 2004 at q=15 and 85. This shows that firm size has a 
significant impact in 2004 for fulfilling the social mission but it becomes 
autonomous in 2012. 
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Maturity of the firm has significant negative correlation at lower quantile q=15 in 
2004 and 2012 with the coefficients (-105.9*, 2004) and (-647.9***, 2012). This 
shows that the younger MFIs in 2012 are more focused on social mission than MFIs 
in 2004. The loan size becomes lower by approximately 500% when firm maturity 
increases by one year in 2012 compared with 2004.  
Number of employees is negatively significantly correlated at lower quantile q=15 
in 2012 and 2004 with the coefficients (-23.41***, 2004) and (-14.85*, 2012).  This 
explains that loan size gets bigger by 9% in 2012 compared with 2004 when MFIs 
increase input by one employee. It is likely that the capacity of employees has 
improved to handle loans in 2012 compared with 2004.  
7.1.1.3 Depth of loan  
Depth of loan explains whether MFIs are targeting poor clients as part of their social 
mission or whether they have been diverted. The changes in MFIs' client 
consideration and governance factors during 2004 and 2012 are explained in Table 
32 below.  
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Table 32:  Compiled ALBPB/GNI for 2012 & 2004 
ALBPBGNI (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
 q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
BOD -0.486 0.722 -0.170 1.976 1.562 5.010 -2.352 5.953 
 (0.312) (0.537) (2.381) (2.508) (7.229) (5.918) (7.023) (5.509) 
INDBOD -3.089** -1.664 -3.089 -1.651 -15.50 3.439 -61.04** 2.245 
 (1.131) (1.027) (8.633) (4.802) (26.21) (11.33) (25.46) (10.55) 
PFONBOD -9.189*** -0.931 29.37 43.06 50.70 89.68 -31.63 106.4 
 (3.025) (6.665) (23.09) (31.16) (70.09) (73.52) (68.10) (68.44) 
DUALITY 14.32*** -0.251 23.54 6.813 -24.84 29.29 -77.15 37.32 
 (3.703) (4.924) (28.26) (23.02) (85.81) (54.32) (83.37) (50.56) 
CASTEDIV -13.31*** 18.92*** -17.57 -5.086 -37.53 -27.41 -25.18 -42.42 
 (4.056) (6.775) (30.96) (31.68) (93.99) (74.74) (91.31) (69.57) 
DPSM 0.00182 0.0511*** 0.0372 0.0194 0.152 -0.00496 0.0972 -0.0859 
 (0.0154) (0.0125) (0.118) (0.0584) (0.358) (0.138) (0.347) (0.128) 
LNASSETS 7.491*** 1.617 7.445 4.749 13.42 23.29 47.02** 31.85 
 (0.757) (2.285) (5.779) (10.68) (17.54) (25.20) (17.04) (23.46) 
AGE -0.327 -0.153 0.543 -1.891 4.115 -0.462 15.00** 0.568 
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 (0.249) (0.276) (1.901) (1.293) (5.773) (3.050) (5.608) (2.839) 
PERSONNEL -0.0792*** 0.00847 -0.0598 -0.0457 -0.251 -0.167 -1.119*** -0.214 
 (0.0162) (0.0185) (0.123) (0.0866) (0.374) (0.204) (0.364) (0.190) 
Constant -110.7*** -32.87 -131.0 -59.18 -212.8 -451.5 -647.1** -612.2 
 (12.12) (42.79) (92.50) (200.1) (280.8) (472.0) (272.8) (439.4) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Independent director is significantly negatively related at quantile q=15 with (-
3.089**, 2004) in 2004 but it loses significance in 2012. 
Percentage of females on the board is significantly negatively related at quantile 
q=15 with (-9.189***, 2004) in 2004 but there is no significant relationship in 2012. 
Duality is positively significantly related at quantile q=15 with (14.32***, 2004) in 
2004 but shows no significance in 2012. 
Caste diversification correlation has changed from significant negative relation in 
2004 to positive significance in 2012 with coefficients (-13.31***, 2004) and 
(18.92***, 2012). This explains that caste diversity increases the loan depth by 
32.13% when MFIs improve caste diversification by one unit on their boards in 
2012 compared to 2004. It is likely that the higher presence of moneylenders in 
some regions impels MFIs to increase their depth of loan when the board caste 
diversity increases. 
Staff productivity is positively significantly related in 2012 at quantile q=15 with 
(0.0511***, 2012) and insignificantly positive in 2004 at q=15. This explains that 
staff productivity improves the depth of loan in 2012. It is likely that staff are more 
capable to deal with group loans at higher amounts.  
Firm size is positively significantly related at quantile q=15 with (7.491***, 2004) 
and q=85 with (47.02**, 2004) in 2004 but insignificantly positive in all quantiles in 
2012. This explains that firm size significantly improves the depth of loan in 2004. 
That is, the bigger the firm, the higher the depth of loan, with social mission missing 
out.  
7.1.1.4 Number of depositors 
This is the indicator of number of depositors compared during 2004 and 2012 in 
Table 33 below.  
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Table 33: Compiled NOD for 2012 & 2004 
NOD (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
 q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
BOD 0.0193 -0.102*** 0.0150 -0.0136 0.0651* -0.0290 0.0423*** -0.0710** 
 (0.0288) (0.0216) (0.0537) (0.0588) (0.0346) (0.0310) (0.0112) (0.0303) 
INDBOD -0.0130 -0.160*** 0.180 0.00788 0.0147 0.0213 0.105** -0.0161 
 (0.104) (0.0414) (0.195) (0.113) (0.125) (0.0593) (0.0407) (0.0581) 
PFONBOD -0.807*** -0.245 -0.296 -0.941 -0.0187 -0.791** 0.423*** -0.383 
 (0.279) (0.269) (0.521) (0.731) (0.335) (0.385) (0.109) (0.377) 
DUALITY -0.545 0.152 0.225 0.139 -0.698 0.269 -0.599*** 0.315 
 (0.341) (0.199) (0.638) (0.540) (0.410) (0.284) (0.133) (0.279) 
CASTEDIV 0.127 0.232 0.744 0.541 1.004** -0.255 1.082*** -0.671* 
 (0.374) (0.273) (0.698) (0.743) (0.449) (0.391) (0.146) (0.383) 
DPSM 0.0150*** 0.00392*** 0.00881*** 0.00272* 0.00692*** 0.00166** 0.00573*** 0.00137* 
 (0.00142) (0.000504) (0.00266) (0.00137) (0.00171) (0.000721) (0.000555) (0.000707) 
LNASSETS 0.167** 0.942*** 0.269* 0.602** 0.325*** 0.631*** 0.338*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0698) (0.0922) (0.130) (0.251) (0.0839) (0.132) (0.0273) (0.129) 
195 
 
AGE 0.0222 -0.00800 0.00552 0.0453 -0.0268 0.0405** -0.0314*** 0.00930 
 (0.0230) (0.0112) (0.0429) (0.0303) (0.0276) (0.0160) (0.00897) (0.0156) 
PERSONNEL 0.00922*** 0.00160** 0.00850*** 0.00169 0.00670*** 0.00146 0.00681*** 0.00137 
 (0.00149) (0.000747) (0.00278) (0.00203) (0.00179) (0.00107) (0.000581) (0.00105) 
Constant 2.373** -9.651*** 1.004 -3.426 1.536 -3.253 1.494*** -0.706 
 (1.117) (1.726) (2.086) (4.693) (1.343) (2.470) (0.436) (2.420) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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The sign of a significant relation of board size changes from positive to negative in 
2012 from 2004 at upper quantile q=85 with the coefficients (0.0423***, 2004) and 
(-0.0710**, 2012). This shows that depositors reduced by 7.1% in 2012 when board 
size increases by one. It is likely that larger boards create mistrust and potential 
borrowers question the credibility of institutions in the market. 
Caste diversity is significantly negatively related in 2012 but was significantly 
positive in 2004 at upper quantile q=85 with the coefficients (1.082***, 2004) and 
(-0.671*, 2012). This shows that the number of deposit accounts reduces by 67.1% 
when a firm includes one more minority director on the board in 2012. It is likely 
that highly diversified boards create uncertainty around a firm’s credibility. 
Staff productivity is significantly positive in all quantiles in 2004 and 2012 but 
strongest at q=15. Number of depositors is less sensitive and reduces by 1.1% when 
staff productivity is increased by one in 2012 compared to 2004 with coefficients 
(0.0150***, 2004) and (0.00392***, 2012). It is likely that potential clients and 
borrowers are more informed and they have more deposit options among BFIs to 
choose.  
Significant positive correlation of firm size in all quantiles in years 2012 and 2004 
shows that the number of deposit accounts increases with firm growth.  However, 
number of depositors is influenced by approximately 80% improvement with 
smaller firm size in 2012 compared to 2004 at quantile q=15 with coefficients 
(0.167**, 2004) and (0.942***, 2012). The changes in number of depositors reduces 
to 20% as the firm size increases in 2012 compared to 2004 at q=85 with 
coefficients (0.338***, 2004) and (0.558***, 2012). It is likely that smaller firms 
need more deposits than bigger firms to be able to improve their social mission, and 
bigger firms are more stable and less affected with firm size than smaller firms.   
Number of employees is significantly positively correlated in the lower quantile at 
q=15 with the coefficients (0.00922***, 2004) and (0.00160**, 2012). This 
explains that deposit accounts were more sensitive in 2004 compared to 2012. It is 
likely that an increase in the number of employees in institutions enables them to 
reach remote areas prudently.  
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7.1.1.5 Percentage of female borrowers 
The indicator of female borrowers compared during 2004 and 2012 is shown in 
Table 34 below.  
Table 34: Compiled PFB for 2012 & 2004 
PFB (1)  
VARIABLES q_15  
 2004 2012 
BOD -3.995*** -5.554*** 
 (0.406) (1.282) 
INDBOD 10.53***  
 (1.473)  
PFONBOD 36.38***  
 (3.939)  
DUALITY 25.72***  
 (4.822)  
CASTEDIV -0.227  
 (5.282)  
DPSM -0.0128  
 (0.0201)  
LNASSETS 7.773***  
 (0.986)  
AGE -1.830*** -1.914*** 
 (0.324) (0.661) 
PERSONNEL 0.0739***  
 (0.0210)  
Constant -59.16***  
 (15.78)  
Observations 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
The significant negative correlation of board size at lower quantile q=15 in 2012 
and 2004 with coefficients (-3.995***, 2004) and (-5.554***, 2012) explains that 
the number of female borrowers reduces by 1.56% in 2012 compared to 2004. It is 
likely that larger boards consider the both genders, male and female, as credit clients 
rather than considering female clients only. 
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The maturity of the firm is significantly negatively correlated at quantile q=15 in 
2012 and 2004 with the coefficients (-1.830***, 2004) and (-1.914***, 2012). It 
explains that the percentage of female borrowers reduces by 8.3% in 2012 
compared to 2004. It is likely that mature firms consider both male and female 
clients over the longer period of service.   
 Compiled financial regression results for 2012 and 2004  
Compiled financial regression results for 2012 and 2004 are shown Tables 35, 36, 
37 and 38.  
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7.1.2.1 Return on assets 
This indicates the change in return on asset in MFIs during 2004 and 2012 as shown in Table 35 below.  
Table 35:  Compiled ROA for 2012 & 2004 
ROA (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
BOD -1.47e-05 0.00388 0.00261 0.00142 0.00637 0.000757 0.0231*** 0.00186* 
 (0.00196) (0.00681) (0.00207) (0.00222) (0.00582) (0.00167) (0.00626) (0.00102) 
INDBOD 0.00532 0.00318 -0.0117 -0.00412 -0.00481 -0.000957 -0.0168 -0.00542** 
 (0.00710) (0.0130) (0.00750) (0.00425) (0.0211) (0.00320) (0.0227) (0.00196) 
PFONBOD 0.0311 0.0261 0.0149 0.0201 -0.00471 0.0341 -0.0843 0.00934 
 (0.0190) (0.0846) (0.0201) (0.0276) (0.0565) (0.0208) (0.0607) (0.0127) 
DUALITY 0.0229 -0.00680 -0.0424* -0.0100 -0.0341 -0.0122 0.0129 -0.0123 
 (0.0232) (0.0625) (0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0691) (0.0154) (0.0743) (0.00940) 
CASTEDIV 0.0440* -0.0326 0.0556* 0.0340 0.0851 0.00912 0.0845 0.00386 
 (0.0255) (0.0860) (0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0757) (0.0211) (0.0814) (0.0129) 
DPSM -2.90e-05 -2.41e-05 3.47e-05 4.47e-05 9.87e-05 5.91e-05 0.000209 2.06e-05 
 (9.69e-05) (0.000159) (0.000102) (5.17e-05) (0.000288) (3.90e-05) (0.000310) (2.38e-05) 
LNASSETS 0.00745 0.00839 -0.00140 0.00659 -0.0122 0.00302 -0.0425** -0.00530 
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 (0.00475) (0.0290) (0.00502) (0.00945) (0.0141) (0.00713) (0.0152) (0.00436) 
AGE -0.000717 -0.000333 -0.000869 0.000562 -0.00165 -0.00103 -0.00409 -0.00265*** 
 (0.00156) (0.00351) (0.00165) (0.00114) (0.00465) (0.000863) (0.00500) (0.000528) 
PERSONNEL -5.57e-05 -1.32e-05 9.20e-06 -3.21e-05 0.000110 -3.58e-05 0.000175 3.17e-05 
 (0.000101) (0.000235) (0.000107) (7.66e-05) (0.000302) (5.78e-05) (0.000324) (3.53e-05) 
Constant -0.160** -0.173 0.0471 -0.140 0.214 -0.0295 0.671** 0.175** 
 (0.0761) (0.543) (0.0804) (0.177) (0.226) (0.134) (0.243) (0.0817) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 




Board size is significantly positively related in upper quantiles at q=85 in 2004 and 
2012 with coefficients (0.0231***, 2004) and (0.00186*, 2012). This explains that 
a firm with a larger board may enjoy higher return on assets in Nepalese MFIs.  
However, the impact of increasing the number of board directors by one in 2012 
produces lesser ROA than in 2004. This means adding one more director to the 
board in MFIs resulted in increasing ROA by 2.31% in 2004 but 0.186% in 2012. 
Independent directors are significantly negatively correlated in upper quantile at 
q=85 with (-0.00542**, 2012) for 2012 but insignificantly negatively correlated in 
2004. This explains that the MFI will have a lesser return on assets when a firm 
increases the independent directors on its board in Nepal. It is likely that the 
independent directors are less skilled or know less about the firm’s management 
style to utilize the assets to generate profit. 
Duality has a significant negative correlation in lower quantile at q=50 with (-
0.0424*, 2004) in 2004 and has an insignificant negative correlation in all quantiles 
for 2012. This explains that duality reduces the asset utilization of a firm to generate 
profitability in MFIs in Nepal. 
Caste diversity is significantly positively related at lower quantiles at q=15 (0.0440*, 
2004) and q=50 with (0.0556*, 2004) but insignificantly positive at other quantiles 
q=75 and 85 in 2004, and it is insignificantly positive at quantiles q=50, 75 and 85 
in 2012. This indicates that minor directors’ presence increases asset utilization to 
generate revenue for MFIs in Nepal. 
Firm size is significantly negatively related in upper quantiles at q= 85 with (-
0.0425**, 2004) in 2004 but insignificantly negative at q= 85 in 2012. This shows 
that larger MFIs are generating less ROA in Nepal. It is likely that operational 
efficiency reduces when firm size improves in Nepalese MFIs. 
Maturity of the firm is significantly negatively correlated at q=85 with (-0.00265***, 
2012) in 2012 but insignificantly negatively related at other quantiles q=15, 50, 75 
in 2004 and 2012. This indicates that the maturity of the MFIs adversely affects 
ROA. MFIs may be facing employee turnover after accumulating years of work 
experience, and their departure affects operational efficiency. 
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7.1.2.2 Return on equity  
This indicates the change in return on equity in MFIs during 2004 and 2012 as shown in Table 36 below. 
Table 36: Compiled ROE for 2012 & 2004 
ROE (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
BOD 0.166*** 0.0232** 0.0569 0.00558 0.196 -0.00320 0.772* -0.00352 
 (0.0539) (0.00961) (0.0378) (0.0192) (0.357) (0.0171) (0.420) (0.00771) 
INDBOD 0.163 -0.00736 -0.0381 -0.0282 -0.0806 -0.0129 -0.257 -0.0130 
 (0.196) (0.0184) (0.137) (0.0367) (1.293) (0.0328) (1.523) (0.0148) 
PFONBOD 1.545*** -0.139 0.150 0.0900 -0.181 -0.109 -2.369 -0.0754 
 (0.523) (0.119) (0.367) (0.238) (3.459) (0.213) (4.073) (0.0958) 
DUALITY 0.387 -0.385*** -0.108 -0.225 0.232 -0.629*** 1.453 -0.640*** 
 (0.640) (0.0882) (0.449) (0.176) (4.234) (0.157) (4.986) (0.0708) 
CASTEDIV 1.966** 0.129 0.277 0.113 0.390 -0.0915 0.480 -0.0760 
 (0.701) (0.121) (0.492) (0.242) (4.638) (0.216) (5.461) (0.0974) 
DPSM -0.00193 -0.000170 0.000388 5.92e-05 -0.000532 -0.000431 0.00203 -0.000423** 
 (0.00267) (0.000224) (0.00187) (0.000447) (0.0176) (0.000399) (0.0208) (0.000180) 
LNASSETS 0.336** -0.0155 -0.00814 0.0104 -0.174 0.0763 -1.075 0.0880** 
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 (0.131) (0.0409) (0.0918) (0.0817) (0.866) (0.0730) (1.019) (0.0328) 
AGE -0.108** 0.00576 -0.0201 0.00639 -0.0741 -0.0284*** -0.272 -0.0289*** 
 (0.0431) (0.00495) (0.0302) (0.00988) (0.285) (0.00883) (0.335) (0.00397) 
PERSONNEL 0.00181 0.000137 0.000249 0.000144 0.00146 -0.000748 0.00558 -0.000796*** 
 (0.00279) (0.000332) (0.00196) (0.000662) (0.0185) (0.000592) (0.0218) (0.000266) 
Constant -8.145*** 0.460 0.0138 -0.0471 2.581 0.226 16.77 0.00964 
 (2.095) (0.766) (1.469) (1.529) (13.86) (1.367) (16.32) (0.615) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
204 
 
Board size is positively significantly correlated with ROE in lower quantile at q=15 
in 2004 and 2012. This explains that MFIs' profitability gets better with larger 
boards in MFIs in Nepal. The explanatory coefficients are (0.166***, 2004) and 
(0.0232**, 2012). The board size explanatory power in 2012 is weaker than in 2004. 
Numerically, this explains that ROE improves by 16.6% in 2004 and 2.32% in 2012 
when board size increases by one. Thus, larger boards are less efficient in producing 
MFI profitability in Nepal. It is likely that boards may have reached optimal size 
during a decade of operation.  
Percentage of females on board is significantly positively correlated in lower 
quantile at q=15 in 2004 but shows no significant relation in 2012. The explanatory 
coefficient (1.545***, 2004) shows return on equity improved by 154.5% when 
MFIs took one female director on board in 2004. However, this loses significance 
during the decade of operation for 2012. It is likely that women on boards are used 
as a token in Nepalese MFIs. 
CEO duality has no significant impact in 2004 but it has a significant relation in 
2012 at quantiles q=15, 75 and 85. This explains that firms with CEO/chairman 
duality will have less return on equity than non-dual boards. It is likely that with 
the dual role the CEO exercises his power to take personal advantage from 
organizational costs, which increases the operating costs, resulting in less profit. 
Caste diversity is positively significantly correlated in lower quantile at q=15 but 
insignificantly positively related in all other quantiles q=50, 75, and 85 in 2004. 
This shows that caste diversity may have a positive impact on firm’s profitability 
in 2004. It has an insignificant positive relation in lower quantiles at q=15 and 50 
and negative in upper quantiles q=75 and 85, which shows that the firm with less 
caste diversity may have improved profitability. Minors’ presence on the board 
increases conflicts, distortion and increases communication costs which reduce firm 
profitability. It is likely that the significant impact of minority directors on boards 
has been lost because of the Maoist insurgency and Nepal’s militant unification and 
Communist Party of Nepal (UML), which may have affected the social revolution 
to reduce the differences in caste hierarchy.  
Firm size is significantly positively correlated at lower quantile at q=15 with 
(0.336**, 2004) and insignificantly negative at all other quantiles at q=50, 75 and 85 
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in 2004. Nevertheless, it is insignificantly negatively related at q=15, positively at 
q=50 and 75 and significantly positively correlated at q=85 with (0.0880**, 2012) in 
2012. This indicates that smaller firms are efficient to increase profitability in 2004 
but bigger firms are efficient to increase profitability on their equity in 2012. It is 
likely that bigger firms are able to utilize economic scale to minimize the cost to 
improve profitability. 
Maturity is significantly negatively correlated at lower quantile at q=15 with (-
0.108**, 2004) and insignificantly negatively correlated in 2004, and is significantly 
negatively correlated in upper quantiles at q=75 with (-0.0284***, 2012) and q=85 
with (-0.0289***, 2012) in 2012. This shows that ROE reduces as MFIs mature in 
Nepal. This indicates that Nepalese firms are unable to generate enough revenue to 
meet their costs, regardless of age. External funding was needed for mature firms 
in 2012 as well as younger firms in 2004. It is likely that mature firms have more 
frequent employee turnover, and the Maoist insurgency blocked access to target 
customers during this decade (data period), which affected revenue reduction with 
fixed costs to absorb.  
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7.1.2.3 Debt to equity ratio 
This indicates the change in debt to equity ratio in MFIs during 2004 and 2012 as shown in Table 37 below. 
Table 37: Compiled DER for 2012 & 2004 
DER (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
BOD 1.593 -0.0825 0.726 -0.268 -2.851 -0.309 -1.071 -0.572** 
 (48.89) (0.165) (1.577) (0.318) (14.18) (0.308) (15.59) (0.217) 
INDBOD 3.431 0.542* 2.399 -0.0316 10.44 -0.961 8.489 -1.275*** 
 (177.2) (0.316) (5.719) (0.608) (51.41) (0.590) (56.54) (0.416) 
PFONBOD 11.04 -0.315 2.911 -6.341 -33.07 -1.035 -3.203 -3.969 
 (474.0) (2.052) (15.29) (3.947) (137.5) (3.830) (151.2) (2.700) 
DUALITY 0.136 -3.515** 0.0321 -4.322 41.25 -4.405 94.13 -4.995** 
 (580.3) (1.516) (18.72) (2.916) (168.3) (2.830) (185.1) (1.995) 
CASTEDIV -25.45 0.779 -1.107 -1.575 -42.88 3.059 -67.71 4.664 
 (635.6) (2.086) (20.51) (4.012) (184.4) (3.893) (202.7) (2.745) 
DPSM 0.0343 0.0109*** -0.00265 -0.000603 0.00272 -0.00831 0.223 -0.0112** 
 (2.418) (0.00385) (0.0780) (0.00740) (0.701) (0.00718) (0.771) (0.00506) 
LNASSETS -1.733 -0.187 1.131 -0.720 -3.665 1.389 29.53 1.192 
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 (118.6) (0.703) (3.828) (1.353) (34.41) (1.313) (37.85) (0.926) 
AGE 0.407 0.139 -0.212 0.138 0.811 0.328** 12.30 0.161 
 (39.04) (0.0851) (1.259) (0.164) (11.32) (0.159) (12.45) (0.112) 
PERSONNEL 0.0473 0.0123** 0.00338 0.00792 -0.0786 -0.00407 -0.856 -0.00473 
 (2.531) (0.00570) (0.0817) (0.0110) (0.734) (0.0106) (0.807) (0.00750) 
Constant 8.887 4.998 -16.88 27.30 92.89 -12.17 -571.5 -0.452 
 (1,899) (13.17) (61.27) (25.34) (550.9) (24.59) (605.8) (17.34) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
208 
 
Board size is significantly negatively related at q=85 with (0.572**, 2012) in 2012 
and insignificantly related at q=85 in 2004. This shows that larger boards may have 
less debt to equity ratio in MFIs in Nepal.  
Independent directors are significantly negatively related at upper quantile q= 85 
with (-1.275***, 2012) and positively related at q=15 with (0.542*, 2012) in 2012. 
This explains that firms with more independent directors have less DER. It is likely 
that independent directors’ involvement increases the donor’s believes on the firm. 
Therefore, the flow of equity increases. 
Duality is significantly negatively related at lower and upper quantiles at q=15 with 
(-3.515**, 2012) and q=85 with (-4.995**, 2012) in 2012. This shows that the dual 
role reduces the DER, that is, firms rely more on equity.  
Staff productivity is significantly positively correlated at q=15 with (0.0109***, 
2012) and significantly negatively at q=85 with (-0.0112**, 2012) in 2012. This 
shows that firms with higher staff productivity have lower DER and rely more on 
self-equity than the debt from less staff productivity. It is likely that higher staff 
productivity may increase retained earnings because of their increased productivity 
that spreads out the operational cost of the MFIs at lower in Nepal. 
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7.1.2.4 Operating self-sufficiency 
This indicates the change in operating self-sufficiency in MFIs during 2004 and 2012 as shown in Table 38 below. 
Table 38: Compiled OSS for 2012 & 2004 
OSS (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES q_15 q_15 q_50 q_50 q_75 q_75 q_85 q_85 
 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 
BOD 0.000141 0.0553*** -0.00210 0.00208 0.00873 -0.0225 0.0243 0.00424 
 (0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0244) (0.0226) (0.0216) (0.0200) (0.0143) (0.0173) 
INDBOD -0.0806* -0.0606** -0.0140 -0.0176 0.0497 -0.0488 0.0205 -0.0697** 
 (0.0461) (0.0278) (0.0884) (0.0432) (0.0783) (0.0383) (0.0518) (0.0331) 
PFONBOD 0.266** 0.384** 0.269 0.153 0.264 -0.0633 0.357** 0.229 
 (0.123) (0.180) (0.236) (0.280) (0.209) (0.249) (0.139) (0.215) 
DUALITY -0.522*** -0.261* -0.00397 -0.175 -0.153 -0.262 -0.315* -0.358** 
 (0.151) (0.133) (0.289) (0.207) (0.256) (0.184) (0.170) (0.159) 
CASTEDIV 0.193 -0.421** 0.220 0.140 0.570* 0.282 0.850*** -0.0689 
 (0.165) (0.183) (0.317) (0.285) (0.281) (0.253) (0.186) (0.218) 
DPSM 0.00229*** -5.55e-05 -4.09e-05 0.000444 -0.000335 0.00122** 0.00126* 0.00120*** 
 (0.000628) (0.000338) (0.00121) (0.000526) (0.00107) (0.000466) (0.000707) (0.000403) 
LNASSETS 0.0572* 0.150** 0.112* 0.0584 0.0998* 0.0578 0.0488 -0.0685 
210 
 
 (0.0308) (0.0618) (0.0591) (0.0961) (0.0524) (0.0853) (0.0347) (0.0737) 
AGE 0.0344*** -0.0329*** 0.00638 -0.000785 -0.00140 -0.00456 -0.00295 -0.0137 
 (0.0101) (0.00748) (0.0195) (0.0116) (0.0172) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.00891) 
PERSONNEL 0.000275 -0.000514 -0.000968 -0.000171 -0.000594 -0.000469 0.000157 0.000424 
 (0.000658) (0.000501) (0.00126) (0.000779) (0.00112) (0.000691) (0.000740) (0.000597) 
Constant -0.435 -1.626 -1.045 -0.0335 -0.653 0.266 0.00665 2.830* 
 (0.493) (1.158) (0.947) (1.800) (0.839) (1.597) (0.555) (1.380) 
Observations 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Board size is significantly positively correlated at q=15 with (0.0553***, 2012) in 
2012 but insignificantly positive at q=15 in 2004. This indicates that the larger 
board improves the operational self-sufficiency of MFIs in Nepal. It is likely that 
larger boards are able to compile the skill and experience to increase the operational 
capacity to generate enough revenue to meet costs. 
Independent directors are significantly negatively correlated in the lower quantile 
at q=15 in 2004 and 2012 with the coefficients (-0.0806*, 2004) and (-0.0606**, 
2012). This indicates that the OSS reduces when the number of independent director 
increases on the board. The impact of one more independent director on OSS has 
slowed down by 2% in 2012 compared with 2004. It is likely that over the decade, 
independent directors may have improved their skills and started to understand the 
management processes of MFIs but they still need to further improve their skills 
and knowledge of management processes to enhance the OSS of MFIs in Nepal.  
Percentage of females on board is significantly positively correlated in lower 
quantile at q=15 in 2004 and 2012 with (0.266**, 2004) and (0.384**, 2012). This 
shows that the presence of females on boards improves the OSS of MFIs in Nepal. 
Increasing the number of females on the board by one, saw OSS improve by 11.8% 
in 2012, compared to 2004. It is likely that females on boards may have learned the 
skills to improve operational capacity to generate enough revue to match the cost 
in Nepalese MFIs.  
Duality is significantly negatively related in lower and upper quantiles at q=15 with 
(-0.522***, 2004) and (-0.261*, 2012) and q=85 with (-0.315*, 2004) and (-0.358**, 
2012) in 2004 and 2012. This indicates that the MFIs with CEO dual roles are less 
efficient at managing their costs and depend on external funding. It is likely that 
CEOs are misusing their CEO dual role for their personal gain, rather than firm 
profits. 
Caste diversity is significantly positive in upper quantiles q=75 with (0.570*, 2004) 
and q=85 with (0.850***, 2004) in 2004, but significantly negatively related at q=15 
with (-0.421**, 2012) and insignificantly negatively related at q=85 in 2012. This 
explains that improvement in caste diversity in MFIs may improve OSS in 2004. 
However, lower caste-diversified MFIs may have higher OSS in 2012. It is likely 
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that minority directors increase political lobbying and communication distortion, 
resulting in operational inefficiency of MFIs in Nepal. 
Staff productivity is positively significantly correlated in upper quantile at q=85 
with (0.00126*, 2004) and (0.00120***, 2012) in 2004 and 2012. This explains that 
MFIs OSS increases when staff productivity increases. It is likely that MFIs are 
increasing their operational efficiency by increasing the number of customers per 
employee, which reduces costs and improves profit.  
Firm size is significantly positively correlated in the lower quantile at q=15 with 
(0.0572*, 2004) and (0.150**, 2012) in 2004 and 2012. This indicates that smaller 
MFIs are more self-sufficient in Nepal. When firm size is increased by unit, MFIs’ 
OSS improves by 9.5% in 2012 compared to 2004.  
Maturity of the firm is significantly positively related at q=15 with (0.0344***, 2004) 
in 2004, but significantly negatively related at q=15 with (-0.0329***, 2012) in 2012. 
This shows mature firms are having less OSS in 2012 and maturity improves OSS 
in 2004. It is likely that the Maoist insurgency and political instability created an 
unfavourable environment, which affected the operational capacity of MFIs in 
Nepal. 
7.2 Governance combination 
MFIs’ outreach and financial performance are discussed with independent 
governance factors in this section. The outreach and financial results differ in 2004 
and 2012. The most likely reasons for regression results differences for 2004 and 
2012 are change in corporate governance structure; regulatory changes; and macro-
economic.   
Change in corporate governance structure: There are changes in corporate 
governance structure in MFIs during the decade, relating to the number of females 
on the board, involvement of independent directors on the board, changes in number 
of employees, variations in firm size, and MFIs’ age. 
Regulatory changes: The Bank and Financial Institutions Act 2006 (BAFIA) is the 
beginning of formal guidelines for the MFIs to follow.  
Macro-economic: Fluctuations in economic growth of the country may have had an 
impact on MFIs services. Changes occurred between the first and last year of the 
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sample period but the variability in variables was insufficient to accept the use of 
time-series data. If an instrumental variable approach had been possible then a fixed 
effect method may have been used. However, efforts to find suitable instruments 
were not successful and the time period is not long enough to use a GMM approach. 
The rigorous results obtained are compared with findings of the other researchers 
and scholars. 
The study result on larger board gives better financial performance but lower 
outreaching and smaller board gives poorer financial performance but higher 
outreaching; suggesting that the choice of having a larger or smaller board depends 
on the MFIs’ individual goal to be accomplished. MFIs may adjust their board size, 
larger or smaller, according to what they want to achieve. Thus, the study aligns 
with the NRB directive for MFIs’ outreach or financial sustaining goal achievement 
on different years basis. 
The study result shows the independent directors negatively affect the all proxies 
of the study to measure MFIs outreaching and financial performance in Nepal. This 
suggests that copying the bundle of governance practice from other country is not 
working for MFIs in Nepal. The mandatory regulation to have an independent 
director on board is being manipulated as a ‘tokenism’ on MFIs governing board in 
Nepal. The independent directors are independent in name only. There is no clear 
guidance on what independent means, other than not executive directors, aligning 
with the regulatory requirement. Accordingly, there is potential for appointing 
“friends”. The lack of diversity brought to boards by the inclusion of independent 
directors supports such a contention. If independent directors bring nothing new to 
the board, then they are purely a cost and the increased size is detrimental to 
efficiency rather than building resources available to the firm as suggested by 
Resource Dependency Theory applied to governance. In that model, the board 
serves as a resource provider to enhance firm performance and maintain social 
resources via external connections. There is no evidence to suggest the 
qualifications, diversity, or age of independent directors add to what the board has 
without them. The following tables indicate the family ties. There is no other 
information provided about the member. The same titles of the MFIs’ board 
members may point to nepotism practices. More supervision on appointing 
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independent directors who are more familiar with particular MFI and their 
administrative system is needed. Fewer or no independent directors on the board is 
suggested for MFIs in Nepal. 
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The study results on the higher percentage of females on board shows less 
outreaching with higher loan size, which does not align with MFIs' social mission 
of reaching to a higher number of needy poor. However, MFIs with a higher 
percentage of females on the governing body may enjoy higher operational self-
sufficiency in Nepal. The mandatory requirement of having female on the board has 
increased token use of a female on the board. MFIs now comply with the regulatory 
requirement (Banking and Financial Institution Act 2006) to have a least one 
woman as a board member. There is no requirement that directors should not be 
relatives of other directors, so it is possible many directors are spouses or another 
form of close relative of another director. The potential for token female directors 
is high and in many respects is little different to the issue of independent directors. 
The addition of women to the Board to satisfy a regulatory requirementis likely to 
have the same impact as other acts of tokenism to appear to support 
diversity. Tokenism theory, stemming from the pioneering work of Kanter (1977)8 
suggests that individuals whose social category is underrepresented in particular 
contexts will face negative experiences such as increased visibility and social 
isolation and this in turn does not contribute positively to performance in the 
organisation. Some MFIs have more than one female director. There are 75% 
boards having more than one female, 22% of boards have a majority of females on 
their board and 85% of board members have the same caste as other directors. The 
same family title or same cast title suggests a family member or relative 
appointment onto boards as the present practice. 
The close monitoring by NRB of the females on board’s education and qualification 
related to the banking and business and more control on the practice of keeping 
close relatives on a board could reduce tokenism. The education and work 
specialization may increase the female performance on a board. The provision of 
training for females on boards may enhance their skill, which result helps MFIs to 
become aligned with their mission and improve MFIs’ performances.   
                                                 
8 Kanter, R. M. (1977). Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and responses 




The study shows the CEO dual role impacts negatively on the MFIs outreach and 
financial performance. This indeed suggests separating the CEO and director role 
in MFIs board of governance may improve the MFIs performance. The present code 
of conduct allows MFIs boards to choose the CEO duality or separate the roles. The 
NRB needs to make it mandatory for the governance board of MFIs to follow up 
the separation role of CEO and director. The excessive power of the CEO in a dual 
role in a geographically difficult country may have given an opportunity to 
manipulate the power for their own benefit. Therefore, separation of CEO dual role 
may reduce the fraud and also may increase the MFIs' performance in Nepal. 
Caste diversification in the governing board shows a decrease in operational self-
sustainability as well as reducing the outreaching. The reduction in the number of 
creditors and inflow of the money as well as increases the amount of loan, and 
diverts the MFIs from their social mission. The NRB mandatory act of having 
minorities on the board is not efficient and effective enough for the MFIs in Nepal 
to achieve their mission. This study suggests having a modification of minorities 
on board mandatory regulation as per the “comply and explain” practice on 
individual MFIs. 
The study result of firm size shows that the MFIs with higher total asset increase 
the outreach as well as being more profitable and operationally self-sufficient. This 
suggests that the NRB should increase the MFIs total assets by increasing 
mandatory requirement of BFIs more than 5% of investment in the rural 
development and increase the NRB and related wholesale institutions' role to 
promote MFIs for donors to raise the supply of funds.  
 Governance factors and MFIs outreach performance 
Different governance factors impact differently at five outreach measures for 
Nepalese MFIs: number of active borrowers, average loan size, depth of loan on 
GNI, number of depositors, and percentage of female borrowers, and four financial 
proxies: return on equity, return on asset, operating self-sufficiency, and debt to 
equity.  
Board size is significantly negatively correlated with the number of active 
borrowers, number of depositors and percentage of female borrowers, and is 
significantly positively correlated with average loan size. It shows no significant 
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relation with the depth of loan. This is likely to mean that MFIs with bigger boards 
have less outreach support (Gohar & Batool, 2015; Kyereboah‐Coleman & Osei, 
2008) findings with larger loans (Mori et al., 2015) in serving the number of clients. 
These findings do not support the findings of Bassem (2009), Hartarska (2005), 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012), Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008), and 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) of higher outreach with a larger board.  
The statistical evidence for independent directors on a board has a significant 
negative relation with the number of active borrowers, loan size and number of 
depositors. This shows that the presence of independent directors on boards 
significantly decreases the number of clients to serve, which does not support the 
findings of Aboagye and Otieku (2010), Bassem (2009), Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Osei (2008(, and Pathan et al. (2007) of increased outreach with the presence of  
independent directors on a board. However, it did not show significant relationships 
with other outreach variables: depth of loan, and percentage of female borrowers. 
It is likely that independent directors do not know the internal mechanism of the 
institutions they serve and their ability to understand the firm’s procedure affects 
capacity to utilize resources. Independent directors’ contribution in policy forming 
is minimal for targeting clients for social mission fulfilment.  
Percentage of females on a board has a negative relationship with number of active 
borrowers and number of depositors and a positive relationship with size of loan. 
Female directors are less focussed on the social mission and poorer clients which 
clarifies that MFIs with higher gender diversity may have lower social mission 
because they serve fewer clients with bigger loans which contradicts findings by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Bassem (2009, Hartarska (2005), Hartarska et al. 
(2014), Mori et al. (2015), Strøm et al. (2014), and Wale (2015) of more clients 
with lower loans. It is likely that women on boards may have less impact on decision 
making and policy forming in Nepalese MFIs because of male domination and 
gendered stereotyping in Nepalese society. However, the study findings partially 
support the findings of Smith et al. (2006), that having educated and experienced 
females on the board may have a greater impact on firm performance in increasing 
the number of credit clients. 
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Duality of the CEO has a significant negative impact on the size of loan but does 
not show a significant relationship with any other outreach dependent variables. 
That duality reduces the loan size supports (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). This may 
explain why the Wai (greeting people by saying Namaste) culture in Nepal has 
greater impact on issuing loans when the CEO has a dual role to play. However, 
this Wai phonemical impact has reduced over a decade because of the political 
changes.  
Caste diversity has a significant negative relationship to the number of active 
borrowers, number of depositors and a positive relationship with loan size and depth 
of loan. This is evidence that Nepalese MFIs do not benefit when their boards are 
highly caste-diversified and not fulfilling their social mission and so deposits are 
reduced. It is likely that traditional religious beliefs in hierarchical society have 
lessened because of the Maoist rebel fighters’ recruitment in its insurgency period, 
which later became a political party and ran the government three times during a 
decade. The long Maoist arms rebellion and rebel involvement with political parties 
has reduced the caste difference at lower levels. This may have helped institutions 
to cross barriers that previously prevented them from serving poorer clients. The 
strong presence of moneylenders in the region may have considerable impact on 
the depth of loans. Moneylender presence and openness to relationship-based loans 
may give borrowers easy access to moneylenders. However, a higher presence of 
independent directors on a board influences bigger loans that may attract credit 
clients to knock on MFIs’ doors. 
Staff productivity has shown a significant positive relation with all four outreach 
variables: number of active borrowers, size of loan, depth of loan, and number of 
depositors. Its statistical relationship shows that the number of borrowers increases 
with small loans to poor clients and increases the number of depositors and staff 
productivity to accompany the social mission, which supports Lafourcade et al. 
(2005). More employees in an MFI may increase outreach to remote rural areas and 
encourage people to become involved with banking services. 
Firm size has a significant positive relationship with the number of active borrowers 
and number of depositors. MFIs’ ability to serve more clients increases when firm 
size increases, supporting Bassem (2009), Gohar and Batool (2015), Mersland and 
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Strøm (2009), and Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) but not supporting Aboagye and 
Otieku, (2010) and Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008). The statistical significant 
relationship with the number of active borrowers and firm size provides evidence 
that MFIs in Nepal may have approached poor clients and increased the number of 
depositors by utilizing their assets. The end of the Maoist insurgency may have 
encouraged MFIs to re-establish their branch offices across the nation, which 
creates an opportunity to get close to customers. 
The maturity of the firm has a significant role to play in serving the social mission 
of outreach. It is positively related with the number of active borrowers and number 
of depositors. It is negatively related with size of loan and female borrowers. 
Nepalese MFIs are serving more clients when they mature which supports Bassem 
(2009), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), and Mersland and Strøm (2009, 2010) but 
does  not support Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei (2008), and Mori et al. (2015). 
Loan size gets smaller with maturity, which supports the findings of Mersland and 
Strøm (2010). This is evidence that the older institutes are more focused on their 
social mission in the Nepalese context but MFIs are becoming flexible in gender-
based service. It is likely that the older firms are more capable of handling a greater 
number of credit clients than newer MFIs. As a result, they may go to rural and 
remote regions to increase their social mission. It is likely that firms with longer-
serving firms gain higher service credibility, which leads to gaining clients’ faith to 
deposit their savings. 
Employees play an important role in MFIs’ outreach. With more employees, MFIs 
can reach rural and difficult geographical regions for their social mission. The 
negative significant relationship with size of loan and positive significance with 
number of depositors provides evidence that the loan size gets lower and deposits 
get bigger with higher numbers of employees. Clients feel more comfortable 
depositing with institutions rather than keeping their money at home or placing it 
with moneylenders. The significant negative relationship of employees with 
average loan size shows that the Nepalese MFIs fulfil their social mission with 
smaller loans when they have higher numbers of employees.  
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 Governance factors and MFIs’ financial performance 
Nepalese MFIs’ financial performance is measured on four financial proxies: return 
on equity, return on assets, operating self-sufficiency, and debt to equity on 
governance factors. Different governance factors affect the financial performance 
proxies differently for MFIs in Nepal. 
Board size is significantly positively related with financial proxies: ROA, ROE, 
OSS and negatively related with DER. This shows that larger boards are able to 
integrate the information sharing that comes from their experiences and knowledge 
for better decision-making. Larger boards are capable of effective monitoring and 
efficient operations to control the operating costs; they generate enough profit and 
increase retained earnings to finance their costs, and they are less dependent on debt. 
Furthermore, Nepalese MFIs with improved profitability and larger boards may 
indicate that MFIs finance their investment through internal funding rather than 
external  (debt) "when MFIs cannot easily access external funding sources" 
(Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015, p. ?). This suggests that larger boards have a positive 
effect on the profitability and sustainability of Nepalese MFIs, which  supports the 
findings of Bassem (2009), Hartarska (2005), and Kyereboah‐Coleman and Osei 
(2008) on OSS and ROA but does not support Eisenberg et al. (1998), Galema et 
al. (2012), Gohar and Batool (2015), Guest (2009), and Vishwakarma (2015) on 
profitability and Hartarska (2005) on sustainability. The finding that smaller boards 
in Nepalese MFIs increase leverage is in line with Ness et al. (2010). 
Independent directors on a board is significantly negatively correlated with 
financial proxies ROA, OSS and DER, but insignificantly negatively related to 
ROE. The insignificant negative relation explains no impact of independent director 
on the MFIs operating performance supporting Bermig and Frick's (2007) finding 
on ROE. The positive significance at lower quantile q=15 on DER shows that MFIs 
may convince the external funder to support them by increasing independent 
directors on board. However, the negative correlation explains that more 
independent directors on the board may lower Nepalese MFIs’ profitability and 
sustainability, not support the findings of Bassem (2009), and Kyereboah‐Coleman 
and Osei (2008) on ROA, OSS and Pathan et al. (2007), Paul et al. (2011), Rashid 
(2011), and Vishwakarma (2015) on  ROA, ROE but increases leverage. However, 
the finding is in line with Thrikawala (2016) on OSS for MFIs in Sri Lanka. Thus, 
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it can be explained in a Nepalese context that independent directors are not 
monitoring well, or they have poor qualifications and less expertise knowledge, 
which does not help Nepalese MFIs to benefit. Further, independent directors’ 
appointments in MFIs in Nepal may depend on their relationship with inside 
directors, which supports Higgs's (2003) findings that most non-executive directors 
are recruited on personal contacts rather than through formal interviews. Thus, the 
idea is not supported, that having independent directors gives superior benefits to 
the firm by avoiding conflict of interest and evaluating executive leaders more 
objectively (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005). Jensen (1993) mentions that many 
independent directors on boards reduces CEO influence. Independent directors 
have less knowledge about the operation and management policies; they take more 
time to understand the workings of the firm, and are more of a token appointment. 
Therefore, MFIs would benefit by having fewer or no independent directors on their 
boards in Nepal. 
Percentage of females on board is significantly positively correlated with OSS but 
insignificantly positively related with ROA, and insignificantly negatively related 
with ROE and DER. This indicates that females do not have an important role to 
play in operational activity to improve MFI profitability and external fund inflow. 
However, an increase in female presence on boards in Nepal shows MFIs’ self-
sufficiency is enhanced, not supporting Thrikawala (2016), and Wellalage and 
Locke (2013) for MFIs and publically listed companies in Sri Lanka. It is probable 
that the female directors are likely to be involved in indoor work and monitoring 
activities in MFIs in Nepal.  
The duality role of CEO is significantly negatively correlated with ROE, DER, OSS 
and insignificantly negatively related with ROA. It supports Gohar and Batool 
(2015) on OSS and ROA measurement. It indicates that the CEO in a dual role has 
poor control of the operational activities to generate enough profit to be self-
sufficient. It is likely that the dual role gives the CEO more power to take personal 
benefits e.g., greatly increasing his/her salary, or buying better offices and 
equipment, which increases the operational costs and reduces the MFIs’ 
profitability. This makes the institution less self-sufficient and more reliant on 
donation funding to cover operational costs, which stimulates the equity on debt. 
Thus, CEO and chairperson wearing one hat is not a good governance phenomenon, 
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indicating the duality role does not work for MFIs in Nepal. It supports Faleye 
(2007), Gohar and Batool (2015), and Vishwakarma (2015) findings that  “one hat 
does not fit all” and the finding suggests that the separation works well with some 
and duality works well with others. It is not a universal standard (Faleye, 2007). 
Caste diversity shows a negative significant relation with OSS only and no 
significant relation with other financial dependent variables: ROA, ROE, and DER. 
This shows that MFIs are more self-sufficient with less caste-diversified boards in 
Nepal. Different caste representation on a board may create information asymmetry 
and distortion in communication processes, which results in poor decision-making. 
More minority directors on a board may easily expose the board to a political 
situation that makes the board politically volatile. 
Staff productivity shows a positive significant relation with OSS and a negative 
significant relation with ROE. It indicates that MFIs are more self-sufficient with 
improvements in staff productivity. Higher staff productivity reduces operating 
expenses and therefore improves profitability. However, returns to the owner on 
their equity may suffer with staff productivity improvements because of less 
technology being used in their operations. Advances in technology may have forced 
owners to invest more in computers and related technology for better operations 
and could be one of many reasons for having a negative relation with ROE and staff 
productivity. Staff may need more technical training to use the modern technology, 
which increases the cost on equity.  
Firm size and total assets are significantly positively correlated with OSS and ROE. 
This indicates that larger MFIs are more self-sufficient and provide higher returns 
to owners in Nepal. This is likely to be because MFIs with larger assets may have 
better reputations, and are able to manage their risks to improve the operating 
profitability in line with Hewa-Wellalage (2012) on ROE in MFIs in Sri Lanka and 
Bassem (2009), Gohar and Batool (2015), Mersland and Strøm (2009), and 
Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) on OSS. The finding supports Bogan (2012), Gohar 
and Batool (2015), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), and Tchakoute Tchuigoua 
(2015) that better financial performance can be achieved with bigger firm size. 
Larger firms are able to attract qualified personnel, diversify their products and 
design their optimal capital structure to increase owners’ return in Nepal. 
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The maturity of the firm, age, is significantly negatively correlated with ROA, ROE 
and OSS but is positively significantly correlated with DER. This explains that 
mature firms are less profitable and they are not self-sufficient, in line with 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) on OSS and the findings support Kyereboah‐Coleman 
and Osei (2008) on ROA. The finding supports Abate, Borzaga, and Getnet (2013) 
but does not support Bassem (2009), and Nurmakhanova et al. (2015) on ROA and 
OSS. However, mature firms are able to receive more debt than smaller firms. It is 
likely that MFIs serving longer in the financial market may have created better 
reputations to earn support from external fund suppliers. There is a possibility that 
during the data period, with the Maoist insurgency and political instability, the 
worsening economy may have made managers less efficient in utilizing their assets 
to create profit and value to owners and had to depend on external funding.  
Personnel, that is, number of employees, is statistically significantly negatively 
related with ROE, and positively significantly related with DER. It is insignificantly 
negatively related with OSS. This explains that profitability and OSS are reduced 




8 Chapter eight – Conclusion 
8.1 Conclusion 
 The empirical analysis results demonstrate that different governance factors impact 
differently on five outreach measures for Nepalese MFIs: number of active 
borrowers, average loan size, depth of loan on GNI, number of depositors, and 
percentage of female borrowers; and four financial measures: return on asset, return 
on equity, debt to equity ratio and operational self- sufficiency.  
There are a few governance variables that influence both MFI outreach and 
financial performance. The regression results show positive and negative 
correlations between outreach, financial proxies and governance factors. The 
positive and negative coefficients align with findings in prior research, albeit in 
other settings.  
The key findings are discussed in the following sections.  
Board size is negatively correlated with the number of active borrowers, number of 
depositors and percentage of female borrowers and positively correlated with 
average loan size. MFIs with larger boards have less outreach offering larger loans 
to credit clients. Nepalese MFIs’ financial performance, measured by ROA, ROE 
and operational self-sufficiency, improve with a larger board, and a smaller board 
size increases leverage.  
Independent directors have a significant negative relationship with the number of 
active borrowers, loan size, number of depositors, return on asset, operational self-
sufficiency and debt to equity ratio. The presence of independent directors on a 
board significantly decreases the number of clients. This leads to an inference that 
more independent directors on boards may lower Nepalese MFIs’ profitability and 
sustainability. It also suggests MFIs will benefit by having fewer or no independent 
directors on their boards in Nepal. 
Percentage of females on a board has a significant negative relationship with the 
number of active borrowers and number of depositors and a positive relationship 
with the size of loan. MFIs with higher gender diversity may achieve lower social 
mission by serving fewer clients with bigger loans. It may be that institutions need 
to provide skill-based training and increase female involvement in the decision-
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making process to improve their leadership skills. In a stereotypical, male-
dominated society such as Nepal, females are expected to focus on domestic chores 
and that creates obstacles for women to become involved in the outside world of 
business. Thus, MFIs should give responsibility to women and monitor them to 
enhance their capability. The percentage of females on boards is significantly 
positively correlated with operational self-sufficiency, suggesting MFIs’ self-
sufficiency is enhanced with increased female presence on boards in Nepal. 
CEO duality is significantly negatively correlated with loan size, return on equity, 
operational self-sufficiency, and debt to equity ratio, suggesting one hat is not a 
good governance phenomenon for MFIs in Nepal. This may be explained by the 
Wai culture in Nepal having greater impact on issuing loans when the CEO is also 
board chairman.  
Nepalese MFIs do not benefit when a board is highly caste diversified, as they fail 
to fulfil their social mission and attract fewer deposits. Instead, boards target their 
rich clients with larger loans, diverting institutions from their social mission. A 
negative statistically significant correlation between caste diversity on boards and 
operational self-sufficiency suggests it is not favourable for Nepalese MFIs’ 
financial performance. 
With improved staff productivity, the number of borrowers increases with small 
loans to poor clients and increases the number of depositors to accomplish MFIs’ 
social mission. MFIs’ ability to serve more clients increases when the firm's staff 
productivity increases. Increased staff productivity reduces the operational 
expenses and increases operational self-sufficiency and institutional profitability. 
MFIs with a greater number of personnel increase their outreach through smaller 
size loans, greater proportion of depositors, which contribute to lower profitability 
counterbalanced by increases in external funding. MFIs with more staff are found 
to have a greater presence in remote rural regions, having poor infrastructure. 
The statistically significant positive correlations between firm size, total assets, 
number of active borrowers, return on equity and operational self-sufficiency 
provide support for the view that MFIs, by approaching poor prospective clients, 
can progress their social missions. Larger sized MFIs are more self-sufficient, 
achieving higher returns to the owners. 
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As they mature, Nepalese MFIs serve more clients and their loans are more likely 
to be smaller. This is evidence that mature MFIs are more focused on their social 
mission and are flexible about choosing male and female clients.  
The MFIs serve their social mission with smaller loans when they have higher 
numbers of employees.  
The absence of a well-developed formal financial institution sector beyond urban 
areas means that monopoly power is invested in moneylenders on whom the rural 
people depend for their cash needs. MFIs can do more to promote the goal of a 
widespread formal financial sector as an integral component of the local socio-
economic situation. They can promote income-generating activities and self-
employment activities. 
Cumbersome processes for completing loan applications are a step too far for 
financially illiterate poor. The supporting documents, recommendations and need 
for guarantors heightens this disparity of access to services for rural and urban 
clients. Getting credit services from BFIs is formal and requires substantial 
paperwork, which also includes a collateral valuation that is expensive for both 
parties. This makes people unwilling to go to MFIs. The discouragement of a longer 
timeline for loan issuance, higher paperwork requirements and collateral demanded 
makes people more inclined to take up informal borrowing (World Bank, 2006). 
With an MFI’s help, rural poor can change their lives by investing in income-
generating businesses. They may start with buying a female goat, and reproduction 
will help them to generate more cash. Poultry farming, ducks, chickens or geese, 
provide a source of protein to families and produce extra for sale. The manure from 
the poultry farm can be used as compost, and may also be sold for cash.   
Development of investment lending in rural communities will stimulate a trickle-
down effect through paid day-labour if this requirement is incorporated in credit 
arrangements. Aghion and Bolton (1997) find that the trickle-down mechanism can 
lead to a unique steady-state redistribution improving the production efficiency of 
the economy. Applying this trickle down mechanism in Nepal can lead to the 
success of economic growth and practice of lending and broadened saving.  In 
Nepal, those who have more wealth and are more capable of managing resources 
will be creating jobs through their investment and producing more business. This 
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encourages people to work more to earn more. This process leads to local economic 
growth and wealth creation that benefits everyone, not just those who invest. These 
all have a positive impact on the demand and supply sides of an economy.  
MFIs measure the field staff’s performance using percentage of repayment of the 
loan and default. This encourages the field staff to favour giving loans to people 
that they believe can repay the loan and have no default risk. This excludes the 
ultra-poor and unskilled rural people from benefitting from MFI services. MFIs’ 
policies allow the rural people themselves to form groups and members are 
responsible for the loan repayments, which again creates the likelihood of excluding 
ultra-poor. Poverty levels of the group members define the confidence to repay 
loans. Thus, in a situation of group members and field staff, combined with 
confidence of one’s loan repayment on time, the poorest people will most likely be 
excluded. 
The poorest rural people own no land, have no regular income sources, collateral 
or financial literacy. The tyranny of remoteness is an obstacle too large to address 
through an immediate policy change. Small incremental steps are more likely to be 
successful. 
Nepal, through recognizing short-term migratory labour as an economic and social 
cohesion issue, can promote the alternative model of an enhanced quality of life for 
rural poor through the provision of connecting sources of cash, viz. microfinance. 
This requires no additional organization or large-scale bureaucratic injection of 
resources. Rather, it requires MFIs to say collectively that they will move to address 
the problem of rural poor in selected regions. There will be establishment costs as 
there are no offices or personnel in the remote regions.  
MFIs, in the modern sense, emerged with a mission of providing low interest loans 
to the poorest of the poor. They were, and are, a key component of financial 
inclusion. However, when financial performance becomes the key consideration 
above outreach, then managing risk gains greater sway. There tends to be a safety- 
first goal in lending and this almost inevitably results in an urban drift. In addition, 
if MFI staff receive bonuses for achieving lending targets, then this sends a clear 
signal, encouraging staff to maximize safe lending rather than promoting outreach 
to the poor.  
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There is a lack of goal congruence for the Nepalese Government, Central Bank, and 
MFI boards and management. Regulation and directives generate adverse selection 
outcomes and the way forward requires an incentivizing of MFI activities in rural 
communities, which is largely fiscally neutral and has minimal monitoring costs. 
Rapid changes in information technology and uses of smartphones encourages 
MFIs to broaden their pioneering services. MFIs can link with more rural poor, 
encouraging more economically active communities by utilising technology-based 
solutions, such as mobile phone and internet banking, payment cards, and electronic 
money. The use of new technology may reduce operating costs and increase their 
outreach to the difficult geographical regions. However, the rollout of mobile and 
wireless into remote regions is not rapid. A trickle-down effect could be helpful and 
may start to build some confidence among Nepal’s poor population that MFIs can 
be trusted and they can be working partners, because they encourage increased 
employment through the MFIs’ financial services activities and income generation 
opportunities. 
The village committee team, which is the hallmark of rural lending by sub-Saharan 
African MFIs, has potential at village level in Nepal. Where there is an informal 
financial sector operating, e.g., a moneylender, then it may be possible to license 
them to be an MFI representative. It would be a first step toward more financial 
formality and, more importantly, open a low-cost funding channel to the village 
poor. Structuring the remuneration to achieve goal congruence between loan shark 
and MFI may prove interesting but it is unlikely to be insurmountable. For the 
moneylender, a move to cooperation rather than regulatory interference is 
preferable. 
An adaption of the adage “money makes the world go round” for rural Nepal could 
be “a lack of money makes the people go around”. 
8.2 Implications of the study  
 The study findings have practical implications for MFIs in Nepal. NRB is 
authorized to do the licensing, regulating and supervising of the BFIs under the act 
of NRB 2002. The Bank and Financial Institutions Act 2006 (BAFIA) empowers 
NRB which broadly guides and issues necessary directives for Nepalese financial 
system. This study shows the mandatory governance mechanism has a negative 
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impact on the MFIs outreach and financial performances in Nepal. Changes to the 
regulatory framework are likely to improve MFI performance. The governance 
structure needs to be tailored in a way to enhance the MFIs' capacity to utilize their 
resources at maximum to promote their performance. Some mandatory part of 
governance is used as a token to fit with the NRB regulation whereas it should be 
complying with the institutions’ nature and their performance improvement. The 
NRB code of conduct for MFIs should allow the MFIs to construct the board 
combination that fits with the firm at regional level to increase the MFIs outreach 
as well as financially sustain themselves. 
The governance practice is still immature and new to the MFIs in Nepal. Regulatory 
practice needs more awareness, support, and encouragement. MFIs need to adopt 
policies to increase their performance. This may be enhanced by collaborative 
arrangements with the NRB and wholesale institutions to inform MFIs about the 
benefits of having a good governance system, and provide training for it. The good 
governance practice and capacity building of MFIs in Nepal may increase donors 
and investors faith in the viability of MFIs and their services. The funders, donors 
and investors, supervise the good governance practices in MFIs when injecting 
funds. MFIs by the nature of their business need the funding for the continuation of 
their service. The appropriate funding is a hurdle for MFIs. MFIs have more limited 
access to fund suppliers and investors than other institutions such as commercial 
banks. The governance of MFIs influences funders and financial investors.  
NRB is taking steps towards regulating providential requirement with minimum 
deposit amount of 4% of core capital and 8% of capital fund for MFIs. Additionally, 
a 4% statutory liquidity ratio that includes government securities, cash reserve ratio, 
deposit kept at a class ‘A’ bank and other banks is to be deposited in NRB or class 
‘A’ bank in current/call accounts when MFIs accept deposits from the public. The 
licencing regulation for MFIs’ paid up capital requirements varies from NRs 
10million for 1-3 districts level, NRs 2million for 4-10 districts level, NRs 6million 
for regional level and NRs 100million for country level services.  
A MFI has to start its service within the six months of licensing. To extend service 
into an additional districts the MFI has to increase paid up capital by NRs 2.5 
million for each additional district (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2016a). MFIs seeking a 
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license for extending service to an additional district, regional or national level may 
only do so after three years of successful service in the previously licensed region. 
NRB requires notification within seven days of a board decision to increase 
branches in a licensed region. MFIs need to keep records of clients electronically 
as well as paper based for five years after closing the account. The NRB requires a 
minimum of 51% of investment from the MFIs’ promoters. MFIs need to declare 
their interest rates publically and notify the NRB within seven days of every 
quarterly financial statement. These are good practices to regulate the MFIs in 
Nepal to minimize the corruption and fraud and promote public trust in the 
institutions.   
NRB and other promoting institutions’ role becomes essential in creating 
confidence in the system. The transparency, fairness and proper treatment of the 
institutions may encourage MFIs to believe in the regulatory person and be 
accountable for their responsibility taken to provide the services. The volatile and 
unstable political situation creates an unfavourable situation and loopholes in rules 
may give chances of having poor governance system. The educational programme 
for the board of directors in incorporating international best practices such as 
transparency, disclosure, conflict of interest and compliance, among others may 
enhance the good governance practices. The awareness of good governance 
practices and their benefits to the intuitional mission should be promoted by NRB 
and other promoting institutes. 
The NRB regulates Class ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ to follow no more than 25% of 
shareholding by a single family/single person/ single firm/single institution/single 
group’s company but excludes the Class ‘D’ bank from this regulation. There is 
need of rethink of MFIs’ regulators and practitioner on the increasing trend of 
banking sectors involvement in for-profit private MFIs, need for use of new 
technology and hiring highly qualified professionals for institution as well as 
industry development. The formulation of new regulation and supervision of MFIs 
may need to have the balance of financial sustainability and outreach.  
MFIs have not yet reached all districts in Nepal. Their outreaching hands in rural 
areas are still minimal because of geographical, transportation and other difficulties 
in Nepal. It is an expensive and lengthy process for MFIs to establish in rural areas. 
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The possibility of joining hands with formal and informal institutions in rural areas 
to increase the financial inclusiveness should be considered in further research. 
8.3 Academic contribution of thesis 
There are studies done on MFIs all over the world. Even though there are studies 
on corporate governance and MFI outreach and their financial performance 
available, the research is still inefficient and in its infancy. This study, by its 
significant results, contributes to the understanding of corporate governance and its 
relationship with the MFIs’ outreach and financial performance to the literature. 
The findings of this study suggest that not all mechanisms that have worked in other 
regions will work in Nepal. Thus, Nepalese MFIs need to show caution when 
implementing internal governance mechanisms if they are to improve their financial 
and outreach performance. 
Firstly, this study on corporate governance and MFI outreach and financial 
performance is the first for Nepal. The wider range of governance variables and 
measuring dependent variables of outreach and financial performance in Nepalese 
MFIs will enhance the understanding of the how different corporate governance 
variables influence the MFIs’ outreach and financial performances. As the first 
study of MFIs in Nepal, this work breaks new ground and has noted how difficult 
this type of research is in LIC.  
Secondly, it creates a well-tested and robust data set. The study of 10 years’ panel 
data provides a clear understanding of the impact of governance practice on MFI 
outreach and financial performance in Nepal.  
Third, through the careful diagnostic testing suggests an appropriate robust model 
of analysis. This study uses quantile regression for a cross-sectional check of MFI 
performance. The degree of governance relationships is explained on the sign of the 
coefficients to measure the outreach and financial performance. There is little 
research that uses quantile regression on not-for-profit firms; some have used it for 
for-profit firms. This is another contribution of the methodology used in measuring 
MFI performance to academic literature.  
Fourth, it provides clear guidance as to how key governance variables affect 
financial and outreach performance. The performance assessment of Nepalese 
232 
 
MFIs may assist external fund suppliers, donors, creditors and investors to 
categorize MFIs on their social mission achievement and financial performance. 
Fifth, it indicates how greater understanding of key variables can form the 
regulatory framework. This study may help the central bank of Nepal (NRB) with 
policy forming and their necessary modification in ‘Directives of Nepalese MFIs’ 
to improve MFI performance for social mission accomplishment with improved 
governance practices.  
Sixth, it extends the thinking to how this new knowledge may be extended to further 
research. Scholars and researchers have done the research on the governance factors 
and MFI outreach and financial performance in different regions other than South 
Asia. The research on the right mechanism of governance that will have greater 
impact on MFI performance is still to be uncovered in South Asia. However, that is 
changing with scholars now taking increased interest in MFI performance and 
corporate governance in South Asia. This study contributes to the literature for 
governance mechanisms that have greater impact on MFI outreach and financial 
performance in Nepal. 
8.4 Limitations of the study and further research 
The main limitation for the study stems from the availability of data. A longer time 
period may have proved advantageous but data are not available. As there is 
inadequate time series variability in the data to allow for panel regression analysis, 
the length of the period may not have been a significant problem. Sourcing data is 
difficult with some institutions because they report neither on their websites nor in 
other mediums such as hardcopy annual reports.  
The board of directors’ information is only available for some institutions for recent 
years. The study needs board information for 10 or more years for analysis. Most 
institutions have no online domain. Observable board of directors’ information was 
taken for the study. The board of directors’ information is collected from the 
accounting statements due to the lack of corporate governance data. 
The Mix Market, NRB, and RMDC are good sources of data. They have provided 
most of the institutional financial, outreach, and financial market data. The Mix 
Market provides the set of accounting information for MFIs in Nepal. However, it 
is still difficult to get recent information on all MFIs. There are variables that 
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needed to be dropped because of insufficient data. The study has taken all the 
regulated MFIs into consideration and their accounting data has been checked by 
an external auditor as per the local government regulations. This study may have 
not considered all approaches to strategic decisions and decision-making processes. 
This study recommends a number of topics for future research that can be beneficial 
for LIC. More comprehensive data availability on boards of directors may enhance 
the ability of researchers and findings of the study, which has been left for further 
study. The most recent data after the study period, 2012, on MFIs may confirm 
analysis results and support the generalization of this study. Some other future 
research can be done to generalize the governance and MFIs’ performance.  
Firstly, the analysis model and findings of this study give a generalization to test 
the model and applicability in other LICs, for example; Bangladesh, Niger, or 
Malawi. This will further extend the research for LIC. The analysis model of this 
study could work for which country and what are other factors that can be used as 
a standard form.  
Secondly, the research on the institutional reforms may highlight the benefits of 
doing it. The findings of this study suggest reformation in the regulation and 
governance structure for the institutional betterment. It will be helpful for other LIC 
to take this as a case to analyse in their perspectives. There are MFIs that work in 
rural areas with the weak infrastructure that leads on the high operating cost. The 
remoteness of place and smaller number of operational volume leads to the less 
outreach to the poor. MFIs are more focused on their principle based approach to 
accomplish their social mission. A set of rules to follow to regulate the MFIs 
devised by regulators who believe that institutions performance may improve 
would be beneficial. However, a set of rules which may or may not work needs to 
be tested and it is seen to be in conflict with the institutional principle-based 
approach. It can be argued whether more formal regulation for MFIs’ gives better 
results than a principle-based approach. Thus, the future research may consider this: 
“Is a formal regulatory framework with rules likely to be better than principle-based 
approach?” 
Thirdly, it obvious to see the corruption, favours and unfair treatment in the LIC. 
The regulators are biased on applying the rules to regulate the firms. Rules are often 
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not enforced with corruption present in LIC. The donor and investor are concerned 
over MFIs’ better performance for their continuation support. The donor and 
investor perspectives are different from those of the government of LIC. The tussle 
of their different perspectives creates the uncertainty of MFIs services. The 
government role in creating a favourable investment environment is essential so 
that it may increase the donors and investors' willingness to support the MFIs’ social 
mission. It is better suggested to have the future research on “In what ways can 
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